M. Labori.—“In relation to the affair of M. Zola.”
The Judge.—“That is not a question, either. I will not put such a question as that. Does it relate to the Dreyfus case or to the Esterhazy case?”
M. Labori.—“Permit me, Monsieur le Président, in spite of all my respect for you, to say that I do not understand this distinction. For this there are two reasons. The first is that, as I said yesterday, the only case in litigation here is the case of M. Zola. The second is—and it is upon this especially that I insist—that General Mercier, General de Pellieux, General Gonse, and others like them, come here, speaking of the decrees of justice with which they are familiar, sheltering themselves behind their privilege to avoid speaking, and nevertheless, one after another, with the same vagueness and the same uncertainty, throwing their word into the balance, convinced that, thanks to the love which this country has for itself, their word, as soldiers, will be sufficient, and need not be supported by any reason. We do not stop them. They have the right to say, one after another: ‘Dreyfus is guilty.’ They speak out thus, in spite of the decrees of the court, and no one blames them, for it is impossible to speak of the Esterhazy case without speaking of the Dreyfus case. For this reason, as for others, being given that there is a thing judged, as in the Esterhazy case, I see but one explanation of the gag that is placed in our mouths—namely, that they do not dare to speak of the Dreyfus case, which it is impossible to separate from the Esterhazy case. I ask that the liberty to speak be given to all the witnesses on all points that do not concern the national defence, and I ask especially that, when I put a question as discreet, as reserved, as moderate, as that which I put to M. Salle, face to face with a witness in possession of a secret which I know they do not want him to tell,—I ask that the question be put, or else I protest against the obscurity that is being thickened a little more every day because of fear of the light.”
The Judge.—“You can protest as much as you like. I have told you that I would put no question to the witness on this point. I repeat it, and so it will be to the end of the trial. [To the witness.] Have you anything to say in relation to the Esterhazy case?”
M. Salle.—“Concerning the Esterhazy case I have nothing to say.”
The Judge.—“Of the Dreyfus case let us say nothing.”
M. Labori.—“But, Monsieur le Président, I do not wish to speak of the Dreyfus case.”
The Judge.—“Pardon me, you wish to speak of it indirectly.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Will Monsieur le Président allow me to put the following question? Was the witness told by one of the members of the council of war of 1894 that a secret document was communicated to the judges in the council-chamber,—a document which had been communicated neither to the accused or to his counsel?”
The Judge.—“I have told you that that question would not be put.”