[51] The soul of a dead man from whom a favourite possession is withheld returns (equally whether the body and the possessions with it are burnt or buried). The story in Lucian, Philops., xxvii, of the wife of Eukrates (cf. Hdt. v, 92η), is quite in accordance with popular belief. [50]
[52] Schliemann, Myc., 212–13: see plan F. A similar altar in the Hall of the Palace of Tiryus: Schuchhardt, Schliemann’s Exc. (E.T.), p. 107.
[53] ἐσχάρα is essentially ἐφ’ ἧς τοῖς ἥρωσιν ἀποθύομεν, Poll. i, 8; cf. Neanthes ap. Ammon., Diff. Voc., p. 34 V. Such an altar rested directly on the ground without anything intervening (μὴ ἔχουσα ὕψος ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ γῆς ἱδρυμένη), it is round (στρογγυλοειδής) and hollow (κοίλη): cf. esp. Harp., 87, 15 ff. Phot., s.v. ἐσχάρα (2 glosses); AB. 256, 32; EM., 384, 12 ff.; Sch. on ζ 52; Eust., Od., p. 1939 (ψ 71): Sch. Eur., Ph., 284. It is evident that the ἐσχάρα is not very far removed from the sacrificial trench of the cult of the dead: thus it is actually called also βόθρος; Sch. Eur., Ph., 274 (σκαπτή S. Byz., 191, 7 Mein.).
[54] Stengel has a different view (Chthon. u. Todt., 427, 2).
II
[55] It is doubtful whether Homer even knew of dream-oracles (which would be closely related to oracles of the dead). That in Α 63 ἐγκοίμησις is “at least alluded to” (as Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol., 172, thinks) is by no means certain. The ὀνειροπόλος would not be a priest who intentionally gave himself up to prophetic sleep and thus ὑπὲρ ἑτέρων ὀνείρους ὁρᾷ, but rather an ὀνειροκρίτης—an interpreter of other men’s unsought dream-visions.
[56] Even the river-gods and Nymphs who are usually confined to their own homes are called to the ἀγορά of all the gods in Olympos, Υ 4 ff. These deities who remain fixed in the locality of their worship are weaker than the Olympians just because they are not elevated with the rest to the ideal summit of Olympos. Kalypso resignedly admits this, ε 169 f., εἴ κε θεοί γ’ ἐθέλωσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν, οἵ μευ φέρτεροί εἰσι νοῆσαί τε κρῆναί τε. They have sunk to the second rank of deities. They are, however, never thought of as free and independent, but as a mere addition to the kingdom of Zeus and the other Olympians.
[57] Exx. in Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol.2, 387 f. (φρένες), W. Schrader, Jb. f. Philol. 1885, p. 163 f. (ἦτορ).
[58] The belief in the existence of more than one soul in the same person is very wide-spread. See J. G. Müller, Americ. Urrelig., p. 66, 207 f., Tylor, i, 432 f. The distinction between the five spiritual powers dwelling within man given by the Avesta rests upon similar grounds (Geiger, Civ. of East. Iran, 1, 124 ff.). Even in Homer Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i, 249, finds a “two-soul” theory fully developed. According to him Homer recognizes in the θυμός—a word supposed to be derived from the steam rising from freshly shed and still warm blood—a second soul in addition to the ψυχή: a “smoke-soul” side by side with the “breath-soul”. But if by soul a “something” is meant—as it must be in popular psychology—which is added independently to the body and its faculties, something which lives separately in the body and after the death of the body (with which it is not indissolubly united) dissociates itself and goes off independently—then the θυμός of Homer cannot be called a “soul” or a double of the ψυχή. Again and again the θυμός is clearly referred to as a mental faculty of the living body; either thinking or willing or merely feeling (θυμῷ νοέω, θυμῷ δεῖσαι, γηθήσει θυμῷ, ἐχολώσατο θυμῷ, ἤραρε θυμὸν ἐδωδῇ, etc.) is conducted by its means. It is the seat of the emotions (μένος ἔλλαβε θυμόν) and belongs to the body of the living man, and is especially enclosed in the φρένες. In the face of [51] this it is impossible to regard it as something independent of the body or as anything else than a special faculty of the same living body. Once, indeed, Η 131, the θυμός is spoken of, instead of ψυχή as that which goes down to Haides, but this can only be an error or an oversight (see also below, ch. xi, [n. 2]). According to Homeric ideas—and this is a conception repeated over and over again in Greek literature and even in Greek philosophy—the body has all its vital powers in itself, not merely θυμός but μένος, νόος, μῆτις, βουλή. Yet it only acquires life when supplemented by the ψυχή, which is something different from all these bodily powers—something with an independent being of its own and alone deserving the name “soul”, a name which belongs as little to θυμός as to νόος. Gomperz thinks that θυμός, etc., were at first the only recognized faculties of the body and that ψυχή was only (for the Greeks) added later. This is certainly not to be made out from Homer—or any other part of Greek literature.
[59] περὶ ψυχῆς θέον, X 161; περὶ ψυχέων ἐμάχοντο, χ 245; ψυχὴν παραβαλλόμενος, I 322; ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι, γ 74, ι 255; ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον, I 401; and cf. ι 523: αἲ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός σε δυναίμην εὖνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω. No one strictly speaking can go into Hades bereft of his ψυχή, for it is the ψυχή alone which goes there. Thus ψυχή here clearly = life, as is shown also by the addition of the words καὶ αἰῶνος for the sake of clearness. It is more doubtful whether this is the explanation of ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, X 325, or of ψυχὰς ὀλέσαντες, Ν 763, Ω 168. Other passages adduced by Nägelsb., Hom. Th.2, 381, and Schrader, Jb. f. Philol. 1885, p. 167, either admit or require the material sense of the word ψυχή: e.g. Ε 696 ff., Θ 123, σ 91, etc.