Wavering as to the standard.
334. In this general sketch we miss a clear ethical standard. The first lessons of nature may easily be perverted, so far as they are common to men and animals, for they point towards the acts of eating, drinking, and sexual union, all of which are associated by the ordinary man with pleasure in a vicious sense. Hence arises a danger (from which many Stoics do not keep clear), that we may fall into the terrible error of the Epicureans, and hold that pleasure itself is a first law of nature[25]. It is therefore necessary to lay it down that man should aim specially at those results which are characteristic of human nature, that is at the development of powers which he does not share with the lower animals. So far the Academy and the Porch might travel together. But the only, higher capacities recognised by the Stoics are reason and the political sense, which is an aspect of the universal reason; such matters as antiquarian interests and the appreciation of beauty could only be introduced under Academic influence. The last, however, as we shall see, is to become with Panaetius the predominant consideration[26].
The four virtues.
335. From the enunciation of general principles we pass on to the separate virtues. Virtue in the strict sense can only be possessed by the wise man; he therefore alone can practise the virtues; nevertheless we may use this and like terms in a secondary sense to describe those adumbrations or reflections of virtue which fall within the reach of the ordinary man[27]. The classification of the virtues varies. Panaetius divided virtue into two parts, theoretical and practical, and Seneca follows him on this point[28]. It was perhaps Chrysippus who distinguished between virtues that are ‘arts’ (τέχναι) and which are based on theoretical principles, and those which are ‘acquirements’ (δυνάμεις), being attained by practice[29]. But generally speaking the division of Virtue into the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness is accepted as sufficient; by subdivision the number of virtues may be increased to any extent; and in scholastic classifications of virtue we find lists which have multiplicity for their direct aim[30].
Wisdom.
336. Wisdom (φρόνησις, prudentia) is considered by Zeno not only as the first of the virtues, but as the foundation of all; so that Courage is wisdom in suffering, Justice is wisdom in distribution, and Soberness is wisdom in enjoyment[31]. His successors treated Science (ἐπιστήμη, scientia) as the parent virtue[32], thus placing Wisdom side by side with the other cardinal virtues, yet losing the point of Zeno’s genealogy. The writers of the later periods desired to recognise separately contemplative wisdom, and therefore introduced as a subdivision of the first cardinal virtue ‘Speculation’ (σοφία, sapientia)[33]. But the Stoics generally held that all wisdom must justify itself by practical results. The study of the so-called ‘liberal arts’ has a value for children, for it prepares the way for virtuous training[34]. Logic is needed to protect us against fallacious reasoning[35], and physics that we may rightly understand the universe and its providential government, upon which the conception of duty depends[36]; in this sense we may speak of logic and physics as virtues, that is, as subdivisions of the virtue of wisdom[37]. The study of physics is also admirable because it elevates the soul[38]. Geometry, law, and astrology are useful in the several professions[39]. But study when carried to excess, as by antiquarians, bookworms, and other learned time-wasters, is nothing but folly[40].
Justice.
337. The second cardinal virtue is Justice (δικαιοσύνη, iustitia), of which Chrysippus drew a striking allegorical picture. ‘She is of virgin form, to show that she is incorruptible and does not give way to bad men; ... of firm and fierce aspect, ... inspiring fear in the wicked, confidence in the good; her eyes are keen-sighted, her bearing is at once sad and awe-inspiring[41].’ Cicero distinguishes Justice in the narrower sense from ‘Beneficence.’ Justice proper is a political virtue, and consists in respect for the rights and property of individuals. By nature indeed all things are common; but since they have become private property by occupation, conquest, law, contract, and so forth, individuals may keep their own, provided they do not forget that they have always the duty of contributing to the common good[42], and that even slaves have reasonable claims upon them[43]. Beneficence needs the guidance of principle, and must be determined by considerations of person and occasion. The claims of persons upon us depend on propinquity; country, parents, wife and children must be first considered, then other relatives, then fellow-citizens, lastly men in general[44]. The consideration of the degrees of propinquity (σχέσεις) was a favourite subject with Epictetus, and a useful defence against those who maintained that the Stoic sage was lacking in natural affection[45]. The virtue of Justice appealed specially to the statesman in both its applications, and is dealt with fully by Panaetius, and by Cicero after him.