TREATIES OF COMMERCE

Russia, Holland, and England speedily obtained treaties similar to that concluded by Commodore Perry in 1854. These, however, were not commercial conventions. It was reserved for Mr. Townsend Harris, American consul-general in Japan, to open the country to trade. Arriving in August, 1856, he concluded in March, 1857, a treaty securing to United States citizens the right of permanent residence at Shimoda and Hakodate, as well as that of carrying on trade at Nagasaki and establishing consular jurisdiction. Nevertheless, nothing worthy to be called commercial intercourse was allowed by the Bakufu, and it was not until Mr. Harris, with infinite patience and tact, had gone to Yedo alter ten months' delay that he secured the opening of ports other than Nagasaki to international commerce. In this achievement he was assisted by Hotta Masamutsu, successor to the great Masahiro, and, like most of his colleagues, a sincere advocate of opening the country.

Japan has been much blamed for her reluctance in this matter, but when we recall the danger to which the Yedo administration was exposed by its own weakness, and when we observe that a strong sentiment was growing up in favour of abolishing the dual form of government, we can easily appreciate that to sanction commercial relations might well have shaken the Bakufu to their foundations. It was possible to construe the Perry convention and the first Harris convention as mere acts of benevolence towards strangers, but a commercial treaty would not have lent itself to any such construction. We cannot wonder that the shogun's ministers hesitated to take an apparently suicidal step. They again consulted the feudatories and again received an almost unanimously unfavourable answer.

In fact, history has preserved only one unequivocal expression of consent. It was formulated by Matsudaira Yoshinaga, baron of Echizen. He had been among the most ardent exclusionists in the first council of feudatories; but his views had subsequently undergone a radical change, owing to the arguments of one of his vassals, Hashimoto Sanae—elder brother of Viscount Hashimoto Tsunatsune, president of the Red Cross Hospital, who died in 1909. "Not only did this remarkable man frankly advocate foreign trade for its own sake and as a means of enriching the nation, thus developing its capacity for independence, but he also recommended the fostering of industries, the purchase of ships and firearms, the study of foreign arts and sciences, and the despatch of students and publicists to Western countries for purposes of instruction. Finally, he laid down the principle that probity is essential to commercial success." Such doctrines were then much in advance of the time. Nevertheless, Harris achieved his purpose. He had audience of the shogun in November, 1857, and, on the 29th of the following July, a treaty was concluded opening Yokohama, from the 1st of July, 1858, to commerce between the United States and Japan.

This treaty was concluded in spite of the failure of two attempts to obtain the sanction of the Throne. Plainly the Bakufu shrank from openly adopting a policy which, while recognizing its necessity, they distrusted their own ability to force upon the nation. They had, however, promised Mr. Harris that the treaty should be signed, and they kept their word at a risk, of whose magnitude the American consul-general had no conception. Mr. Harris had brought to this conference exceptional diplomatic skill and winning tact, but it cannot be denied that he derived assistance from contemporaneous events in China, where the Peiho forts had just been captured and the Chinese forced to sign a treaty. He was thus able to warn the Japanese that the British and the French fleets might be expected at any moment to enter Yedo Bay, and that the best way to avert irksome demands at the hands of the British was to establish a comparatively moderate precedent by yielding to the American proposals.

THE THIRTEENTH SHOGUN, IESADA (1853-1858)

Between the conclusion of the Harris commercial treaty and its signature, the Bakufu prime minister visited Kyoto, for the purpose of persuading the Imperial Court to abandon its anti-foreign attitude. His mission was quite unsuccessful, the utmost concession obtained by him being that the problem of the treaty should be submitted to the feudatories. Another question raised on this occasion in Kyoto was the succession to the shogunate. The twelfth shogun, Ieyoshi, had died in 1853, and was succeeded by Iesada, a physically incompetent ruler. Iesada had been married to the daughter of the Satsuma feudatory, as planned by the former Bakufu premier, Abe, who hoped thus to cement friendly relations with the great southern baron, a hereditary enemy of the Tokugawa. There was no issue of the marriage, and it being certain that there could be no issue, two candidates for the shogunate were proposed. They were Keiki, son of Nariaki of Mito a man of matured intellect and high capacities, and Iemochi, son of Nariyuki of Kii, a boy of thirteen. Public opinion supported the former, and his connexion with the house of Mito seemed to assure an anti-foreign bias. Chiefly for the latter reason, the Court in Kyoto favoured his nomination.

But Keiki was not really an advocate of national seclusion. Had the succession been given to him then, he would doubtless have adopted a liberal policy. On the other hand, his appointment would have been equivalent to the abdication of Iesada, and in order to avert that catastrophe, the shogun's entourage contrived to obtain the appointment of Ii Kamon no Kami to the post of prime minister in Yedo. This baron was not less capable than courageous. He immediately caused the young daimyo of Kii to be nominated successor to the shogunate, and he signed the Harris treaty. A vehement outcry ensued. It was claimed that the will of the Imperial Court had been set at nought by signing the treaty without the sovereign's sanction, and that unconditional yielding to foreign demands was intolerable. The Mito baron headed this opposition. But it is observable that even he did not insist upon the maintenance of absolute seclusion. All that he and his followers demanded was that a delay should be imposed in order to obtain time for definite preparation, whereas the premier, Ii, was for the immediate opening of the country.

THE FOURTEENTH SHOGUN, IEMOCHI (1858-1866)

Iesada died in 1858, and the reluctance of the Imperial Court to sanction the succession of Iemochi was evidenced by a long delay in the transmission of the necessary Imperial document. During that interval, the feudatories of Mito and Echizen had a memorable interview with the premier, Ii, whose life seemed at that time to hang by a thread, but who, nevertheless, advanced unflinchingly towards his goal. The three feudatories offered to compromise; in other words, they declared their willingness to subscribe the commercial convention provided that Keiki was appointed shogun; the important fact being thus established that domestic politics had taken precedence of foreign. Ii not only declined this offer, but also did not hesitate to punish the leaders of the opposition by confinement and by temporary exclusion from the Court.