CHAPTER XIII.
DAILY DUTIES.
From principles to practice.
330. As in our study of the Stoic philosophy we turn aside from the supreme problems of the universe, such as gather round the questions of the divine purpose, the existence of evil, and unfettered choice, our way becomes easier. Our new problems, dealing with the constitution of the human soul, and the ideals of human life in the state and in the individual, are perhaps not simpler in themselves, but they are of narrower range, and in finding our way over the first rough ground we learn to tread with some assurance, so that we now feel ourselves, as it were, on a downward path. For all that, the problems of the universal law and the perfect man must still be compared to mountain tops, if not to the highest peaks of all. But from this point on we steadily descend towards the plains, to that common and practical life by which the worth of philosophy is tested. We no longer gaze on the same bright sunlight or breathe the same invigorating air; philosophy enters a region of mists and shadows, and even learns to adapt her language to new neighbours. But her meaning is the same as before, and the pathway to the heights is not closed behind her.
The daily round.
331. The region we have now reached is that of ‘daily duties,’ by which phrase we propose to translate here the Greek καθήκοντα and the Latin officia[1]. This word is defined by Zeno as meaning ‘that which it comes in one’s way to do[2],’ and its quiet sound at once brings it into contrast with the proud claims of Virtue. The contrast is in fact great. Virtue, displaying itself in Right Action, is only possible for reasoning beings, that is, for gods and men; and within our view it is only attained, if at all, by the wise man. But daily duty is common to the wise and the unwise[3]; it not only extends to children, but also to the unreasoning animals[4] and to plants[5]. Virtue always contemplates the Universal law; for daily duty it is sufficient to follow the individual nature[6]. Virtue cannot even be understood except by the trained philosopher, whilst the principles of daily duty may be explained to the simple. To use a comparison from mathematics, daily duty is the projection of virtue upon the plane of ordinary life. Between the two there always remains an assured correspondence. Each Right Action which Virtue achieves is at the same time the performance of a daily duty, and that in the most complete manner[7]; each daily duty performed by the unwise is a step by which he may in the end climb to Wisdom[8].
First laws of nature.
332. The subject of ‘daily duties’ was treated both by Zeno[9] and by Cleanthes[10], and is implied in the theory of Stoic ethics as a whole; it has also a special relation to the doctrine of advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless the Stoics do not directly say that daily duty consists in the seeking of advantages, but that it is based upon primary ends which nature sets up (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, principia naturae)[11]. This phrase indicates the source of this part of the Stoic philosophy; it marks teaching common to the Peripatetic school and the Academy, and accepted by Zeno from his teacher Polemo[12]. We are not informed how Zeno and Cleanthes elaborated this subject; and when we find it taken up in earnest, the spirit of the Academy is firmly established. Thus the Stoic demand for certain knowledge is here set aside; and we are told that the standard of daily duty is ‘that which when done can reasonably be defended[13]’; which definition closely corresponds with the definition of the supreme good by Diogenes of Babylon ‘to take a reasonable course in the choice of things according to nature[14].’ Thus strong will and assured conviction are no longer required; the door is thrown open for convention, opportunism, and respectability. The daring moral theories and bold paradoxes of the founders of Stoicism tend to disappear from sight, and are replaced by shrewd good sense and worldly wisdom: in short, by the doctrine of ‘making the best of both worlds.’ The subject was therefore congenial to Panaetius, who was both a practical statesman and an admirer of Plato and Aristotle; and it was from this standpoint that Stoicism so rapidly won its way with the Roman nobility of the last century of the republic. Panaetius’ book περὶ καθηκόντων was the basis of Cicero’s work de Officiis, which is the only systematic treatise which we possess on Stoic ethics, and therefore generally the most convenient source of information. As however this work leans very strongly towards Peripatetic views, it will frequently be necessary to refer to other authorities, amongst which Cicero’s de Finibus best represents the older Stoics, and Seneca and Epictetus the Stoics of the Roman principate.
From the animals to man.
333. It is no departure from the fundamental principles of Stoicism when we learn that the ‘first lessons of nature’ are those which are imprinted upon every animal at its birth[15]; Zeno himself had sought for the natural law of marriage by a like method[16]. The first natural lesson is that each animal seeks, not indeed pleasure as the Epicureans hold, but its own preservation and the maintenance of its life in its completeness[17]. At a later stage is imparted the desire of sexual union for procreation’s sake, and with it some kind of affection for each one’s offspring[18]. But nature’s best lessons are reserved for man; as to look into the future, and regard life as a whole[19]; to interest himself in his fellows, to attend public festivities, and to procure the amenities of a civilized life for himself and those dependent upon him[20]; in spare hours, to acquire information on points of historical or philosophical interest[21]; in riper life to claim freedom, and to refuse to submit to any arbitrary commands[22]; and finally, to perceive in all things harmony and beauty, and to avoid any disturbance of it by wilful action[23]. ‘Such,’ says Cicero, ‘is the picture of a beautiful life; and could we see it with our eyes (as Plato says), great would be our desire to possess Wisdom for a bride[24].’