[CHAPTER VIII]
THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS OF ENLIGHTENED MORAL JUDGMENTS
Definitions of the term “conduct,” p. [202] sq.—The meaning of the word “act,” p. [203] sq.—The meaning of the word “intention,” p. [204].—There can be only one intention in one act, p. [204] sq. The moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention, p. [205] sq.—A person morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. [206].—A deliberate wish is a volition, p. [206] sq.—The meaning of the word “motive,” p. [207].—Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral valuation, [ibid.]—The motive of an act may be an intention, but an intention belonging to another act, [ibid.]—Even motives which consist of non-volitional conations may indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments, p. [207] sq.—Refutation of Mill’s statement that “the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action,” p. [208] sq.—Moral judgments really passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract, p. [209].—Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. [209] sq.—Distinction between forbearances and omissions, p. [210].—Moral judgments refer not only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances, but to omissions, p. [210] sq.—Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, p. [211].—Moral judgments of blame concerned with not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is attributed to a defect of the “will,” p. [211] sq.—Distinction between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing to refrain from doing and willing to do, p. [212].—The “known concomitants of acts,” p. [213].—Absence of volitions also gives rise to moral praise, p. [213] sq.—The meaning of the term “conduct,” p. [214].—The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person’s will, or character, conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. [214] sq.—Moral judgments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the will, p. [215] sq.
[CHAPTER IX]
THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL EVENTS
Cases in which no distinction is made between intentional and accidental injuries, pp. [217]–219.—Yet even in the system of self-redress intentional or foreseen injuries often distinguished from unintentional and unforeseen injuries, pp. [219]–221.—A similar distinction made in the punishments inflicted by many savages, p. [221] sq.—Uncivilised peoples who entirely excuse, or do not punish, persons for injuries which they have inflicted by mere accident, p. [222] sq.—Peoples of a higher culture who punish persons for bringing about events without any fault of theirs, pp. [223]–226.—At the earlier stages of civilisation gods, in particular, attach undue importance to the outward aspect of conduct, pp. [226]–231.—Explanation of all these facts, pp. [231]–237.—The great influence which the outward event exercises upon moral estimates even among ourselves, pp. [238]–240.—Carelessness generally not punished if no injurious result follows, p. [241].—An unsuccessful attempt to commit a criminal act, if punished at all, as a rule punished much less severely than the accomplished act, p. [241] sq.—Exceptions to this rule, p. [242].—The question, which attempts should be punished, p. [243].—The stage at which an attempt begins to be criminal, and the distinction between attempts and acts of preparation, p. [243] sq.—The rule that an outward event is requisite for the infliction of punishment, p. [244] sq.—Exceptions to this rule, p. [245].—Explanation of laws referring to unsuccessful attempts, pp. [245]–247.—Moral approval influenced by external events, p. [247].—Owing to its very nature, the moral consciousness, when sufficiently influenced by thought, regards the will as the only proper object of moral disapproval or praise, p. [247] sq.
[CHAPTER X]
AGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
An agent not responsible for anything which he could not be aware of, p. [249].—The irresponsibility of animals, pp. [249]–251.—Resentment towards an animal which has caused some injury, p. [251].—At the lower stages of civilisation animals deliberately treated as responsible beings, [ibid.]—The custom of blood-revenge extended to the animal world, pp. [251]–253.—Animals exposed to regular punishment, pp. [253]–255.—The origin of the mediæval practice of punishing animals, p. [255] sq.—Explanation of the practice of retaliating upon animals, pp. [256]–260.—At the earlier stages of civilisation even inanimate things treated as if they were responsible agents, pp. [260]–262.—Explanation of this, pp. [262]–264.—The total or partial irresponsibility of childhood and early youth, pp. [264]–267.—According to early custom, children sometimes subject to the rule of retaliation, p. [267].—Parents responsible for the deeds of their children, p. [267] sq.—In Europe there has been a tendency to raise the age at which full legal responsibility commences, p. [268] sq.—The irresponsibility of idiots and madmen, p. [269] sq.—Idiots and insane persons objects of religious reverence, p. [270] sq.—Lunatics treated with great severity or punished for their deeds, pp. [271]–274.—Explanation of this, p. [274] sq.—The ignorance of which lunatics have been victims in the hands of lawyers, pp. [275]–277.—The total or partial irresponsibility of intoxicated persons, p. [277] sq.—Drunkenness recognised as a ground of extenuation, pp. [278]–280.—Not recognised as a ground of extenuation, p. [280] sq.—Explanation of these facts, p. [281] sq.