323. But virtue, though single in its essence, is manifold in its applications; though it can only be possessed as a whole, it is attained by stages. By this amplification of the Stoic doctrine the way is prepared for that adaptation of ethical doctrine to varieties of circumstance which will be the special subject of our next chapter. By the side of virtue stand ‘the virtues,’ sometimes conceived as virtue herself endowed with various qualities[143], more often as virtue at work in different spheres of action. In this way virtue assumes in turn the shape of each one of the four virtues as commonly understood, namely Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness[144]; we may, if we please, reckon with a smaller or greater number[145]; yet we must always remember that the virtues are so knit together, that he who truly possesses one, possesses all[146]. Virtue again is displayed in single acts, each of which (whatever its sphere) is a ‘right action’ (κατόρθωμα, recte factum)[147]. In proportion as virtue is displayed in its various qualities and spheres, and in successive right actions, it gains itself a larger field; it cannot be said to increase, but it is in a way spread out and broadened[148].
How virtue is won.
324. Virtue, as it is displayed in individual men, has also a history. This follows clearly from Stoic principles, since virtue is an aspect of reason, and children are not possessed of reason[149]. Virtue therefore comes by training, not by birth[150]; by art, not by nature[151]. In the period that precedes the attainment of virtue, there exist states of the soul which are the semblances and the forerunners of virtue; and he who is on his way towards wisdom, and whom we call ‘the probationer’ (προκόπτων, proficiens[152]), by learning and practice comes daily nearer to his goal, till in the crowning moment he wins it as a whole; for virtue is no sum of lesser dispositions reached by a gradual addition of item to item, but a thing complete in itself[153]. Can virtue thus won be lost at a later time? Virtue, it may seem, is not really such, unless it is indestructible; and the Cynics and the earlier Stoics taught accordingly that virtue cannot be lost[154], that it is a ‘possession for ever.’ In this point, as in so many others, Chrysippus yielded to criticism, and admitted that virtue might be lost through intoxication or indigestion[155], to which causes might well be added the failure of the reason through insanity or old age[156]. But in spite of these difficulties the general feeling of the Stoic school held firmly to the doctrine that virtue once acquired is acquired for ever[157].
Wise men.
325. Virtue and vice are not mere theories of the philosopher; they exist and can be studied in human shape, in the wise and foolish men of myth, history, and society. The lesson of virtue in particular can best be learnt by considering virtuous men[158]. Here the Stoics followed closely the teaching of their predecessors the Cynics[159]. As the best of models they accepted Hercules, the man rightly deemed a god[160], who travelled over all the world, purging it of every lawlessness, and bringing with him justice, holiness, and peace[161]. Next comes Ulysses, who like Hercules was untiring in his labours, triumphant over pain, and a conqueror throughout all the world[162]; an example to all men of endurance and vigour[163]. To barbarians Cyrus, king of Persia, was a like example to prove that suffering is a good[164]. Many such are counted amongst the philosophers; first Heraclitus, not for his insight into nature, but for his control over his passions[165]; then Socrates, who in life and death was equally a model as a man and as a citizen[166]. Diogenes the Cynic is worthy of special honour, for he was so filled with love for mankind and obedience to God, that he willingly undertook a life of labour and bodily suffering, and thus won himself the true freedom[167], and became truly happy, truly divine[168]. Zeno the most temperate of philosophers[169], and Cleanthes[170] the most enduring, were men of like type within the Stoic school itself.
Wise Romans.
326. To the list of wise men recognised by the Greeks the Romans were proud to add other names from their own history, thereby associating their philosophic principles with patriotic pride. From their mythology Aeneas was selected, the man who crushes his desires that he may loyally cooperate with the destiny of his people; from the times of the republic Scipio Africanus minor and his gentle companion Laelius[171]; whilst in Publius Rutilius Rufus a Roman could be found who, like Socrates, would not when on his trial consent to any other defence than a plain statement of the facts, in which he neither exaggerated his own merits nor made any plea for mercy[172]. But amongst all Romans Cato of Utica was pre-eminent[173]. If Cicero, as a contemporary and a colleague in political life, was little liable to illusions as to his character and success, his testimony to Cato’s sincerity is all the more valuable[174]; nor can we believe that Cato’s voluntary death would so soon and so greatly have stirred Roman feeling, had it not come as the climax of a life worthily spent[175]. The period of the principate brought to the front both men and women whose fearless lives and quiet self-approved deaths proved them to be worthy successors to the heroes of the past; and at the same time we notice a disposition to find some at least of the elements of the heroic character in simple uneducated folk, as in the soldier, the athlete, and the gladiator, so that these too serve in their degree as models for those that seek wisdom[176].
Wise men are few.
327. The founders of Stoicism never doubted that wise men had existed and did exist; they looked forward to a time not far distant when there should be a Cosmopolis in which every citizen should be wise. This robust belief was not maintained by their successors. According to Chrysippus, only one or two wise men have ever existed[177]; and he expressly denies that he himself or any of his acquaintance are amongst the number[178]. The Stoics of the transition period avoided the topic as troublesome[179]; and their opponents naturally pressed it on them all the more. Zeno had said ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods: it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore the gods exist.’ This was now parodied: ‘It is reasonable to honour wise men: it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore wise men exist.’ If this argument was unsatisfactory, as we are told[180], to the Stoics, because they had not yet discovered their wise man anywhere, we are not surprised to find that sometimes they refer him to the golden age[181], at other times convert him into an ideal[182]. The Stoics under the Roman principate re-affirmed vigorously the existence of the wise man[183]. Seneca however admits that his appearance is as rare as that of the phoenix[184], and altogether disclaims any such character for himself individually[185]. Epictetus is far more true to the spirit of the old doctrine, when he not only abstains from any morbid depreciation of his own character, but also urges his pupils never to give up the hope of reaching perfection[186].