‘With regard to that part of the argument which says, ‘Quod hominem homini insidiari nefas est, et quæ magis insidiatur homini,’ &c. it alludes to a tyrant who is continually practising the death of his king and sovereign lord. ‘Et homo est nefas, et perditio, et iniquitas.’ As for him who slays a man, by watching a proper opportunity for it, to save the life of his king, and preserve him from mortal peril, he does no ‘nefas,’ but acquits himself of his duty toward his sovereign lord. ‘Et homo est nefas, et perditio, et iniquitas;’ and therefore he who kills such an one, by watching a proper opportunity, does it to save the life of his king.
‘In regard to that passage which says, ‘Non facias aliis, &c. alterum non lædere,’ &c. I reply, that it makes against the tyrant, and in favour of him who slays him; for he (the tyrant) does against his king that which he would not have to be done against himself, ‘et ipsum regem injuriatur et lædit.’ For which reason, he who has put to death such a person, according to his deserts, has done nothing contrary to the laws, but has preserved the meaning of them, namely, true equity and loyalty towards his king and sovereign lord.
‘To the other quotation from the laws that says, ‘Hominem occidere, capitale esse omnis usus armorum,’ &c. I answer, that there are no laws nor usages so very general but that there may be some exceptions made from them. I say, that the case of killing a tyrant is exempted, more especially when he is guilty of the crimes before mentioned. How can any greater cause of exemption be shewn than that, when the murder is done through necessity, to save the king from being put to death?
‘Even when conspiracies against his royal person have been so far carried by witchcraft and otherwise, that he is disabled from administering justice; and the tyrant being found deserving of that punishment, the king, from weakness of intellect, cannot, or will not, punish him, the killing of him, in such cases, is not against the law, properly speaking, for all laws have two meanings: the first is the textual signification, the other is the ‘quo animo,’—the person committing a crime has done it, and the law, as intended by those who made it, is to be explained according to the intent of its framers, and not always according to the literal sense.
‘Thus the philosopher brings forward the example of citizens who made a law for the defence of their city, that no one, under pain of death, should mount the ramparts, because their city was besieged; and they were afraid, should strangers mount the walls with the inhabitants, there might arise danger to them, from these strangers, at a proper opportunity, joining their enemies, or at least making them signs to show where they might the more easily attack the town.
‘It happened, that this town was attacked at several places,—when the strangers and pilgrims who were within it, observing the enemy were much superior to the inhabitants, armed themselves and mounted the walls at the weaker parts, when they repulsed the enemy, and saved the town. The philosopher then asks, Since these pilgrims have mounted the walls contrary to the express words of the law, they have infringed it, and should they not be punished? I say no; for although they have acted contrary to the literal text of the law, they have not disobeyed the spirit of it, which was the saving of the town,—for had they not mounted the walls in its defence, it must have been taken.
‘As to the laws which declare, that none ought to administer justice but the prince, nor do any deeds of arms without his licence,—I maintain, that these laws were made for the preservation of the king’s honour and person, and for the public good.
‘Should there exist a tyrant of great power and authority, who is continually practising, by witchcraft and other means, the death of the king, and to deprive him of his kingdom,—and should that king, from weakness of intellect or want of force, be unable to punish him, and should he permit him to go on in his wickedness,—I should disregard, in this case, the law that forbids me to bear arms without the king’s licence, or to take the authority into my own hands in a general sense only. What have I to do with the literal sense of it? Am I to leave my king in such peril? By no means. I am bound to defend my king, and put to death the tyrant; for should I, by thus acting, do contrary to the text of the law, I follow the spirit of it, and the object it was directed to, namely, the preservation of the honour and life of my king; and I should think myself more deserving of praise than if I had suffered the tyrant to live on in his wickedness. I ought therefore to be rewarded, and not punished, for having done a meritorious deed, tending to a good purpose, for which end all laws were made.
‘St Paul says, ‘Littera occidit, charitas autem ædificat;’ which means, that to follow the literal sense of the holy Scriptures is death to the soul, but that we ought to obey the true meaning in all charity,—that is to say, to mark and accomplish the end for which the divine laws were made. Spiritual edification is a goodly thing.
‘Item, the laws divine, natural and human, give me authority for so doing, and by so doing I am a minister of the divine law; and it is plain, that the objections I have started, as probably to be made against what I have said, are not of any weight.