[392] Epict. Diss. 3. 22. 5.
[393] Epict. Diss. 1. 1. 10; cf. Seneca, de Provid. 5. 7, ‘non potest artifex mutare materiam.’ But Epictetus sometimes makes it a question, not of possibility, but of will, e.g. Diss. 4. 3. 10.
[394] The data for the long history of the moral conceptions of Greek religion which are briefly indicated above are far too numerous to be given in a note: the student is referred to Nägelsbach, Die Nachhomerische Theologie, i. 17-58. One may note the list of titles applied to God, e.g. in Dio Chrysostom, and the diminishing use of ἱλάσκεσθαι.
[395] Epict. Diss. 1. 6.
[396] Diss. 3. 11. 1.
[397] Diss. 3. 24. 42, 43.
[398] Destiny is Reason: Heraclitus ap. Aet. Placit. in Plut. de placit. philos. 1. 28. 1; Stob. Ecl. 1. 5. 15 (Diels, p. 323), οὐσίαν εἱμαρμένης λόγον τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ παντὸς διήκοντα: Chrysippus, ibid. εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται: Zeno ap. Ar. Did. Epit. phys. 20, in Stob. Ecl. 1. 11. 5 (Diels, p. 458), τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λόγον ὃν ἔνιοι ἑιμαρμένην καλοῦσιν.
[399] Destiny, or Reason, is Providence: Chrysippus, in the quotation given in the preceding note: Zeno ap. Aet. Placit. in Stob. Ecl. 1. 5. 15 (Diels, p. 322).
[400] Destiny, Reason, Providence, is God, or the Will of God: Chrysippus in Plut. de Stoic. repug. 34. 5, ὅτι δ’ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἐστιν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν· καὶ, Διὸς δ’ ἐτελείετο βουλὴ’ τὸν Ὅμηρον εἰρηκέναι φησὶν [sc. ὁ Χρύσιππος] ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν καθ’ ἣν πάντα διοικεῖται: id. de commun. not. 34. 5, oὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς βούλησιν: Arius Didymus, Epit. ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. 15. 15 (Diels, p. 464): Philodemus, de piet. frag. ed. Gompertz, p. 83 (Diels, p. 549). The more exact statement is in the summary of Aetius ap. Plut. de placit. philos. 1. 7. 17, Stob. Ecl. 1. 2. 29 (Diels, p. 306), where God is said to comprehend within Himself τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ’ οὓς ἅπαντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεται. The loftiest form of the conception is expressed by Lucan, Pharsal. 2. 10, ‘se quoque lege tenens:’ God is not the slave of Fate or Law, but voluntarily binds Himself by it.
[401] Plat. Rep. 2, pp. 379, 380; Tim. p. 41. Philo, de mund. opif. 24 (i. 17), de confus. ling. 35 (i. 432), θεῷ γὰρ τῷ πανηγεμόνι ἐμπρεπὲς οὐκ ἔδοξεν εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ κακίαν ὁδὸν ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ δημιουργῆσαι· οὗ χάριν τοῖς μετ’ αὐτὸν ἐπέτρεψε τὴν τούτου τοῦ μέρους κατασκευήν: de profug. 13 (i. 556), ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἡγήσατο τὴν κακῶν γένεσιν ἑτέροις ἀπονεῖμαι δημιουργοῖς τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτῷ μόνῳ: so also in the (probably) post-Philonean de Abraham. 28 (ii. 22). The other phase of the conception is stated by Celsus, not as a philosophical solution of the difficulty, but as one which might be taught to the vulgar, ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ εἰς πλῆθος εἰρῆσθαι ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι κακὰ ὕλῃ δὲ πρόσκειται.