Besides this he who knows nothing of wife and child has not tasted the truest joys of affection. For other friendships are like platefuls of beans or other like mixtures of juxtaposition, but the union of man and wife is like the mixing of wine and water, or any other case of penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων); for they are united not only by the ties of substance and soul and the dearest bond of children, but also in body. Other alliances are for occasion, this is bound up with the whole purpose of life, so that the parents on each side gladly allow that the wife should be first in her husband’s affection, and the husband in his wife’s.

But in these days of dissolution and anarchy all things change for the worse and marriage is thought a hard thing; and men call the celibate life divine because it gives opportunity for licentiousness and varied pleasures, and they bar the door against a wife as against an enemy. Others have their fancy taken by beauty or dowry, and no longer look for a wife who is piously brought up and obedient and a good manager; nor do they trouble to instruct their wives in these matters. But if a man would attend to the warnings of philosophers, of all burdens a lawful wife would be the lightest and sweetest. Such a man would have four eyes instead of two, and four hands instead of two, to supply all his needs: and if he desired leisure to write books or take part in politics, he could hand over the whole business of housekeeping to his partner[114].’

Advantages sought.

351. The four cardinal virtues, however widely they are interpreted, do not exhaust the field of daily duties. All objects that are ‘advantages’ (προηγμένα) are prima facie such that the good man aims at securing them; although if sufficient reason appears, he will entirely forego them. The advantages of the soul, good natural disposition, ‘art,’ and ‘progress’ are discussed elsewhere in this chapter; as advantages of the body are reckoned life, health, strength, good digestion, good proportions, and beauty; whilst external advantages are wealth, reputation, noble birth, and the like[115]. In all the details there is a lack of exactitude and of agreement amongst the teachers. According to Seneca, men may reasonably wish for tallness[116], and there is a kind of beauty (not dependent on youth) of which women may be proud without blame[117]. Fine clothes make no one the better man, but a certain degree of neatness and cleanliness in dress is an advantage[118]. For nobility the Stoics have little regard; all men are derived through an equal number of degrees from the same divine origin; virtue is the true nobility[119]. Good name (δόξα, gloria) is commonly reckoned amongst ‘advantages’[120]; but Chrysippus and Diogenes are said to have taught that a good man need not move a finger for the sake of reputation, unless some advantage can be obtained by it. Later teachers, influenced (as we are told) by the criticisms of Carneades, made it absolutely plain that they reckoned good name (apart from anything attainable by it) as an advantage, and they even considered it natural that a man should think of posthumous reputation[121]. The general feeling of the school seems to be that the approval of others is too uncertain to be a fitting aim; its place is taken by the approval of ‘conscience.’ This term, which originally expressed the burden of a guilty secret, became in the Roman period modified in meaning, and could thus express the approval awarded to a man by his inner and personal consciousness, even when all the world disapproves his acts: this self-approval is closely akin to peace of mind[122].

Wealth.

352. On no subject would it be easier to find apparently contradictory views amongst Stoic writers than on that of wealth. To decry wealth and praise poverty is to some extent a commonplace with all the philosophical schools; and with Seneca in particular this was so frequent a practice[123] that his hearers found some inconsistency between his words and his deeds; for he was, as is well known, a rich man. But the position of the school is clear. ‘Riches are not a good’ is a Stoic paradox, emphasized in a hundred forms, and by every teacher[124]; but nevertheless they are an ‘advantage,’ and thus are rightly aimed at by the good man[125]. To the wealthy Stoics generally, and to the Romans of the republican period especially, the maintenance of the family property (res familiaris) was a duty of high importance; and the wasting of it in wholesale largess, a serious misdeed[126]. The Stoic view was sufficiently summed up in a proverb borrowed from Epicurus or one of his followers: ‘he who feels the need of wealth least, can make the best use of it[127].’ Although Panaetius did not write a special chapter on the acquisition and use of wealth[128], yet his views on the latter point are made sufficiently plain in his treatment of the virtue of Justice[129]. The justification of wealth lies in the intention to use it well, and this was a favourite subject with Hecato of Rhodes[130]. As to its acquisition and investment, Cicero is content to refer us to the high-principled men who conduct the financial affairs of the capital[131].

Liberty.

353. Amongst those popular terms which hold an ambiguous place in the Stoic philosophy we must reckon ‘liberty’ (ἐλευθερία, libertas). In one sense liberty is a condition of soul such as characterizes the free-born citizen in contrast to the slave; this liberty differs but little from the virtue of Greatness of Soul already described[132], and in its full meaning is a good, which the wise man alone can possess[133]. But in another sense liberty is an external advantage, sometimes defined as ‘the power of living as you wish[134],’ and as such eagerly desired by the slave; more often perhaps it is conceived as ‘the right of saying what you please[135].’ In this sense liberty is equivalent to the παῤῥησία which was the watchword of the democracy of Athens, and was the equally cherished privilege of the nobility of Rome[136]; in a slightly different sense it was the boast of the Cynic missionary. The Stoics take a middle position; whilst all recognise that some sort of liberty is a precious privilege[137], and are prepared on occasion to sacrifice life or position for its sake[138], there are not wanting voices to remind us that it is unreasonable to speak out one’s mind without regard to persons or circumstances[139], that the wrath of tyrants ought not lightly to be provoked[140], and that the most terrible of all oppressors is the soul that has lost its self-control[141].

Disadvantages.