Pleasure an aftergrowth, or an evil.
347. From this contradiction an escape was sought by making a distinction. In one sense pleasure is an affection of the body, namely a tickling (titillatio) of organs of sense, most readily illustrated in the eating of dainties. This kind of pleasure, even if it is not an advantage naturally sought, yet has some likeness to one; though it is not directly to be aimed at, yet it may be welcomed when nature grants it to us as an extra[98]. This new view practically coincides with that of Aristotle, who calls pleasure an ‘aftergrowth’ (ἐπιγέννημα, accessio), which of itself follows on virtuous action, and is attached to it as the scent to a flower[99]. But much more commonly, in ethical discussions, ‘pleasure’ denotes the excitement which is more strictly termed ‘hilarity’ (ἔπαρσις, sublatio animi), and is the unhealthy condition of the soul when it is unduly attracted to an object of choice[100]. For this mischief Cicero suggests the Latin term laetitia, which is perhaps not altogether adequate[101]. This ‘pleasure’ may be unreservedly condemned as not merely indifferent, but actually contrary to nature[102]; whilst the virtuous and natural disposition is that of the man who not only contemplates toil and pain with calm mind, but actually welcomes them as possible stepping-stones towards his own true advantage[103].
Active soberness.
348. Although the prevailing tendency in Stoic teaching is to consider Soberness as a negative virtue, and as opposed to the perturbation of Hilarity, there is not wanting some recognition of its positive side. For Soberness also demands that there shall be a healthy activity of the soul in matters such as eating, drinking, and the relations of sex; abstinence is not in itself an end, and if pursued out of season is both a folly and a fault. But this point of view is not adequately treated by any Stoic writer. Panaetius in discussing daily duties omitted to consider the proper care of the body, as was afterwards noticed by Antipater of Tyre; and Cicero gets little further than a general recommendation of common sense and self-restraint in all the circumstances of life[104]. The Romans of the principate were disposed to leave the matter to the physician, suggesting only that food should suffice to allay hunger, drink to put an end to thirst, and clothing to keep away cold[105]; but it is probable that popular moral discourses stopped short of this, and favoured some amount of endurance as a discipline for the soul[106].
Sober love.
349. With regard to the relations of sex, the Socratic tradition was favourable to a more positive treatment. Accordingly the Stoics (not without some feeling that they are adopting a paradoxical position) assert that love (ἔρως, amor) is an essential, both for the maintenance of the State[107] and for the character of the good man. Zeno had laid it down that ‘the wise man will love[108].’ We must, however, make a sharp distinction between love as the desire of sexual union, and the higher Love (ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή) which is defined anew as ‘an effort to make friends suggested by a beautiful object[109].’ Upon this impulse, which is natural in the widest sense, is based friendship in the young, and the more lasting tie between husband and wife. By imposing self-restraint on the man, and inviting the woman to share the lessons of philosophy, the Stoics introduced a new relation between husband and wife based upon equality and comradeship[110]. A notable precedent was furnished by the Cynic community, when the witty and learned Hipparchia joined Crates in the life of the beggar-preacher[111]; and Roman Stoicism supplies us with numerous instances of the same companionship[112]. Under such conditions marriage is no longer a matter of free choice; it is a civic duty incumbent on the young Stoic. The Stoics of the Roman principate well perceived the danger that threatened the society in which they lived through the growing practice of celibacy[113].
Of marriage.
350. The Stoic attitude towards marriage is well illustrated by the following extract from a discourse by Antipater of Tarsus:
‘A youth of good family and noble soul, who has a sense of social duty, will feel that no life and no household is complete without wife and child. He will also bear in mind his duty towards the State, for how can that be maintained unless, as the fathers decay and fall away like the leaves of a fine tree, the sons marry in the flower of their age, and leave behind them fresh shoots to adorn the city, thereby providing for its protection against its enemies? He will look upon marriage also as a duty towards the gods; for if the family dies out, who will perform the accustomed sacrifices?