‘That authority is required as essential to enable any one to put another to death appears clearly in many parts of the holy Scriptures: and in fact, St Austin, when discussing the saying of our Lord, in the 26th chapter of the gospel of St Matthew,‘Omnis qui gladium acceperit, gladio peribit;’ that is, Whosoever useth the sword shall perish by the sword; adds, ‘All who shall, without lawful authority, make use of the sword, or shall arm himself against another, is bold in his wickedness.’ He afterwards asserts, that even a malefactor cannot be put to death without lawful authority; for in his Civitas Dei, ‘Qui, inquit, sine publica administratione maleficum interfecerit, velut homicida judicabitur.’ That is, Whoever shall slay a malefactor without the forms of public administration of justice shall be judged guilty of murder. This the law confirms, ‘Vigor, inquit, publicus tutela in medio constituta est, ne quis de aliquo, etiam sceleribus implicato sumere valeat ultionem:’—which is, That the public strength is as a defence constituted and ordained to prevent any one from taking vengeance, even upon him who is involved in great and abominable crimes.
‘In truth, the advocate for our adversary may say, that the laws should only take cognizance of such as act contrary to law; and that as a tyrant proceeds directly in opposition to them, he will affirm that this murder is no way contrary to the law. Alas! and does the advocate of our opponent know that my late lord of Orleans was a tyrant? Who is the judge that declares him such?
‘The fallacy of this assertion must be strictly examined, for on this deception is founded the supposition of my lord being a tyrant; and as our adversary groundlessly asserts, that the late duke of Orleans was a tyrant in the eye of reason, he concludes that it was lawful to put him to death. Let us, however, consider the properties of tyranny, and who should be accounted tyrants.
‘The philosopher says, in his 4th chapter on morals, ‘Tyrannus est, cum aliquis princeps, vi et violentia potestatis, sine titulo terram usurpat alienam, et de facto aliquam occupat civitatem vel patriam et qui incorrigibilis est, et nulli obediens.’ Now let us see whether my lord of Orleans had these properties. Certainly not; for he never took possession of another’s land: if any one know the contrary, let him say so.
‘Our opponent, therefore, ought not to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, for he never usurped any dominion, excepting over such places as were given him as appanages by the king, or what he had himself justly acquired. The duke of Burgundy, on the contrary, withholds three castles and their dependencies, without any just title, from the inheritance and domain of the king, namely, Lille, Douay and Orchies, notwithstanding his oaths on the holy sacrament to the king, that he would restore them to the crown, according to the conditions and agreements then made.
‘My lord of Orleans was never incorrigible; for I firmly believe that never did so great a prince pay more respect and honour to the laws.
‘Let our opponent say what acts or opposition the duke of Orleans ever committed or made against the laws. There are many noble persons now living, who can testify that no lord ever supported or maintained the dignity of justice more than the duke of Orleans during his whole life.
‘If we consider the properties of a tyrant according to the philosophers, they declare that a tyrant bends his whole mind to slay and destroy the prudent and wise: he seeks the ruin of churches and colleges of learning, and is solely occupied with destruction. He is much to be feared for his wickedness, whilst he studies to preserve his personal safety by strong guards. Such were not the qualities of my late lord, for his were the direct opposite.
‘In the first place, he never caused either wise men or fools to be put to death, but was particularly fond of the learned, and desirous of seeing any new improvements. In regard to churches, so far from destroying them, he repaired many, and founded some new ones, to which he gave large estates, as is well known. As for guarding his personal safety, he felt himself so innocent and pure toward all mankind, that he suspected no one of attempting to hurt him, and took no precautions, as you have seen, against his murderers. In fact, had he been of a suspicious temper, he would not have been thus treacherously slain.
‘It is therefore wonderfully astonishing how our adversary should have dared to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, by way of excusing his abominable act, when it is apparent that his qualities were directly the reverse to those of a tyrant. This I think a sufficient answer to the damnable proposition of our opponent.