‘The second fact is, that in cases where a subject-vassal has been guilty of this crime, he cannot be too severely or too speedily punished; but a man of rank is more deserving of punishment than a simple subject, a baron than a simple knight, a count than a baron, a duke than a count, the cousin to the king than a foreigner, the king’s brother than a cousin, the son to the king than his brother. Such is the first part of the second fact,—and I thus prove the second part; for as the obligation is greater, by many degrees, to desire to preserve the safety of the king’s person and the good of the state, so the punishment of those who act contrary increases according to their rank; and the consequence I draw from it will prove true, namely, that the son is more bounden than the brother, the brother than the cousin, a duke than a count, a count than a baron, a baron than a knight, &c. to guard and preserve the honour of the king and the welfare of the realm; for to each of these ranks and dignities is a certain corresponding duty attached,—and the higher the rank, the greater the obligation, for the larger the possessions, and the more noble the person, the more he is bounden, as St Gregory, before quoted, says, ‘Cum crescunt dona et rationes donorum.’
‘To continue my argument: the nearer the person is to the king by blood or hereditary honours, should he commit such crimes, it is by far more scandalous than if they were done by others removed at a greater distance from royalty. It is more scandalous for a duke or a potent lord, nearly related to the king, to practise his death, in order to gain his kingdom, than it would be for a poor subject no way related to the king; and being more iniquitous, the more deserving punishment.
‘I shall, in the third place, prove my proposition by saying, Where there is greater danger there should be a greater degree of punishment; for the machinations of near relations to the king are of far more importance and more perilous than those of poor people. And as they are more dangerous, they are deserving of severer punishment to obviate the perils that may happen, and to check the desires that may arise in such as are so near to the crown, to gain possession of it. For this end, they may exert every influence, by force or otherwise, to grasp it, which a poorer subject would never think of doing, as he could not have any expectations of wearing it.
‘My third truth is, That it is lawful for any subject, without any particular orders from any one, but from divine, moral and natural law, to slay, or to cause to be slain, such disloyal traitors; I say it is not only lawful for any one to act thus in such cases, but it is also meritorious and highly honourable, particularly when the person is of such high rank that justice cannot be executed by the sovereign himself. I shall prove this truth by twelve reasons, in honour of the twelve Apostles.
‘The three first reasons are drawn from the authorities of three moral philosophers: three others are from three dogmas of sacred theology of St Augustin, who says, in the last part of the second book of sentences, ‘Quando aliquis dominium sibi per violentiam surripit nolentibus subditis, vel etiam ad consensum coactis: et non est recursus ad superiorem per quem de tali judicium posset fieri. Talis enim qui ad liberationem patriæ talem tirannum occidit, laudem et præmium accissit. Hic primum laudatur. Item debet laudari per quæ facit opus dignum laude. Idem licitum præmium et honorabile accipit, et idem debet accipere. Ille facit opus meritorium quia nullum opus est dignum, primo nisi fieret meritorium.’ To translate this briefly, the holy doctor declares, that a subject who shall put to death such a tyrant does a work deserving praise and remuneration.
‘My second authority is as follows: ‘Salisberiensie, sacræ theologiæ eximii doctoris in libro suo Policratici, li. ii. cap. 15. Sic dicit; amico adulari non licet; sed aurem tiranni mulcere licitum est, ei namque scilicet tiranno licet adulari quem licet occidere;’ that is to say, It is unlawful to flatter a friend, but not so to deceive by fair words the ears of a tyrant; for since it is lawful to put him to death, it is allowable to cheat him by flattering speeches.
‘My third authority is from several doctors, whom I class together, not to exceed the number of three, namely, ‘Ricardi de media villa, Alexandri de Hallis et Astensis, in summa qui conclusionem præfatam ponunt in iii. efforum;’ adding, for higher authority, the confirmation of St Peter the apostle, who says, ‘Subditi estote regi quasi præcellenti sive ducibus, tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, audem vero bonorum, quia sic est voluntas Dei.’ Scribitur primæ Pet. ii. That is to say, It is the will of God that all should obey the king, as sovereign lord over his kingdom; and the duke, as being sent by the king to punish those who have done ill, and remunerate the good.
‘Hence it follows, that dukes are obliged, to the utmost of their power, to avenge the injuries that are done, or may be intended against the king’s person, and to oppose all such attempts as may come to their knowledge.
‘I now proceed to the authorities from moral philosophers, the first of which is,—‘Ante forum principis pluribus locis cuilibet subditorum licitum est occidere tyrannum, et non solum licitum immo laudabile.’ That is to say, It is lawful for any subject to destroy a tyrant, and not only lawful, but even honourable and worthy of praise.
‘Cicero, in libro de Officiis, ‘Laudatis illos qui illum Cæsarem interfecerunt quamvis esset sibi familiarium amicus eo quod jura imperii quasi tyrannus usurpaverat.’ That is, Tully writes, in his noble book on morality, That those who killed Julius Cæsar are praiseworthy, because Julius had usurped the government of Rome as a tyrant.