A history of the Japanese people

by F. Brinkley; Dairoku Kikuchi

But although the Tokyo Government sought to soften the situation by the grace of speedy acquiescence, the effect produced upon the nation was profound. There was no difficulty in appreciating the motives of Russia and France. It was natural that the former should object to the propinquity of a warlike people like the Japanese, and it was natural that France should remain true to her ally. But Germany's case defied interpretation. She had no interest in the ownership of Manchuria, and she professed herself a warm friend of Japan. It seemed, therefore, that she had joined in snatching from the lips of the Japanese the fruits of their victory simply for the sake of establishing some shadowy title to Russia's good-will.

THE CHINESE CRISIS OF 1900

In the second half of the year 1900 an anti-foreign outbreak, known as the "Boxer Rebellion," broke out in the province of Shantung, and, spreading thence to Pehchili, produced a situation of imminent peril for the foreign communities of Peking and Tientsin. No Western power could intervene with sufficient promptness. Japan alone was within easy reach of the commotion. But Japan held back. She had fully fathomed the distrust with which the growth of her military strength had inspired some European nations, and she appreciated the wisdom of not seeming to grasp at an opportunity for armed display. In fact, she awaited a clear mandate from Europe and America, and, on receiving it, she rapidly sent a division (20,000 men) to Pehchili. Tientsin was relieved first, and then a column of troops provided by several powers, the Japanese in the van, marched to the succour of Peking. In this campaign the Japanese greatly enhanced their belligerent reputation as they fought under the eyes of competent military critics. Moreover, after the relief of the legations in Peking, they withdrew one-half of their forces, and they subsequently cooperated heartily with Western powers in negotiating peace terms, thus disarming the suspicions with which they had been regarded at first.

WAR WITH RUSSIA

From the time (1895) when the three-power mandate dictated to Japan a cardinal alteration of the Shimonoseki treaty, Japanese statesmen concluded that their country must one day cross swords with Russia. Not a few Occidental publicists shared that view, but the great majority, arguing that the little Island Empire of the Far East would never risk annihilation by such an encounter, believed that forbearance sufficient to avert serious trouble would always be forthcoming on Japan's side. Yet neither geographical nor historical conditions warranted that confidence. The Sea of Japan, which, on the east, washes the shores of the Japanese islands and on the west those of Russia and Korea, has virtually only two routes communicating with the Pacific Ocean. One is in the north, namely, the Tsugaru Strait; the other is in the south, namely, the channel between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese island of Kyushu. Tsugaru Strait is practically under Japan's complete control; she can close it at any moment with mines. But the channel between the Korean peninsula and Kyushu has a width of 102 miles, and would therefore be a fine open seaway were it free from islands. Midway in this channel, however, lie the twin islands of Tsushima, and the space that separates them from Japan is narrowed by another island, Iki. Tsushima and Iki have belonged to Japan from time immemorial, and thus the avenues from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of Japan are controlled by the Japanese empire. In other words, access to the Pacific from Korea's eastern and southern coasts, and access to the Pacific from Russia's Maritime Province depend upon Japan's good-will.

These geographical conditions had no great concern for Korea in former days. But with Russia the case was different. Vladivostok, the principal port in the Far East, lay at the southern extremity of the Maritime Province. Freedom of passage by the Tsushima Strait was therefore a matter of vital importance, and to secure it one of two things was essential, namely, that she herself should possess a fortified port on the Korean side, or that Japan should be restrained from acquiring such a port. Here, then, was a strong inducement for Russian aggression in Korea. When the eastward movement of the great northern power brought it to the mouth of the Amur, the acquisition of Nikolaievsk for a naval basis was the immediate reward. But Nikolaievsk, lying in an inhospitable region, far away from all the main routes of the world's commerce, offered itself only as a stepping-stone to further acquisitions. To push southward from this new port became an immediate object.

There lay an obstacle in the way. The long strip of seacoast from the mouth of the Amur to the Korean frontier—an area then called the Usuri region because that river forms part of its western boundary—belonged to China, and she, having conceded much to Russia in the way of the Amur, showed no inclination to make further concessions in the matter of the Usuri. She was persuaded to agree, however, that the region should be regarded as common property, pending a convenient opportunity for clear delimitation. That opportunity soon came. Seizing the moment (1860) when China had been beaten to her knees by England and France, Russia secured the final cession of the Usuri region, which then became the Maritime Province of Siberia. Then Russia shifted her naval basis in the Pacific to a point ten degrees south from Nikolaievsk, namely, Vladivostok. Immediately after this transfer an attempt was made to obtain possession of Tsushima. A Russian man-of-war proceeded thither, and quietly began to establish a settlement which would soon have constituted a title of ownership had not Great Britain interfered. The same instinct that led Russia from the mouth of the Amur to Vladivostok prompted the acquisition of Saghalien also, which, as already related, was accomplished in 1875.

But all this effort did not procure for Russia an unobstructed avenue from Vladivostok to the Pacific or an ice-free port in the Far East. In Korea seemed to lie a facile hope of saving the maritime results of Russia's great trans-Asian march from Lake Baikal to the Maritime Province and to Saghalien. Korea seemed to offer every facility for such an enterprise. Her people were unprogressive; her resources undeveloped; her self-defensive capacities insignificant; her government corrupt. On the other hand, it could not be expected that Japan and China would acquiesce in any aggressions against their neighbour, Korea, and it became necessary that Russia should seek some other line of communication supplementing the Amur waterway and the long ocean route. Therefore she set about the construction of a railway across Asia. This railway had to be carried along the northern bank of the Amur where engineering and economic difficulties abound. Moreover, the river makes a huge semicircular sweep northward, and a railway following its northern bank to Vladivostok must make the same detour. If, on the contrary, the road could be carried south of the river along the diameter of the semicircle, it would be a straight, and therefore a shorter, line, technically easier and economically better. To follow this diameter, however, would involve passing through Chinese territory, namely, Manchuria, and an excuse for soliciting China's permission was not in sight. In 1894, however, war broke out between Japan and China, and in its sequel Japan passed into possession of the southern littoral of Manchuria, which meant that Russia could never get nearer to the Pacific than Vladivostok, unless she swept Japan from her path. It is here, doubtless, that we must find Russia's true motive in inducing Germany and France to unite with her for the purpose of ousting Japan from Manchuria. The "notice to quit" gave for reasons that the tenure of the Manchurian littoral by Japan would menace the security of the Chinese capital, would render the independence of Korea illusory, and would constitute an obstacle to the peace of the Orient. Only one saving clause offered for Japan—to obtain from China a guarantee that no portion of Manchuria should thereafter be leased or ceded to a foreign State. But France warned the Tokyo Government that to press for such a guarantee would offend Russia, and Russia declared that, for her part, she entertained no design of trespassing in Manchuria. Thus, Japan had no choice but to surrender quietly the main fruits of her victory. She did so, and proceeded to double her army and treble her navy.

RUSSIA'S AND GERMANY'S REWARDS

As a recompense for the assistance nominally rendered to China in the above matter, Russia obtained permission in Peking to divert her trans-Asian railway from the huge bend of the Amur to the straight line through Manchuria. Neither Germany nor France received any immediate compensation. But three years later, by way of indemnity for the murder of two missionaries by a Chinese mob, Germany seized a portion of the province of Shantung, and forthwith Russia obtained a lease of the Liaotung peninsula, from which she had driven Japan in 1895. This act she followed by extorting from China permission to construct a branch of the trans-Asian railway from north to south, that is to say from Harbin through Mukden to Talien and Port Arthur. Russia's maritime aspirations had now assumed a radically altered phase. Hitherto her programme had been to push southward from Vladivostok along the coast of Korea, but she had now suddenly leaped Korea and found access to the Pacific by the Liaotung peninsula. Nothing was wanting to establish her as practical mistress of Manchuria except a plausible excuse for garrisoning the place. Such an excuse was furnished by the Boxer rising, in 1900. The conclusion of that complication found her in practical occupation of the whole region. But here her diplomacy fell somewhat from its usually high standard. Imagining that the Chinese could be persuaded, or intimidated, to any concession, she proposed a convention virtually recognizing her title to Manchuria.