Attention should be called to two or three points emphasized by Mr. Arthur Diosy.[108] The first is that “Nelson’s own plan, as valid to-day as it was in his time,” has been carried out in the types of vessels built for the Japanese fleet. “The main idea prevailing in their selection is the defence of the national interests by offensive operations against the enemy’s fleets,” but “at no very great distance from the base of operations at home.” The warships of Japan, therefore, are not required to devote so much space to the storage of coal and other supplies for long voyages, and can utilize more space for guns and reserve ammunition, or can be built smaller and “handier.” It is in this way that “they are among the swiftest of all the fighting ships afloat.”
The second point, which is related to the first, is that Japan “stands in the foremost rank as a naval power,” not merely on account of the number and fighting strength of her ships, the efficiency of their officers and crews, and the perfection of the naval organization, but also on account of the well-equipped dockyards and arsenals in convenient locations, and the abundant supply of excellent coal in easy reach.
The third point concerns what Diosy calls the “Blue-jacket Spirit,” a “scarcely definable something” that is hard to describe in words, but that shines forth in every word and deed of the officer, the sailor, the marine,—the esprit de corps of the personnel of the Japanese navy. This spirit he finds only in the British, Japanese, and United States navies.
And we cannot refrain from quoting the same writer’s paragraph of summary as follows:—
“Japan possesses all the elements of Sea-Power: swift, powerful ships, adapted to the work they are intended for, numerous good harbors, excellent coal in abundance, capital facilities for the repair of her vessels, and the necessary plant, constantly augmented and improved, for building new ones. Her naval organization is wise and efficient, her administrative services are thorough and honest; her naval officers are gallant, dashing, and scientifically trained, and the armament they control is of the latest and best pattern. Strong in ships, strong in guns, Japan is stronger still in the factor without which ships and guns are useless—‘the Man behind the Gun.’”[109]
Ten years ago it was improper to speak of Japan as a world power; it was then fitting to treat of her, as Norman did in one chapter of his “Real Japan,” under the caption of “Japan as an Eastern Power.” But, as already pointed out, it was her overwhelming defeat of China that at least expedited her formal and nominal recognition in the comity of nations. The new treaties which formulated this recognition went into effect in 1899, from which date it may be eminently proper to begin a seventh period,[110] that of “Cosmopolitanism,” in the history of New Japan. And by Japan’s successes in the second war with China arising out of the Boxer troubles, she confirmed her claim to recognition as a world power; and this recognition was completed through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Not many years ago the ideal was still such a narrow theme as “The Japan of the Japanese”; then the vision widened out so as to include “The Japan of Asia”; but now the horizon is unlimited and extends to “The Japan of the World.” Indeed, the Japanese have outgrown “Native Japan,” and even “Asiatic Japan,” into “Cosmopolitan Japan.” They are interested, not only in national, but also international, problems.
It has already been pointed out that the complete recognition of Japan as a world power was manifested in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This is the greatest political event of 1902,[111] so far as concerns directly the future of the Orient and indirectly the affairs of the Occident. This convention between Great Britain and Japan caused profound surprise and widespread rejoicing, and in Japan particularly it was the occasion for numerous feasts, even in various provincial localities, where more or less profuse self-gratulation was the order of the day. But it is now possible to take a calmer view of the situation and to make a more judicial estimate of the importance of the alliance.
In the first place, it is well to remember that this formal alliance is only the natural outcome of a community of interests in the Far East, and is the natural result of practical coöperation for some time past. As Count Ōkuma put it, they (Great Britain and Japan) have been allies in effect for some years; they are now allies in name. Indeed, for several years past this alliance has existed in spirit, and it has now merely become a public acknowledgment of sympathy and similar aims in policy in the Far East. This alliance, then, is not artificial or compulsory, but natural, spontaneous, and voluntary.
The second point to notice is that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance includes the greatest power each of the Occident and of the Orient. This alliance is also the combination of two of the greatest naval powers, as well as two great military powers of the world. It would seem likely, therefore, as a prominent Japanese expressed it, “that there is no power or combination of powers that could make head against this union in the Far East; the attempt would be like spitting at a tiger.” The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is, therefore, a guarantee, of the very first quality, of peace in the Orient, and of just dealings with China and Korea.
Another important point in connection with this alliance is the fact that herein Great Britain has abandoned, has broken to pieces, her traditional policy of “splendid isolation.” For many decades she has not been in the habit of contracting alliances with other powers in carrying out plans to advance her own interests. The fact, therefore, that in this case she has seen fit to depart from her usual policy is a positive indication that the situation in the Far East was one of imminent peril and demanded unusual precaution. It is a proof that Russian aggressions were no mere phantoms, but were terribly real and threatening.