A history of the Japanese people

by F. Brinkley; Dairoku Kikuchi

JAPAN'S ATTITUDE

Japan watched all these things with profound anxiety. If there were any reality in the dangers which Russia, Germany, and France had declared to be incidental to Japanese occupation of a part of Manchuria, the same dangers must be doubly incidental to Russian occupation of the whole of Manchuria. There were other considerations, also. The reasons already adduced show that the independence of Korea was an object of supreme solicitude to Japan. It was to establish that independence that she fought with China, in 1894, and the same motive led her after the war to annex the Manchurian littoral adjacent to Korea's northern frontier. If Russia came into possession of all Manchuria, her subsequent absorption of Korea would be almost inevitable. Manchuria is larger than France and the United Kingdom put together. The addition of such an immense area to Russia's East Asiatic dominions, together with its littoral on the Gulf of Pehchili and the Yellow Sea, would necessitate a corresponding expansion of her naval force in the Far East. With the exception of Port Arthur and Talien, however, the Manchurian coast does not offer any convenient naval base. It is only in the harbours of southern Korea that such bases can be found. In short, without Korea, Russia's East Asian extension would have been economically incomplete and strategically defective.

If it be asked why, apart from history and national sentiment, Japan should object to Russia in Korea, the answer is, first, because there would thus be planted almost within cannon-shot of her shores a power of enormous strength and traditional ambition; secondly, because whatever voice in Manchuria's destiny Russia derived from her railway, the same voice in Korea's destiny was possessed by Japan, as the sole owner of the railways in the Korean peninsula; thirdly, that whereas Russia had an altogether insignificant share in the foreign commerce of Korea and scarcely ten bona fide settlers, Japan did the greater part of the oversea trade and had tens of thousands of settlers; fourthly, that if Russia's dominions stretched uninterruptedly from the sea of Okhotsk to the Gulf of Pehchili, her ultimate absorption of northern China would be inevitable, and fifthly, that such domination and such absorption would involve the practical closure of all that immense region to the commerce and industry of every Western nation except Russia.

This last proposition did not rest solely on the fact that in opposing artificial barriers to free competition lies Russia's sole hope of utilizing, to her own benefit, any commercial opportunities brought within her reach. It rested, also, on the fact that Russia had objected to foreign settlement at the Manchurian marts recently opened, by Japan's treaty with China, to American and Japanese subjects. Without settlements, trade at those marts would be impossible, and thus Russia had constructively announced that there should be no trade but the Russian, if she could prevent it. Against such dangers Japan would have been justified in adopting any measure of self-protection. She had foreseen them for six years and had been strengthening herself to avert them. But she wanted peace. She wanted to develop her material resources and to accumulate some measure of wealth without which she must remain insignificant among the nations.

Two pacific programmes offered and she adopted them both. Russia, instead of trusting time to consolidate her tenure of Manchuria, had made the mistake of pragmatically importuning China for a conventional title. If, then, Peking could be strengthened to resist this demand, some arrangement of a distinctly terminable nature might be made. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan, joining hands for that purpose, did succeed in so far stiffening China's backbone that her show of resolution finally induced Russia to sign a treaty pledging herself to withdraw her troops from Manchuria in three installments, each step of evacuation to be accomplished by a fixed date. That was one of the pacific programmes. The other suggested itself in connexion with the new commercial treaties which China had agreed to negotiate in the sequel of the Boxer troubles. These documents contained clauses providing for the opening of three places in Manchuria to foreign trade. It seemed a reasonable hope that the powers, having secured commercial access to Manchuria by covenant with its sovereign, would not allow Russia to restrict arbitrarily their privileges. Both of these hopes were disappointed. When the time came for evacuation, Russia behaved as though no promise had been given. She proposed new conditions which would have strengthened her grasp of Manchuria instead of loosening it.

NEGOTIATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN

China being powerless to offer any practical protest, and Japan's interest ranking next in order of importance, the Tokyo Government approached Russia direct. They did not ask for anything that could hurt her pride or impair her position. Appreciating fully the economical status she had acquired in Manchuria by large outlays of capital, they offered to recognize that status, provided that Russia would extend similar recognition to Japan's status in Korea; would promise, in common with Japan, to respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and would be a party to a mutual engagement that all nations should have equal commercial and industrial opportunities in Manchuria and in the Korean peninsula. In a word, they invited Russia to subscribe the policy originally enunciated by the United States and Great Britain, the policy of the open door and of the integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.

Thus commenced negotiations which lasted five and a half months. Japan gradually reduced her demands to a minimum. Russia never made any appreciable reduction of hers. She refused to listen to Japan for one moment about Manchuria. Eight years previously, Japan had been in military possession of the littoral of Manchuria when Russia, with the assistance of Germany and France, had expelled her for reasons which concerned Japan much more than they concerned any of these three powers. Now, Russia had the assurance to declare that none of these things concerned Japan at all. The utmost she would admit was Japan's partial right to be heard about Korea. At the same time, she herself commenced a series of aggressions in northern Korea. That was not all. While she studiously deferred her answers to Japan's proposals, and while she protracted the negotiations to an extent visibly contemptuous, she hastened to make substantial additions to her fleet and her army in far-eastern Asia. It was impossible to mistake her purpose. She intended to yield nothing, but to prepare such a parade of force that her obduracy would command submission. The only alternatives for Japan were war or permanent effacement in Asia. She chose war.

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Before passing to the story of this war, it is necessary to refer to two incidents of Japan's foreign relations, both of which preceded her struggle with Russia. The first was the restoration of her judicial autonomy. It has always been regarded as axiomatic that the subjects or citizens of Western countries, when they travel or reside in Oriental territories, should be exempted from the penalties and processes of the latter's criminal laws. In other words, there is reserved to a Christian the privilege, when within the territories of a pagan State, of being tried for penal offences by Christian judges. In civil cases the jurisdiction is divided, the question at issue being adjudicated by a tribunal of the defendant's nationality; but in criminal cases jurisdiction is wholly reserved. Therefore powers making treaties with Oriental nations establish within the latter's borders consular courts which exercise what is called "extraterritorial jurisdiction." This system was, of course, pursued in Japan's case. It involved the confinement of the foreign residents to settlements grouped around the sites of their consular courts; for it would plainly have been imprudent that such residents should have free access to provincial districts remote from the only tribunals competent to control them.