354. Just as virtue chooses advantages in accordance with natural laws, so it refuses disadvantages in accordance with a disinclination (ἔκκλισις, alienatio), which is equally natural and right so long as it is controlled by reason[142]. Since to every advantage there is opposed a corresponding disadvantage, to choose the one is necessarily to refuse the other; and the doctrine of ‘reasonable refusal’ is that of reasonable choice in its negative form. It will therefore be sufficient to give a formal statement of the theory. Disadvantages, or things that have negative value (ἀπαξία), may be subdivided according as they are disadvantages in themselves, as an ungainly figure; or as they bring about other disadvantages, as shortness of ready money; or for both reasons, as bad memory or ill-health[143]. They may also be subdivided into three classes, according as they affect the soul, the body, or things external. Disadvantages of the soul are such things as inborn vulgarity or dulness of wit; of the body, ill-health, and dulness of the organs of sensation; of external things, poverty, loss of children, and the contempt of our neighbours[144].
Healthy affections.
355. Since the virtues are permanent dispositions (διαθέσεις) of the soul, rooted in firm principles in which the wise man never wavers, but to which none else can attain, some other name is required to describe those more passing but yet wholesome moods which stand in contrast with the evil ‘affections’ or perturbations of the soul which will be discussed in our next chapter. A beginning is made in this direction with the three ‘good affections’ (εὐπάθειαι, constantiae, sapientis affectiones). Here a new use of terms is introduced. Strictly speaking an ‘affection’ is an evil state of soul; but as we have no corresponding word for a good and calm condition, the use of the word ‘affection’ is extended in this direction[145]. Each of these ‘good affections’ is introduced to us in contrast with a perturbation to which it bears a superficial resemblance. Thus contrasted with Fear is ‘Caution’ (εὐλάβεια, cautio), which is right avoidance, and is entirely consistent with Courage rightly understood. Subdivisions of Caution are (i) ‘Shame’ (αἰδώς, verecundia), the avoidance of deserved blame, and (ii) ‘Sanctity’ (ἁγνεία) the avoidance of offences against the gods[146]. Contrasted with Greed is ‘Readiness’ (βούλησις, voluntas), the reasonable stretching out after future advantages[147]; contrasted with Hilarity is Joy (χαρά, gaudium), the reasonable appreciation of present advantages[148]. Both Readiness and Joy are entirely consistent with Soberness rightly understood. To the perturbation of Grief no good affection is named as bearing any resemblance; but we need not for that reason question but that the wise man may entertain some quiet form of sympathy for the troubles of others, and of regret for the blows which fortune deals to him in political disappointment or personal bereavement[149].
The ‘good affections’ are possessed by the wise man only[150]; but not all wise men possess them, nor any at all times[151]. On the other hand it is a daily duty to approximate to them, so that on this ground the good citizen enters into competition with the wise man on not altogether uneven terms[152]. The whole doctrine of ‘good affections’ may be conceived as an answer to those who accuse the Stoic of lack of feeling[153]; for the much derided ‘apathy’ of the school is substituted the doctrine of ‘eupathy.’ Wisdom is not to be compared to the surface of a frozen sea, but to that of a rippling river. The lectures of Musonius and Epictetus bring out on every point the meaning of ‘eupathy’ in its various applications.
The ethical motive.
356. We have now sketched the Stoic system of daily duties in its main features, and this sketch will be made more complete in many particulars in the course of the next two chapters. To the modern reader the question here suggests itself—what compelling force has this system? what motive is supplied to the ordinary man for thus planning out his life? To this question the ancient philosophers did not directly address themselves; nevertheless their answers are implied in their teaching as a whole. Thus the Stoics would doubtless reply, first, that daily duties are prescribed to us by reason[154]; not perhaps always by reason in its highest sense, to which we must not appeal in every individual action, but at least by the spirit of reasonableness (εὐλογιστία). Secondly, that the common opinion of mankind, growing daily stronger, recommends them; they are, as we have seen from the beginning, things that it comes in our way to do, that every good citizen and good man will be sure to do. As to future rewards and punishments, though these are not excluded by Stoicism, they are certainly never pressed as motives for right living. But the strongest of all motives is undoubtedly the mental picture of the wise man, the vision of that which is ‘absolutely good.’ Critics may urge: ‘it is a picture that never has been or will be realized in men’s lives, a vision of that which is very far off and which you will never see or touch.’ This the Stoics hardly care to deny, but the difficulty does not disturb them. The vision attracts by its own beauty, the hope of attainment is cherished by all but the worst[155]. We have spoken of the ‘ordinary man,’ or, as the Stoics put it, of ‘us who are not wise men.’ But, strictly speaking, there is no room for the ordinary man in the system, but only for the ‘probationer’ (προκόπτων, proficiens). It remains for us to trace the upward path from daily duty to virtue, along which every good man is endeavouring to advance.
Progress.
357. The doctrine of progress (προκοπή, progressio) is not peculiar to Stoicism, but it is nevertheless an essential feature of it[156]. Critics may indeed dispute as to whether virtue has ever been in practice attained; but the Stoic must hold fast to the ethical principles that ‘virtue can be taught[157]’ and that ‘virtue is an art[158].’ Every man has from birth a capacity for acquiring virtue[159], which varies in degree according to his natural disposition of soul[160]; on this foundation every man builds by concurrent learning and practice[161]. The child is greatly helped if he possesses the trait of ‘modesty’ (αἰδώς, verecundia), which is essentially a readiness to defer to others and to learn from those who are older and wiser[162]; though later it may turn to ‘false shame,’ which is a hindrance[163]. He will then learn to understand and perform his daily duties; and as his character ripens, this performance will daily become easier and more pleasurable to him[164], more certain and more steady in itself. And now daily duties come near to Right Actions, which are indeed daily duties perfected (τέλειον καθῆκον, perfectum officium), and complete in every point[165]. In order to rise to this higher standard the good man must first perform his duty in all particulars[166]; he must do so with regularity and in harmony with the order of nature[167]; he will then need only a certain fixity, conviction, and stability to pass into the ranks of the wise[168].