“I am absolutely convinced that M. Zola acted in good faith, and these are my reasons. In the Esterhazy case there was an astonishing gap, which I consider very important. The examination had shown that Major Esterhazy had received from a veiled lady on several occasions the copy of a secret document which existed in the office of the minister of war, and which demonstrated, it was said, the guilt of Dreyfus. Well, I say very frankly to the jury that what struck me in this military examination was that this matter of extreme importance was not thoroughly looked into. If the veiled lady really existed, why did they not search for her with much activity and patience, and why was not this important matter gone into thoroughly? I am astonished—and in parliament I am not alone in this astonishment—that the military authorities dropped this matter without a fundamental examination. If a secret document of this character had been taken from the office of the minister of war, a secret document on which everybody’s eyes were fixed, and which was securely locked in a closet, it was for the interest of the national defence that serious measures should be taken to avoid other leaks of this sort, for other secret documents might be similarly embezzled by this woman, or by some one in her confidence. Moreover, it would have been easy to make such an investigation. This woman had arranged meetings in somewhat strange spots; she had been taken there in cabs on two occasions, if my memory serves me; and Paris cabmen never exhibit a failure of memory when the courts call on them for testimony. Hence the cabman, and perhaps the woman, could easily have been found. At any rate, a serious investigation should have been made to find out how the document was taken.
“If the veiled lady is a legendary character,—which is possible, for I believe that in this case there are many legends,—the question was no less serious. For then the problem arises: how could a secret document, from the office of the minister of war, showing the guilt of Captain Dreyfus, have been communicated to Major Esterhazy, when it had not been communicated to Captain Dreyfus, whom this document accused? I can understand that M. Zola’s conscience has been troubled. And it is not only his that has been troubled. I can understand how M. Zola could arrive at the belief that the second council of war, inexactly informed by an inadequate examination, had perhaps misjudged.”
M. Thévenet was then asked by M. Labori what he thought of M. Zola’s good faith in writing that sentence in his letter to President Faure in which he accused the second council of war of having covered the illegality of the first council of war, in obedience to orders, by committing in its turn the crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty person. The witness answered:
“It is said that neither Dreyfus or his council were made aware of a secret document, which nevertheless had been communicated to the members of the council of war that condemned Dreyfus. Well, gentlemen, I am astonished that this question, which has been under discussion so long, has not been settled already. It is, in my opinion, not simply the only question involved in this trial, but the capital question of this entire discussion. It should have been met at the beginning, and it seemed to me—I ask your pardon for this allusion—that it was possible to answer it very frankly by a yes or a no. I have read the reports of the trial, and I have been surprised that this question, which has been asked, if I am not mistaken, has been met by silence. It has been put to honorable generals who were able to answer, but who considered themselves bound by professional secrecy. I say, gentlemen, that here we touch a question which is not simply a point of law, but a much higher principle,—that of the liberty of defence, the imprescriptible right which every accused man has of knowing on what evidence he is accused. Is it true, yes or no, that the first council of war considered documents that were not made known to M. Demange or to Captain Dreyfus? That can be answered by a yes or a no. They make no answer. What does that mean? If they had answered yes, the court of appeals would have passed upon it. Would that have established the innocence of Dreyfus? Not at all. He would have come again before the council of war, before military authority itself, and military authority, after examining the documents and submitting them to Dreyfus and his counsel, would have decided whether Dreyfus was guilty. But in that case Dreyfus would have had a chance to defend himself against documents that he had been permitted to read. Perhaps there would have been a second conviction. I do not know. But the trial would have been complete, the law would have been respected, and the liberty of defence—human dignity, I should say—would have been safeguarded. I declare, for my part, that, if the minister of war had come here to give his word of honor that no communication had been made to the council of war which judged Dreyfus, I should have bowed before his word. But let him give it. This it is that disturbs public opinion, and prolongs, and perhaps will perpetuate, this trial, which is an evil for everybody and an evil for the country.”
M. Zola.—“Surely.”
M. Thévenet.—“I say that this no should be spoken with a loud voice. But they are silent. What are we to believe? What are we to think? In what country are we living? Where are we? Is there a magistrate among those who listen to me, is there any of my confrères, any person whatsoever, anyone among you, gentlemen of the jury, who can understand that we should be left in uncertainty on this important point whether Dreyfus, yes or no, was acquainted with the documents that proved his guilt, and, if not, why they were not shown to him, why they were not shown to his counsel, that confrère whom we all respect, bound to professional secrecy as well as the generals, and who is certainly as patriotic as anybody. That is what I have to say. And I finish with one word: I say that, for the reasons that I have indicated, perhaps at too great length, the good faith of M. Zola is on a level with his talent, and I consider that glorious.”
M. Thévenet was succeeded on the witness-stand by M. Salle, an aged member of the Paris bar, who was said to have received from a member of the council of war a confession that a secret document was communicated to it.
Testimony of M. Salle.
M. Labori.—“Does M. Salle know any fact of interest to the defence of M. Zola?”
The Judge.—“That is not a question. In relation to what?”