‘But the advocate for our adversary says, That whatever he may have done contrary to the letter of the law was not, however, contrary to the intention of the maker of the law, nor contrary to its spirit, but through love of God. Who is he that has thus revealed to him the intention of the Maker of the law, and that it is the object of laws to cause men to be put to death without authority or sentence of the law? The consequence would be, that any prince may be made away with, under pretence that he was a tyrant; for every one would interpret the law according to his fancy, which would create the greatest misfortunes. ‘Cujus est leges condere ejus est interpretari.’ It is therefore clear, that our opponent could not establish laws binding on the duke of Orleans, who was not his subject, or interpret the law in respect to him. For although his advocate styles him dean of the peers, it does not follow that he had any authority over the defunct; for if so, he would have authority over the whole kingdom, and be equal to the king. What though he be a peer? he has no power but over his own lands; and in so much as he attributes to himself the power of another over the realm, he appropriates to himself kingly domination.
‘His advocate has indeed alledged twelve reasons to prove that his lord might lawfully put to death the duke of Orleans without orders from any one whatever. The three first are founded on the declarations of three doctors in theology, and three others on the writings of three moral philosophers,—three on the civil law, and the three last on examples drawn from the holy Scriptures.
‘With regard to the first, taken from the writings of St Thomas Aquinas, who says,—‘Quando aliquis aliquod dominium sibi per violentiam suscipit nolentibus subditis, vel sine consensu communitatis et non est recursus ad superiorem per quem de tali invasore judicium posset fieri, tunc qui ad liberationem patriæ talem tyrannum occidit laudatur et præmium accipit.’ To this I reply, that it is no way applicable to the case; for my lord of Orleans never intruded on any other’s domination by violence, nor did he attempt to usurp the power and authority of the king. I say, he never even thought of such a thing, as will more amply be shown in the third part of my defence of him.
‘I am therefore right in saying, that Saint Thomas speaks of him who may be proved a tyrant,—but my lord of Orleans was not one. On this subject St Austin proposes a question, whether it be lawful for a pilgrim to kill a robber, who is on the watch on the highway? and from his conclusion it is apparent, that he does not think it lawful for any man to put another to death without sentence of the law, as Henry de Gand afterward determined.
‘I shall add, that supposing my lord of Orleans was such a person as our opponent describes him, but which I deny, he had a safe resort to the king, when he was in good health and cheerful with the queen and the princes of his blood,—none of whom would have hesitated to have personally exposed himself in bringing to punishment the duke of Orleans, had he been proven guilty of usurping the king’s authority. Most certainly, my late lord had too good an understanding to imagine he could ever succeed to the crown, when so many obstacles were against him and the king assured of successors.
‘The second reason is founded on the authority of St Peter, who says, ‘Subditi, estote regi quasi præcellenti sive ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum quia hæc est voluntas Dei.’ These words appear to me of no weight in the present case; for it would seem that the Apostle would not that any duke should have dominion over a whole kingdom, but solely in his own country: otherwise it would follow that Brittany, Berry, and the other duchies within the realm, should obey the duke of Burgundy.—The advocate has, therefore, wrongfully perverted the holy Scripture to his purpose.
‘His third reason is drawn from what Sabellicus says, in the fifteenth chapter of his third book, ‘Tyranno licet adulari quem licet occidere.’ That is to say, It is lawful to flatter and deceive a tyrant who may legally be put to death; but Sabellicus here speaks of such as have been proven and known for tyrants.
‘The fourth reason is founded on what Aristotle says, in his book on the government of cities, That it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to slay a tyrant. But Aristotle alludes to a public tyrant; and such was not my lord of Orleans, as I have before shown.
‘The fifth reason is grounded on the praise Tully, in his book ‘de Officiis,’ gives to those who killed Cæsar. To this I reply, that although Tully was a man of great ability, he here speaks as an ill-wisher to Cæsar; for he was always of the party, and supported the cause of Pompey the rival and adversary to Cæsar,—and Cæsar perpetrated many deeds which my lord of Orleans never thought of.
‘The sixth reason is grounded on what is said in the sixth chapter of the second book of the Misfortunes of great Men: ‘Res est valde meritoria occidere tyrannum.’ To this I answer, That it must apply only in cases where no other remedy can be had; and the conduct of our opponent has been illegal and wicked.