[CHAPTER V]
THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS
We may feel disinterested resentment, or disinterested retributive kindly emotion, on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a kindly interest, p. [108].—Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. [109] sq.—Only when aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take a kindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to produce disinterested retributive emotions, p. [110] sq.—Sympathetic resentment to be found in all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments, p. [111] sq.—Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. [113] sq.—Sympathetic resentment may not only be a reaction against sympathetic pain, but may be directly produced by the cognition of the signs of anger (punishment, language, &c.), pp. [114]–116.—Disinterested antipathies, p. [116] sq.—Sympathy springing from an altruistic sentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion, p. [117].—Disinterested likings, [ibid.]—Why disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive emotions, p. [117] sq.—Custom not only a public habit, but a rule of conduct, p. [118].—Custom conceived of as a moral rule, p. [118] sq.—In early society customs the only moral rules ever thought of, p. [119].—The characteristics of moral indignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p. [120].—Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality, p. [120] sq.—Public indignation lies at the bottom of custom as a moral rule, p. [121] sq.—As public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval, so public approval is the prototype of moral approval, p. [122].—Moral disapproval and approval have not always remained inseparably connected with the feelings of any special society, p. [122] sq.—Yet they remain to the last public emotions if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. [123].—Refutation of the opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness has been the individual’s own conscience, p. [123] sq.—The antiquity of moral resentment, p. [124].—The supposition that remorse is unknown among the lower races contradicted by facts, p. [124] sq.—Criticism of Lord Avebury’s statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely wanting in moral feeling, pp. [125]–129.—The antiquity of moral approval, p. [129] sq.
[CHAPTER VI]
ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
Our analysis to be concerned with moral concepts formed by the civilised mind, p. [131].—Moral concepts among the lower races, pp. [131]–133.—Language a rough generaliser, p. [133].—Analysis of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong, p. [134].—Of ought and duty, pp. [134]–137.—Of right, as an adjective, pp. [137]–139.—Of right, as a substantive, p. [139] sq.—Of the relations between rights and duties, p. [140] sq.—Of injustice and justice, pp. [141]–145.—Of good, pp. [145]–147.—Of virtue, pp. [147]–149.—Of the relation between virtue and duty, p. [149] sq.—Of merit, p. [150] sq.—Of the relation between merit and duty, p. [151] sq.—The question of the super-obligatory, pp. [152]–154.—The question of the morally indifferent, pp. [154]–157.
[CHAPTER VII]
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
How we can get an insight into the moral ideas of mankind at large, p. [158].—The close connection between the habitualness and the obligatoriness of custom, p. [159].—Though every public habit is not a custom, involving an obligation, men’s standard of morality is not independent of their practice, p. [159] sq.—The study of moral ideas to a large extent a study of customs, p. [160].—But custom never covers the whole field of morality, and the uncovered space grows larger in proportion as the moral consciousness develops, p. [160] sq.—At the lower stages of civilisation custom the sole rule for conduct, p. [161].—Even kings described as autocrats tied by custom, p. [162].—In competition with law custom frequently carries the day, p. [163] sq.—Custom stronger than law and religion combined, p. [164].—The laws themselves command obedience more as customs than as laws, [ibid.]—Many laws were customs before they became laws, p. [165].—The transformation of customs into laws, p. [165] sq.—Laws as expressions of moral ideas, pp. [166]–168.—Punishment and indemnification, p. [168] sq.—Definition of punishment, p. [169] sq.—Savage punishments inflicted upon the culprit by the community at large, pp. [170]–173.—By some person or persons invested with judicial authority, pp. [173]–175.—The development of judicial organisation out of a previous system of lynch-law, p. [175].—Out of a previous system of private revenge, p. [176].—Public indignation displays itself not only in punishment, but to a certain extent in the custom of revenge, p. [176] sq.—The social origin of the lex talionis, pp. [177]–180.—The transition from revenge to punishment, and the establishment of a central judicial and executive authority, pp. [180]–183.—The jurisdiction of chiefs, p. [183] sq.—The injured party or the accuser acting as executioner, but not as judge, p. [184] sq.—The existence of punishment and judicial organisation among a certain people no exact index to its general state of culture, p. [185].—The supposition that punishment has been intended to act as a deterrent, p. [185] sq.—Among various semi-civilised and civilised peoples the criminal law has assumed a severity which far surpasses the rigour of the lex talionis, pp. [186]–183.—Wanton cruelty not a general characteristic of the public justice of savages, pp. [188]–190. Legislators referring to the deterrent effects of punishment, p. [190] sq.—The practice of punishing criminals in public, p. [191] sq.—The punishment actually inflicted on the criminal in many cases much less severe than the punishment with which the law threatens him, p. [192] sq.—The detection of criminals was in earlier times much rarer and more uncertain than it is now, p. [193].—The chief explanation of the great severity of certain criminal codes lies in their connection with despotism or religion or both, pp. [193]–198.—Punishment may also be applied as a means of deterring from crime, p. [198] sq.—But the scope which justice leaves for determent pure and simple is not wide, p. [199].—The criminal law of a community on the whole a faithful exponent of moral sentiments prevalent in that community at large, pp. [199]–201.