‘My third authority is from Boccacio, who, in his book ‘de Casibus virorum illustrium, s. lib. ii. cap. 15. contra filios tyrannorum,’ in speaking of the tyrant, says, ‘Shall I call him king? shall I call him prince? shall I preserve my allegiance to him? Oh no: he is an enemy to the public welfare. May I employ conspiracies and open force against him? It is very proper and necessary so to do,—for there is not a more agreeable sacrifice than the blood of a tyrant, and it is insupportable to receive blame for having done good.’
‘I come now to my three authorities from the civilians. As I am no lawyer, it will suffice if I mention the judgments that have been given without producing them; for in my life I never studied the canon nor civil law more than two years, and twenty years have passed since that time, so that what little I may have learnt I have quite forgotten since the period of my studies.
‘The first authority of the civil law is, That any one may put to death deserters from the laws of chivalry; and who can be a greater deserter from chivalry than him who deserts the person of his king, the fountain of chivalry, and without whom it cannot long exist?
‘Secondly, It is lawful for every one to kill thieves and robbers, who infest forests and rob on the highways,—because they are particularly the enemies of the public weal, and consequently plotting to destroy all travellers: consequently, it is lawful to kill a tyrant, who is continually practising against his king, the sovereign lord, and against the public good.
‘Thirdly, If it be lawful for any one by the civil and imperial law to put to death a thief found by night in a house, it is much more so to slay a tyrant, who day and night devises the death of his sovereign lord. This consequence clearly follows, and will be apparent to any man of sound understanding, if he consider it, and the antecedent texts from holy writ.
‘Before I touch on the three examples from the holy Scriptures, I wish to reply to some objections that may be made to what I say, in arguing thus: All murder is forbidden by every law, divine, natural, moral and civil. Whatever may be said to the contrary, I shall prove it from Scripture: ‘Non occides,’ in Joh. xx. is one of the divine commandments, which forbids any kind of murder. That it is forbidden by the natural law, I prove by this quotation,—‘Natura enim inter homines quandam cognationem constituit qua hominem homini insidiari nefas est.’
‘I prove it forbidden by the moral law, from ‘Quia per id: hoc non facias aliis quod tibi non vis fieri: alterum non lædere; jus suum unicuique tribuere: hoc est morale, insuper et de naturali jure.’
‘That the civil and imperial laws forbid murder, those laws shall prove, ‘Qui hominem occidit capite puniatur, non habita differentia sexus vel conditionis. Item omne bellum omnis usus armorum vitiosus præcipue prohibitus est: nam qui vitio præcipue bellum gerit, læsæ majestatis reus est. Item regis proprium furta cohibere, adulteria punire, ipsos de terra perdere: qui enim talia sibi appropriat aut usurpat, principem injuriatur et lædit: quoniam ut dicit lex judiciorum vigor: juris et publica tutela in medio constituta est, ne quis de aliquo quantumcunque sceleribus implicito assumere valeat ultionem.’
‘To reply to the above arguments: It should be known that theologians and jurists use diversely this word homicidium; but, notwithstanding, they agree in the same opinion respecting the thing. The theologians say, that to kill a man lawfully is not homicide, for the word homicidium carries with it ‘quod sit justum propter hoc dicunt quod Moyses, Phinees, et Mathathias non commiserunt homicidia quia juste occiderunt;’ but some jurists say, that killing of a man, just or unjust, is homicide,—while others deny it, saying there are two modes of homicide, legal and illegal; and for justifiable homicide no man ought to be punished.
‘I answer, therefore, with the theologians, that the killing of a tyrant is not homicide, inasmuch as it is just and legal. According to the general law, I confess it would be homicide; but if there be shewn justifiable cause for it, no punishment, but remuneration, should follow.