CHAPTER XXVIII
THE MANAGEMENT OF FUEL
In the world war fuel fought, and food, and steel, as well as men. Fuel quickly became as much of a fighting necessity as were the munitions which could not be made without it and the food for whose transportation it was necessary. It was a war of manufactures, of applied science, and the foundations of both are laid in fuel. And therefore fuel, which means chiefly coal, had to be mobilized for war and its production and distribution so managed that its potency could be applied where needed and when needed without unnecessary detriment to civilian welfare. During the first months of our participation in the war and for nearly a year previous there had been a menacing coal situation in which the increasing demand for coal, inadequate transportation and storage facilities and other causes had combined to send prices to four and even five times their former level and to cause uneasiness and dissatisfaction among consumers and in the ranks of both labor and capital. As soon as Congress gave the necessary authority, in August, 1917, the President fixed schedules of provisional prices and appointed a Fuel Administrator for the United States.
Before the Fuel Administration was created there had unfortunately been published unauthorized and unwarranted assurance of prospective better conditions in the coal situation which had led many to postpone their usual summer and autumn purchases. When the winter set in, at an unusually early date, with its unprecedentedly long continued and bitter cold and frequent storms, this delay on the part of so many buyers added much to the universal difficulties and discomforts. To all the usual demand for coal and the extraordinary demand due to the unwonted weather, there were added the large and increasing fuel needs for war manufacture, for the bunkering of ships, for the heating of the many cantonments and camps, each a goodly sized city in itself, and other war activities. And with all this increased demand, there were fewer workers in the mines, for many had joined the fighting forces or gone to work in munition factories, and transportation facilities were disorganized by the strain upon them and disabled by storms and zero weather. This was the situation with which the Fuel Administration was contending three months after it began its work.
The total coal production of the country during 1917 amounted to 651,402,000 net tons, of which approximately 100,000,000 tons were anthracite and the rest bituminous. This was an increase over all previous production records of more than 60,000,000 tons, but it did not meet the ever increasing demands of the war machine, whose requirements for bituminous coal for 1918 went above this amount by nearly 100,000,000 tons. It was necessary to stir production in the mines to utmost endeavor, to facilitate that production by prompt and adequate distribution and to induce such fuel saving among consumers as would supplement production sufficiently to meet war needs.
Not only was there a decrease of many thousands in the number of men employed in the production of coal, but also in many mines efficiency was lessened by the hatreds and suspicions of the different racial representatives—Magyar, Pole, Italian, Slovak, Jugo-Slav, with their animosities bred in the bone, brought with them from Europe and fanned into fresh activity by the war. Each furbished up anew his old grudge and carried it on his shoulder, where it quickly received the knocking it challenged, and old racial battles were fought over again while the mining of coal was laid aside.
To better conditions and stimulate effort a Production Bureau was formed in the Fuel Administration whose representatives were sent to every mine. There they worked with and through a committee composed of mine operators and mine workers. The Bureau bent its energies incessantly to the influencing of mine operators and managers to establish such conditions and methods as would keep the miners satisfied and busy and of the miners to put forth their utmost efforts. Its representatives dealt tactfully with the racial hatreds, using the foreign language newspapers read by each group and also dealing with individual men in person, allaying suspicions, and showing each group what the success of the Allied and American armies would mean for its people in Europe. Officials of the United Mine Workers toured the mining regions, addressing the workers, informing the men on the questions involved in the war and urging them to do their best. Other speakers, including men returned from army service in France, went up and down through the mining regions, holding meetings, talking to the workers. The President’s proclamation addressed to all engaged in coal mining and appeals from other men of influence among them were distributed everywhere.
The result was a hearty response from the mining men. They dealt amicably with the production committees, they kept the peace with their racial enemies, they agreed to forego holidays and the usual laying off for funeral days, they worked even on Labor Day, they plunged into the increased production program with enthusiasm, they worked more efficiently and many old men who had quit active work on account of age voluntarily took up again the pick and shovel. The average number of days worked by each miner in the bituminous fields was increased over that of the previous year by twelve and by twenty-five over that of 1916. From week to week during the summer and fall of 1918, until November, the weekly production of coal showed an increase in the neighborhood of a million tons over the same week in the previous year. During the half-year period from the first of April to the end of September more coal was mined than ever before in any half year in the history of the American coal industry. In that time the bituminous production was twelve per cent greater than in the corresponding period in 1917, which had itself established a record.
As important as increased production in the mines was the rapid distribution of coal as soon as it was brought to the surface. Coal is not commercially produced until it is distributed, for coal dumped at the mine mouth or lying in cars on railroad switches is of no more use to the consumer than that still underground. It was mainly the efficient work of the Railroad Administration that brought order and successful achievement into this phase of the war coal situation. The manner in which it relieved the freight congestion which had paralyzed traffic during the last months of 1917 is described in the chapter on “Running the Railroads.” By the prompt actions it took it released the tied-up trains of coal, sent them to their destination and made possible the swift, economical and steady service of all cars available for the carrying of coal from mines to consumers’ bins.
But so much in excess of possible production was the amount of coal that was urgently necessary for war making purposes that only a great and general program of coal saving would prevent the slacking of our war effort. The Fuel Administrator turned at once to the American people, confident that, if they understood the need, they would voluntarily endeavor to meet it. Articles explaining the situation and showing why it was necessary for consumers to save in the neighborhood of fifty million tons of coal during the next few months in newspapers and magazines, all of which throughout the country cordially coöperated with the Fuel Administration, brought the responsibility of the continuing of the nation’s prosecution of the war straight to the feet of every individual user of coal, gas and electricity. Widely circulated leaflets urged conservation of coal and posters that met the eye at every turn emphasized their message. Instructions were published in periodicals of every sort for the economical but equally efficient use of coal in manufacturing and domestic furnaces, in kitchen ranges and household stoves. To save each day at least one shovelful of coal was laid upon the conscience of every consumer.
So-called “lightless nights” were established on which was forbidden the use of electricity, gas, oil, or coal for the illumination or display of windows, advertisements or signs and street lighting was reduced to the minimum necessary for safety. In order to aid in the conserving of coal by reducing the amount of artificial light necessary, the daylight saving measure was passed by Congress and the clocks moved ahead for an hour from the end of March to the end of October. Non-war industries had their consumption of coal curtailed.