A recent act of the small but sturdy Republic of Uruguay seems to be very significant. After first severing relations with Germany and then rescinding her declaration of neutrality, Uruguay decreed that "No American State, if engaged in a war against a European State in defence of its rights, shall be treated as a belligerent by Uruguay." There is something a little whimsical in this previous sweeping aside of all contingencies, and one may imagine circumstances where the interpretation of this decree might puzzle the legal advisers of the Uruguayan Foreign Office. But the whole-hearted comprehensive intention of the decree is obvious. Uruguay is prepared to go the whole way in the direction of Pan-Americanism, and opens her arms equally to all the republics of both American continents.
The proposal to establish a Pan-American University at Panamá may be worth mentioning here. The suggestion sounds like a product of the tropical spirit of those regions; but it may yet take significant shape.
The United States, before entering the war, had largely increased her trade with Latin America. She succeeded in supplying, in great degree, the gaps left by Germany and Great Britain. Her entry into the war has deprived her of part of that advantage. But, on the other hand, the final decision, the manner in which it was made, and the resolute way in which it is being pursued, have vastly strengthened the moral standing of the United States in the New World. Those Latin-American states which are dependent on her joined her as belligerents. The action of Brazil, though taken independently and inspired more by French than by North American sympathies, followed North American action and cannot be wholly dissociated from it. Most of the Latin-American states, by their attitude towards the war, have as it were mounted guard behind the Allies. But the United States stands embattled in front of her southern neighbours, to fight the monster which threatens them all. The United States now, at last, appears, not merely as the theoretic propounder of a protection which was really ensured by the assent of Great Britain and the strength of the British fleet, but as the active champion in a common cause. This position has been strengthened by President Wilson's solemn disavowals of any aggressive intention. These promises have produced a marked impression in South America.
The war has brought into view another practical reason for a closer inter-American understanding. As long as the United States remained neutral, no other American state, such as Brazil, could have incurred the risk of entering the war. In the past, while South American countries were able to keep apart from European politics, this complication or hindrance was latent and remote. But the period of aloofness is closed, and the American republics are taking their place among the nations of the world. Some kind of permanent entente, some standing arrangement for exchanging views and adjusting policy, would seem to be the best means of obviating any friction or awkwardness between north and south in respect of external relations. Thus a closer understanding with the United States may be regarded as a necessary condition of closer relations with the rest of the world.
Many who know South America well will dissent from the suggestion that the war is helping to mould into some kind of shape the rather shadowy scheme called Pan-Americanism. They will point to the fact that most South Americans would rather have dealings with a European than with a North American and will recall what has been said elsewhere, namely, that the two Americas, both historically and actually, face severally towards Europe and not towards one another. All this is true; yet there are signs that the tendency called Pan-Americanism, hitherto a rather unsubstantial vision, may become a reality, differing indeed from the picture traced by some North American prophets, but resting upon more solid bases. We have touched upon business relations and the machinery for carrying them on. As to political relations, the growing strength of the greater South American republics counts for much. They feel themselves to be in a position to say, "We do not want your protection; but we value your equal friendship; for we are Americans as well as you. And we are willing to group ourselves together for the preservation and protection of that America which is ours." An equal understanding between equals—provided it is not too formal at first, and is allowed to be moulded by the course of events—would probably meet with a fairly general assent, which might gradually win over those holding aloof at first. Something of the kind seems to be taking form at the present time. The ultimate result may be the formation of a Concert of America, in which the more tranquil and educated elements may guide the whole. President Wilson has suggested some such arrangement, and proposes a combination of American republics as the best security against aggression by one American Power upon another.
From what has been said above, it is obvious that some of the Caribbean lands would enter such a combination as satellites or subject-allies of the United States. Such an arrangement is not unparalleled and does not seem impracticable, since these small states have already entered the war in that capacity. Obviously, Pan-Americanism cannot aim at precise symmetry or theoretical consistency. It must be an elastic system, and must be prepared to meet and overcome difficulties. That is the purpose of its existence. But in general the first condition of a Pan-American combination would seem to be the abandonment of any pretensions to hegemony by any one state. Such pretensions have shattered the Concert of Europe. But America is a younger Europe which may take example—and warning too—from that old Europe which has given her such institutions and such order as she possesses. Thus a New World may indeed arise to redress the balance of the Old.
To the emancipation of Latin America Great Britain and the British contributed more than any other outside nation. In the subsequent development of those countries, Britain has had a large share. In the moral protection afforded to them by the attitude of the United States, the unostentatious and almost tacit support of Great Britain has counted for much. And those countries are now being drawn nearer to Great Britain and nearer to Europe than ever before. The question now arises:—In the closer grouping of American states now in process of formation, is Great Britain to stand aloof, a sympathetic but silent and inactive spectator? That this question has actually been raised in the United States, is shown by the following quotation from The Times History of the War (chapter 222, page 9): "As the Philadelphia Ledger put it 'it seemed an absurdity to talk of Pan-Americanism and in the same breath to ignore the fact that one of the greatest of the American Powers is not included in it.' The New Republic went further ... 'Pan-Americanism,' it declared, 'is a tripod that cannot stand on two legs for ever. Only a combination of the Latin countries, the United States and Great Britain, that is to say a combination of all the American Powers, can make it a safe and useful organization in the world to-day.'"
There is nothing new in this idea; for Bolívar, with singular magnanimity, invited Great Britain and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to send delegates to the Pan-American Congress which he attempted to assemble at Panamá in 1826: the circumstances of the time precluded an invitation to France. And now that Brazil and Cuba sit at the council-board of the Allies in Paris, a conception, which seemed feasible a century ago to a great imaginative mind, may perhaps not seem so very remote to a practical mind today. For the present epoch has brought home to all Americans of both continents a fact which has long been known to Canadians and Englishmen, namely that the ocean is no estranging gulf between nations. Today it is known that the geographical boundary which divides the peoples into two categories and separates the Old World of force from the New World of reason is not the Atlantic but the Rhine. Thus now, more than ever, does it seem a little incongruous that Washington should deny to Ottawa a community of American interests which is conceded to Caracas, Asunción and La Paz.
Yet the scheme thus adumbrated is not at the present time clearly in sight. The inclusion of Canada would reverse the system which now confines Pan-Americanism to those states which have thrown off all political connexion with Europe together with all monarchical forms. Moreover, new and large combinations must keep within manageable limits. Yet it is significant that a Uruguayan public man, Señor Lopez Lomba, is now vigorously agitating, in Paris and in South America, for the formation of a Pan-Atlantic Union, wherein the three great Atlantic Powers, Britain, France and the United States, are to combine with the Latin-American states, in order to wield with full effect that economic weapon which is to decide the world conflict. A combination formed for an immediate purpose may well have further and larger results. It is an interesting speculation whether, in some not very remote future, the daughter nations of the Iberian Peninsula may not be drawn into a wide circle of understanding with Britain and her daughter nations. Thus, that grouping of the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon peoples, which has been formed under stress of war, might continue its beneficent working through generations of peace. Portugal and Brazil, Great Britain and the United States stand side by side. Most of the daughter nations of Spain have ranged themselves in the same ranks, beside France, their intellectual foster-mother. Spain may yet re-discover herself and her true place in the comity of nations. At all events it is a great thing to have proved that the line dividing freedom from autocracy does not divide the peoples of the New World from their mother Europe, or preclude the whole of the former from joining any great international league such as the future may have in store for succeeding generations.