In January, 1918, the public east of the Mississippi River was asked to observe a series of so-called “heatless days” in which there should be no consumption of fuel except for absolutely necessary uses. The purpose was to make possible the bunkering of two hundred and fifty ships at eastern ports laden with food and war materials for Europe, but unable to move for lack of coal. There was dire need of their cargoes in France. The United States Government had been told that the Western Allies could not continue their war effort unless these cargoes were delivered on the other side of the Atlantic in the quickest possible time. For a five-day period in January and for each following Monday for several weeks the Fuel Administration asked commerce and industry to forego as far as possible the burning of coal in order that it might give priority for deliveries of coal to the waiting ships and to the newly established Railroad Administration, struggling with ice-covered tracks, frozen engines and storm-tied trains, a little time in which to relieve the congestion of cars and set in motion long lines of stalled coal trains. The “heatless day” period was loyally observed and by the day after it ended every one of the two hundred and fifty ships had bunkered and was speeding across the ocean to deliver its sorely needed cargo. There had also been accumulated a stock of coal for the equally necessary bunkering of the other ships that came and went in a steady stream to supply the demands of war.
For all these measures the response of the public was immediate and willing. Manufacturers of nonessentials voluntarily offered to curtail operation if by so doing they could aid the nation’s war effort. Domestic consumers reduced their lights and watched their furnaces and stoves as they had never done before, and everywhere any attempt on the part of merchants, corporations or private individuals to use light or fuel in excess of the Fuel Administration’s requests and rules was frowned down by the public.
The Oil Division of the Fuel Administration played so important a part in the final success of the Allied and Associated nations that if it was true, as a British authority declared, that “we floated to victory on a sea of oil,” the credit belongs largely to the men who directed the American oil supply, for the Western front was dependent almost wholly upon oil from America. There was a constantly increasing production of crude oil, which was speeded by all possible methods, and the proportion of gasoline extracted was continually being increased. Oil-burning vessels in the British, French, Italian and American navies needed the oil and the Motor Transport Services of all the armies needed immense and rapidly increasing quantities of gasoline. Oil production was increased in 1918 to 344,000,000 barrels, which was 50,000,000 barrels more than it had been in 1914. To provide transportation a fleet of oil tankers was built and when the war closed over half the gross tonnage of tankers in service was American.
Gasoline this country sent across the ocean in an ever increasing flood which grew in 1917 by a million and a half of barrels over the previous year and in 1918 amounted to 13,312,000 barrels, an increase of more than 9,000 barrels per day over that sent in the previous year. But so sharp grew the need for it at the front in the summer of 1918 that restriction had to be put upon its use at home. The Allied forces warned by cable that without increased and early deliveries of gasoline their plans were likely to collapse. Marshal Foch’s cablegram said bluntly, “If you don’t keep up your petroleum supply we shall lose the war.” Immediate saving of gasoline was the only answer to the necessity and the Fuel Administration asked the people living east of the Mississippi River to forego the use of motor-propelled vehicles, except for specified necessary purposes, on Sundays. Compliance was voluntary and for military reasons the public could not be told how dire was the necessity.
But so immediate and universal was the response that from every section reports showed that Sunday motoring was almost wholly abandoned, the reduction being from 75 to 99 per cent. During the nearly two months that the restriction continued it was estimated that a saving had been made of approximately 1,000,000 barrels of gasoline, of which more than 500,000 barrels, ten shiploads, had been sent overseas.
A comprehensive plan was worked out by the Fuel Administration for the saving of fuel by conservation of light and power which enlisted the aid of a force of engineers and of other departments of the Government. A study was made by inspectors and engineers of conditions in large manufacturing concerns and in public utilities plants all over the country which brought about, by the willing coöperation of their managers, such rearrangements of machinery and appliances, elimination of duplicating plants and of unnecessary expenses as resulted in important savings, ranging from ten to thirty per cent in the amount of coal consumed, without interfering with the output. The Fuel Administration urged the generation of electric energy from water power instead of steam wherever possible, and enough plants made the change to effect a considerable saving in coal consumption.
A zone system for the distribution of bituminous coal providing for the supply of each section of the country from the nearest mines, put into operation by the Fuel and Railroad Administrations together, eliminated approximately 160,000,000 car miles and affected more than half of the total distribution of bituminous coal. The overcoming of this waste in transportation made possible the swifter and steadier use of rolling stock, thus speeding deliveries and more quickly returning cars and engines to the mines for new loads, and made more effective the railroad consumption of coal, which amounts to about twenty-five per cent of the coal production of the country.
The organization of the Fuel Administration stretched out in a network that touched every community. The fuel administrator of each state, working under the national organization, had under him administrators and local committees for cities and counties whose duty it was to keep in constant touch with the supplies and the needs of their own localities. Upon their reports the state administrator apportioned the supply to be allowed each locality and upon their investigations into business costs were based the maximum local retail prices of coal to be charged. The fixing of local retail prices was in addition to the regulation of prices at the mines and violators of either, whether mine operators, jobbers or retailers, were made to refund their excess profits and were then turned over to the Department of Justice for prosecution. Each of the several divisions of the work of the Fuel Administration, in addition to that of fuel distribution, such as conservation, production and oil, was organized by districts or specialized bureaus for intensive and effective work.
Economies urged by the Fuel Administration resulted in the saving during the first half of 1918 of 12,700,000 tons of coal. Although the coal mining industry lost 100,000 or more workers to other war industries and to the fighting forces, the speeding program of the Fuel Administration resulted in a production of bituminous coal during 1918 of 585,883,000 tons, setting a new high record and exceeding the production of the previous year by 34,000,000 tons. Notwithstanding the enormous and constantly growing increase there had been throughout the preceding eighteen months in the consumption of coal for war purposes, at the end of hostilities the country faced the approaching winter with stocks of coal on hand greatly in excess of previous years.