[101] Guazzini, Tractatus ad defensam inquisitorum, xxx. 4. 24, vol. ii. 86.
[102] Ibid. xxx. 17, vol. ii. 102 sq.
The moral notions regarding the infliction of bodily injuries require little comment. They are based on the principle of sympathetic resentment, modified by the ascription of particular rights to some and particular duties to others, on account of the relation in which the parties stand to each other; and they follow the same rules as the ideas concerning homicide, to the exclusion, of course, of all such considerations as result from fear of the slain man’s ghost or from the religious horror of taking life. One point, however, calls for special attention. The forcible interference with another person’s body not only causes physical pain but commonly entails disgrace upon the sufferer. This largely accounts for the fact that a person’s right to bodily integrity varies so much according to his social standing.[103] Even among the lower races we meet with the notions that an act of bodily violence involves a gross insult, and that corporal punishment disgraces the criminal more than any other form of penalty. According to the Malay Code, “the persons who may be put to death without the previous knowledge of the king or nobles, are an adulterer, a person guilty of treason, a thief who cannot otherwise be apprehended, and a person who offers another a grievous affront, such as a blow over the face.”[104] Among the Maoris a blow with the fist would lead to a combat with arms.[105] The Thlinkets consider corporal punishment to be the greatest indignity to which a freeman can be subjected, hence they never inflict it.[106] And civilised nations who are ready to punish certain criminals with death, hold whipping to be a punishment too infamous to be employed.
[103] Cf. Dimetian Code, ii. 17. 17 (Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales, p. 248): “The Law says that the limbs of all persons are of equal worth; if a limb of the king be broken, that it is of the same worth as the limb of the villain: yet, nevertheless, the worth of saraad [or fine for insult] to the king, or to a breyr, is more than the saraad of a villain, if a limb belonging to him be cut.” See also Gwentian Code, ii. 7. 12 sq. (ibid. p. 342).
[104] Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, iii. 105 sq.
[105] Shortland, Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders, p. 227.
[106] Holmberg, ‘Ethnograph. Skizzen über die Völker des russischen Amerika,’ in Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicæ, iv. 321.
CHAPTER XXIII
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
IN previous chapters we have examined the regard for the life and physical well-being of others as displayed in moral ideas concerning homicide and the infliction of bodily harm. We shall now consider the same subject from another point of view, namely, the valuation of such conduct as positively promotes the existence and material comfort of a fellow-creature.