‘I come now to my three instances from the holy Scriptures, to confirm the truth of my third fact. In the first place, Moses, without any authority whatever, slew the Egyptian who tyrannised over the Israelites.
‘At this period, Moses had no authority to judge the people of Israel, for this power was not given to him until forty years after the perpetration of this act. Moses, however, was much praised for having done it. ‘Ut patet auctoritate, Exodi ij. quia tanquam minister legis hoc facit. Ita in proposito in hoc faciendo ego ero minister legis.’
‘The second instance is that of Phineas, who, without any orders, slew the duke Zambry, as has been related. Phineas was not punished for this, but on the contrary praised, and greatly requited in affection, honour and riches. In the affection that God shewed him, greater than before. In honour, ‘Quia reputatum est ei ad justiciam,’ &c. In riches, ‘Quia per hoc acquisivit actum sacerdotii sempiternum non tantum pro se, sed pro tota tribu sua.’
‘The third instance is that of St Michael the archangel, who, without waiting for any commands from God, or others, but solely from his natural love, killed the disloyal traitor to his God and Sovereign Lord,—because Lucifer was conspiring to invade the sovereignty and honour of God. St Michael was rewarded for his action in love, honour and wealth. In love, in that God had a stronger affection for him than any other, and confirmed him in his love and grace. In honour, ‘Quia fecit eum militiæ cœlestis principum in æternum.’ That is to say, He made him the prince of his angelic chivalry for ever. In wealth, for he gave him riches and glory to his satisfaction: ‘Tantum quantum erat capax, de quibus loquitur. O altitudo divitiarum sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et investigabiles viæ ejus.’ Ad. Rom. xi.
‘Thus my third fact has been proven by twelve reasons. The fourth is, That it is more meritorious, honourable and legal, that a tyrant should be slain by one of the king’s relations than by a stranger no way connected with him by blood,—by a duke than by a count,—by a baron than by a simple knight, and by a knight than by a common subject.
‘I thus prove my proposition. He who is related to the king has an interest to guard his honour and life against every injurious attempt, and is bounden so to do more than any stranger, and, in like manner, descending from those of high rank to the common subject. Should he fail in this his duty, the more deserving is he of punishment, while, on the contrary, by performing it, he gains the greater honour and renown. ‘Item in hoc magis relucent amor et obedientia occisoris, vel occidere præcipientis ad principem et dominum suum quia est magis honorabile si fuerit præpotens dux vel comes. Item in hoc magis relucet potentia regis quod est honorabile et quanto occisor vel dictæ occisionis præceptor non fuerit vilior et potentior tanto magis,’ &c.
‘In regard to alliances, oaths, promises and confederations, made between one knight and another, in whatever manner they be, should they be intended to the prejudice of the prince or his children, or the public welfare, no one is bound to keep them; for, in so doing, he would act contrary to the laws, moral, natural and divine. I shall now prove the truth of this: ‘Arguendo sic. Bonam æquitatem (dictamen rectaæ rationis) et legem divinam boni principes in persona publica servare, et utilitatem reipublicæ debent præferre, et præsupponere in omnibus talibus promissionibus, juramentis, et confederationibus: immo excipiuntur implicite secundum dictamen rectæ rationis: bonam æquitatem et charitatis ordinem quia alias esset licitum non obedire principi immo rebellare contra principes, quod est expresse contra sacram Scripturam quæ sic dicit: ‘Obedite principibus vestris, licet etiam discolis et alibi. Subjecti estote regi præcellenti, sive judicibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum.’ 1 Pet. iij. ut sup. allegatum est.
‘‘Ex illo arguitur sic. Quandocunque occurunt duæ obligationes ad invicem contrariæ major tenenda est, et minor dissolvenda quantum adhoc, sed in casu nostro concurrunt duæ obligationes. Et cum obligatio ad principem sit major, et alia minor obligatio ad principem tenenda est, et alia non in tali casu. Item arguendo eandem quæstionem, quandocunque aliquis facit quod est melius quamvis juravit se id non facturum, non est perjurium, sed perjurio contrarium: ut expresse ponit magister sententiarum ultima dicti tertii: sed in casu nostro melius est tyrannum in præfato casu occidere quamvis juravit se non occisurum quam presentem vivere ut tactum est superius: ergo occidere tyrannum in præfato casu quamvis juravit se non occisurum, non perjurium facit, sed perjurio contrarium. Et consequenter Isidorus in libro de summo bono sic dicit: id non est observandum sacramentum et juramentum quo malum incaute remititur, sed in casu nostro male et incaute promititur. Sed non tenent promissiones jurata vel confæderationes contra principem, uxorem principis, liberos, vel reipublicæ utilitatem.’
‘Seventhly, If any of the above confederations and alliances should turn out to the prejudice of the person so engaging, of his wife or his children, he is not obliged to abide by them. ‘Patet hic veritas per rationes tactas prius et cum hoc probatur sic, quia observare in illo casu confæderationes contra legem charitatis qua quis magis sibiipsi, uxori propriæ vel liberis quam posset obligari cuicunque alteri virtute talis promissionis et omnia præcepta et consimilia in ordine ad charitatem patent per apostolum sic dicentem. Finis præcepti est charitas, quia in omnibus casibus et promissionibus intelligitur hoc, si in fide observaverit juxta illud frangenti fidem, &c. Item, subintelligitur si domino placuerit sed certum est quod non placeret Deo cum foret contra legem charitatis, ideo,’ &c.
‘In regard to the seventh proposition, namely, that it is lawful and meritorious for any subject to put to death a traitor that is disloyal to his king, by waylaying him, and whether it be lawful for him to dissemble his purposes,—I shall prove it first by the authority of that moral philosopher Boccacio, already quoted, in his second book ‘De Casibus Virorum illustrium,’ who, in speaking of a tyrant, says, ‘Shall I honour him as prince? shall I preserve my faith to him as my lord? By no means: he is an enemy, and I may employ arms and spies against him.’ This act of courage is holy and necessary; for there cannot be a more agreeable sacrifice to God than the blood of a tyrant.