A history of the Japanese people

by F. Brinkley; Dairoku Kikuchi

-Foreign trade, so far from benefitting the nation, cannot fail to impoverish it, inasmuch as oversea commerce simply means that, whereas Japan receives a number of unnecessary luxuries, she has to give in exchange quantities of precious metals.

-To permit foreign intercourse would be to revoke the law of exclusion which has been enforced for centuries, and which was the outcome of practical experience.

These opinions were subscribed by a great majority of the feudatories. A few, however, had sufficient foresight and courage to advocate foreign intercourse. The leaders of this small minority were, Ii Naosuke, baron of Hikone, historically remembered as Ii Kamon no Kami; Toda Izu no Kami, bugyo of Uraga; Takashima Kihei (called also Shirodayu, or Shuhan); Egawa Tarozaemon, bugyo of Nirayama; and Otsuki Heiji, a vassal of the baron of Sendai. The views of these statesmen may be briefly summarized as follows:

-It is not to be denied that many illustrious and patriotic men, anticipating injury to the country's fortunes and perversion of the nation's moral canons, are implacably opposed to foreign intercourse. But the circumstances of the time render it impossible to maintain the integrity of the empire side by side with the policy of seclusion. The coasts are virtually unprotected. The country is practically without a navy. Throughout a period of nearly two and a half centuries the building of any ship having a capacity of over one hundred koku has been forbidden, and in the absence of war-vessels there is no means of defence except coast batteries, which are practically non-existent.

-When inaugurating the policy of seclusion, the Bakufu Government took care to leave China and Holland as a bridge between Japan and the rest of the world. It will be wise to utilize that bridge for dealing with foreign States, so as to gain time for preparations of defence, instead of rushing blindly into battle without any supply of effective weapons. If the Americans have need of coal, there is an abundant supply in Kyushu. If they require provisions and water, their needs can easily be satisfied. As for returning distressed foreign seamen, that has hitherto been done voluntarily, and an arrangement on this subject can be made through the medium of the Dutch. As for foreign trade, the times have changed radically since a veto was imposed on all commercial transactions, and it by no means follows that what was wise then is expedient now. Japan must have ocean-going vessels, and these cannot be procured in a moment. Her best way is to avail herself of the services of the Dutch as middlemen in trade, and to lose no time in furnishing herself with powerful men-of-war and with sailors and gunners capable of navigating and fighting these vessels.

-In short, the wisest plan is to make a show of commerce and intercourse, and thus gain time to equip the country with a knowledge of naval architecture and warfare. The two things most essential are that Christianity should not be admitted in the train of foreign trade, and that the strictest economy should be exercised by all classes of the people so as to provide funds for the building of a navy and the fortification of the coasts.

The question alluded to at the close of the above, namely, the question of finance, was a paramount difficulty for the Bakufu. In the very year of Perry's coming, a member of the Cabinet in Yedo wrote as follows to Fujita Toko, chief adviser of the Mito feudatory: "Unless I tell you frankly about the condition of the treasury you cannot appreciate the situation. If you saw the accounts you would be startled, and would learn at a glance the hopelessness of going to war. The country could not hold out even for a twelvemonth, and there is nothing for it except that everyone should join in saving money for purposes of equipment. If we keep the peace now and toil unremittingly for ten years, we may hope to restore the situation." In truth, the Bakufu had practically no choice. "On one hand, thousands of publicists, who believed themselves patriotic, clamoured for the policy of seclusion, even at the cost of war; on the other, the Yedo Government knew that to fight must be to incur crushing defeat." The Bakufu then issued the following temporizing decree:

"With regard to the despatch from the United States Government, the views of competent men have been taken and have been carefully considered by the shogun. The views expressed are variously worded but they advocate either peace or war. Everyone has pointed out that we are without a navy and that our coasts are undefended. Meanwhile, the Americans will be here again next year. Our policy shall be to evade any definite answer to their request, while at the same time maintaining a peaceful demeanour. It may be, however, that they will have recourse to violence. For that contingency we must be prepared lest the country suffer disgrace. Therefore every possible effort will be made to prepare means of defence. Above all it is imperative that everyone should practise patience, refrain from anger, and carefully observe the conduct of the foreigners. Should they open hostilities, all must at once take up arms and fight strenuously for the country."

A less vertebrate policy could scarcely have been formulated, but the conduct of the Bakufu statesmen was more stalwart than their language. Under the guidance of Abe Masahiro, one of the ablest statesmen that Yedo ever possessed, batteries were built at Shinagawa to guard the approaches to Yedo; defensive preparations were made along the coasts of Musashi, Sagami, Awa, and Kazusa; the veto against the construction of ocean-going ships was rescinded, and the feudatories were invited to build and arm large vessels; a commission was given to the Dutch at Deshima to procure from Europe a library of useful books; cannon were cast; troops were drilled, and everyone who had acquired expert knowledge through the medium of the Dutch was taken into official favour.

But all these efforts tended only to expose their own feebleness, and on the 2nd of November, 1853, instructions were issued that if the Americans returned, they were to be dealt with peacefully. "In short, the sight of Perry's steam-propelled ships, their powerful armament, and the specimens they carried of Western wonders had practically broken down the barriers of Japan's isolation without any need of treaties or conventions." Thus, when the American commodore returned in the following February with ten ships and crews numbering two thousand, he easily obtained a treaty by which Japan promised kind treatment to shipwrecked sailors; permission to foreign vessels to obtain stores and provisions within her territory, and an engagement that American vessels might anchor in the ports of Shimoda and Hakata. Much has been written about Perry's judicious display of force and about his sagacious tact in dealing with the Japanese, but it may be doubted whether the consequences of his exploit did not invest its methods with extravagant lustre.