Thus, the obvious application of the term is geographical. Yet Americans of authority are fully aware of the need of reservation in this geographical application. In 1909, the Director of the Pan-American Union pointed out, with some mortification, that on the occasion of the Pan-American Congress at Buenos Aires, most of the delegates from the north found that the easiest route from the chief city of North America to the chief city of South America lay through Europe. And an eminent American economist[6] has lately uttered a warning against geographical misapprehensions, explaining that, whereas the Panamá Canal makes the west coast of South America an extension of the east coast of the United States, nevertheless the bulk of the South American population lives upon the Atlantic coast and prefers its traditional, customary and natural intercourse with Europe.
But in considering the meaning of an incipient and growing force, it would be a mistake to dwell on possible limitations and difficulties; and it would be pedantic and unpractical to demand precise consistency or exact definition. We are rather concerned with aspirations, tendencies and formative ideas. Indeed, it might fairly be argued that these limitations, which are fully realised and avowed in North America, are no argument against the Pan-American movement, but rather an argument in support of it, as being a prudent and wholesome effort to overcome existing obstacles and promote a better understanding between neighbours.
Pan-Americanism may be described as the movement which aims at uniting all the American republics:—one cannot say all the American countries; for in the map printed on the cover of the Pan-American Bulletin, Canada is left blank, as not forming part of "Pan-America." This omission alone is enough to prove, if proof were needed, that there is something artificial about Pan-Americanism: for obviously a New Yorker is more at home in Toronto or Halifax than in Rio or Buenos Aires; and there is a closer political similarity as well as a closer political bond between Washington and Ottawa than between Washington and Caracas. But, after all, most political combinations are largely artificial: they are products of statesmanship rather than of nature, or at all events they are products of nature assisted by statesmanship. And Pan-Americanism need not be less real or less valuable for being a construction deliberately planned instead of a spontaneous organism. But since the Pan-American movement is artificial, and a matter of policy and management, still rather formless, Americans of both continents differ considerably both as to its meaning and its usefulness, some declaring that it means nothing and is useless or even mischievous, while others regard it as a kind of perfect circle embracing all the future.
Dr Usher, the American historian, dismisses the whole notion, on the ground that the United States and Latin America are utterly unlike, unsympathetic and even antipathetic to one another. Against this conclusion may be quoted two opinions from Chile and from Colombia, the two South American countries which have in the past shown most resentment at North American pretensions. "We want no papa" exclaimed a Chilian public man some years ago: yet in 1910 Señor Echeverria, Chilian consul in London, in a public lecture declared himself a decided believer in the benefits of Pan-Americanism, and as disposed to accept the sincerity of North American pacific and non-aggressive professions: and in the same year Señor Pérez Triana, the Colombian diplomatist, expressed a restrained but decided optimism concerning the benefits to be derived from the Pan-American Congresses, and pointed out that they had already brought about the general acceptance of the principle of arbitration among American Governments. These favourable views have regard to the practical benefits to be found in a certain course of action. The destiny of Pan-Americanism depends on the question whether these practical benefits are strong enough to overcome the barriers of race, language, religion, law, customs and tradition.
The objections based upon these obstacles to union is not quite convincing. Incompatibility of temper is a bar to marriage: it is no bar to a practical and thoroughly friendly business understanding supported by mutual respect and methods of give and take. The tendencies of the age favour large combinations, overstepping the bounds of nationality and sometimes cutting across the lines of kindred and tradition. The challenge of Central Europe has raised up such a combination in Western Europe, and may help to give birth to a fresh and large grouping of the Powers of the western hemisphere.
The question occurs whether, apart from reasons of practical convenience, any fundamental basis can be found for the union of communities so dissimilar in character and in action. These republics have this at least in common: they have all started life in "new lands"; they are all trans-Atlantic offshoots from European monarchies; they have all thrown off political dependence upon Europe; they have all adopted republican forms of government; and, to whatever extent some of them may avoid democratic or even republican methods, they have all rejected the hereditary principle in government. Moreover, before the present crisis they all cultivated, so far as possible, a certain political aloofness from Europe: and they all aim at pursuing a destiny distinct from and, in their belief, transcending that of Europe through the inexhaustible possibilities offered by a New World.
What success has attended the United States in her recent policy of approaching Latin America? Here we are on delicate ground, and whatever view be expressed is sure to meet with disagreement on the part of qualified judges. It is not easy to keep one's finger on the pulse of South American sentiment, nor can we expect to find unanimity. We can only watch indications and symptoms. In the past, on the whole, the attitude of the United States has been accepted in so far as it implied protection; but it has been warmly resented in so far as it seemed to imply any kind of protectorate. A certain arrogance in the public pretensions of the United States has been felt to be an offence and a menace; and this feeling has been intensified by the bearing of individual Americans. Yet a representative Chilian, Señor Vildósola, writing since the outbreak of the war, says, "The United States was not popular in Chile; her political attitude was rude and overbearing (une politique brutale); but in the past ten years this is changed. The Big Stick is relegated to the cellars of the White House. A certain refinement of forms has appeared in the Secretaryship of State, and a deeper knowledge of the peoples of the continent has induced the Government, press and people of the United States to treat Chile and her neighbours with a new respect and consideration." It may here be noted that Chile has lately entered into close economic relations with the United States, through the American acquisition of great mining properties in Chile and through the export of nitrate and copper to North America, largely carried in Chilian government transports.
A representative Brazilian lately remarked to the present writer, "I believe there is no danger at all from the United States" and, referring to the preferential tariff granted by Brazil to certain imports from the United States, he added, "The Americans admit our coffee free, and we grant this abatement in return. They tax imports of things that they produce, and admit free the things they cannot produce. You English are different. You tax our coffee: you tax things you cannot produce and let in free the things you can produce." There can be no doubt that these close commercial relations and recent large American investments in Brazilian industries conduce to this tentative entente with the United States.
The relations of the A.B.C. countries seem to indicate similar tendencies. It is probable that the main object, which led these three republics to entertain proposals of alliance, was security against possible danger from the United States. As these apprehensions diminished, the proposals were shelved, and the A.B.C. resolved itself into its component alphabet. There was another not less interesting reason for this dissolution: the proposed combination of the stronger South American states was not welcomed by the other republics, which felt that an arrangement of this kind did not favour the union and harmony of the whole continent, even though the professed intention was that it should serve as a nucleus which might gradually win the voluntary adhesion of other republics.
Again, those republics which have been drawn closely under the influence of the United States, threw in their lot with her by declaring war against Germany—a decision which seems to be an act of gratitude, and a recognition that their position of dependence is not felt to be irksome or degrading.