‘The seventh and two following reasons are founded on the civil laws, which declare there are three sorts of men who may lawfully be put to death,—namely, such as disgrace their knighthood, highway robbers, and housebreakers found during the night within any dwelling. Now my lord of Orleans cannot be included with any one of the above three classes. He was ever attended by a noble body of chivalry, and was fond of it beyond measure. And in regard to the two other cases, I maintain that the law does not command such to be slain except when the danger is most inevitable. They can in no wise be applicable to my lord of Orleans, who, thank God, was no waylayer on the high roads, nor a housebreaker; and there is no law in the world that can excuse our adversary.
‘The example of Moses, who slew an Egyptian without any authority, is produced to support the tenth reason. To this I say, according to the opinion of St Austin and many other doctors, that Moses sinned in killing the Egyptian; and although Moses and St Peter both acted contrary to the rules of justice, their cases are not similar,—for Moses was a Hebrew, and noticing an unbeliever moving towards his brother, to slay him, put him to death to prevent him from so doing.
‘The eleventh reason is grounded on the instance of Phineas, who slew Zambry without orders, and not only remained unpunished, but was remunerated for it. Thomas Aquinas says, in exculpation of this act, that he did it as a teacher of the law, for he was the son of the high priest, and, on this account, had power and public authority. This is also inapplicable to the question before us, as history will show.
‘The twelfth reason is founded on Saint Michael having slain Lucifer without the Divine command. For this he was rewarded with riches and power, as our opponent says. To this I reply, That St Michael did not slay Lucifer,—and the assertion that he did so is deserving only of derision; for the slaying of Lucifer is nothing more than the deprivation of the Divine grace, and of the sovereign glory of paradise, whence he was cast out by God for his inordinate pride. O, my lords! in what book has this advocate learned such theology? I am confounded at the boldness of his assertions, for there is not certainly any book in which it can be found. On the contrary, we see in the epistle of St Jude, that St Michael dared not to rail against Lucifer, although he had power over him, nor command him to do any thing; but he only said, ‘Our Lord commands thee;’ and thus it clearly appears, that the arguments which our adversary has produced are no way applicable to his case, nor can they serve to justify his disloyal and treacherous act.
‘I repeat, that such murders as the above, which our opponent has brought forward, are not of any consequence as examples; for many things have been suffered, that are mentioned in the Old Testament, which are now forbidden. As for instance, Samuel, as a churchman, put to death the king Amalech,—but at this day it is not lawful for a churchman to commit such crimes. To Moses was given the power of repudiation from the marriage-vow, which is now forbidden. The doctrine, therefore, which is here attempted, and the examples quoted to palliate and even justify this atrocious crime, cannot be supported; and truly princes would be in constant dread of death, if this deed go unpunished,—for should any evil report be spread abroad of them, some one of their subjects might take it into his head to punish them himself for it.
‘O, princes! consider well, that if such doctrines are supported, any man may say, ‘I also may kill him as such a one did.’ You will therefore be pleased to condemn this false doctrine as dangerous, seditious and abominable. Our adversary, and all those of his party, may then say with Jeremiah, in his twentieth chapter, ‘Confundantur vehementer qui non intellexerunt opprobrium sempiternum quod nunquam delebitur.’
‘The second argument is founded upon this consideration, that the cruel death of the duke of Orleans was not accomplished according to the way of justice; and supposing our adversary had the right to inflict it, he was, notwithstanding, bound to do so according to the forms of law, by information, and on the testimony of irreproachable witnesses. But he no way followed this course; for he first kills the duke of Orleans, and then seeks for reasons to exculpate himself for so doing. O, God! what a trial, and what a judge!! O, justice! do thy duty; and what thou owest to thyself, defend thy own cause against one who seeks to reduce thee to nothing. In truth, every law ordains that causes should be first tried, and sentences examined, before they are put into execution; and to this purpose Julius Cæsar, according to what Sallust relates, said, That when judges shall put men to death before they be condemned, the greatest evils may arise, and no man live in security. He brings, as an example, the Lacedemonians, who, after their victory over the Athenians, constituted thirty persons to govern the public state, who put to death numbers without any previous trial, which caused great misfortunes.
‘The like will befal us, if such crimes are suffered to go unpunished. Sallust tells us, that when Cataline and his associates were intending to burn the city of Rome and murder its senators, Tully was then consul; but although he was fully acquainted with the plot, he did not cause one of the conspirators to be put to death until he had fully proved their guilt. Now, my lords, as I have fully and clearly proved the heinousness of the crime with which I have charged the duke of Burgundy; and as it was done contrary to all law and justice, I trust it will not remain unpunished, according to the words of our Lord by the prophet Isaiah, in his 47th chap.: ‘Videbitur opprobrium tuum, ultionem capiam, et non resistet mihi homo.’
‘My third argument is grounded on our adversary’s having entered into the strongest possible alliance with the duke of Orleans, in the presence of many of their dependants; and a twelvemonth prior to the murder of the above duke this alliance was renewed before several prelates, nobles, clergymen and counsellors of each side, when the two dukes swore on the crucifix, with the holy evangelists in their hands, to the due and faithful observance of it, promising, on the salvation of their souls, and by their honour, that henceforward they would be to each other as brothers and companions in arms, engaging to reveal mutually any evil designs that might be plotted or meditated against their persons or interests. They then agreed to wear each other’s badge, which was done. And at the last feast at Compiègne, for the greater confirmation of the above, my lord of Orleans and our adversary made many of their knights and dependants alternately swear, that they would loyally and truly abide by and support the bonds of friendship entered into between them, through love and attachment to their persons,—and would make known to each party any thing that should be imagined against their persons or estate.
‘Moreover, my lord of Orleans and our adversary entered into other private engagements, promising and swearing on the true cross, that they would mutually defend and guard each other’s person and honour against all who should attack them. This agreement was signed with their own hands and seals.