Gen. Elphinstone told me, that Sale had been very imprudent in using his leg, and had consequently been suffering a great deal of pain, but that the remedies applied had given him relief; he expressed great regret that he had not communicated any information to me, taking it for granted that the Envoy had done so, if I had not a letter from Sale himself; but he was wounded, and with plenty of military occupation, could not always find time to write me many particulars, as he had to send his despatches off as quickly as possible to the General.
A letter from a friend with the force that was sent from Kandahar mentions, that the force had arrived at the extreme point of their tour (Dehwarah) on the 15th of October, and that they were to set out on their return the following day. Capt. Leeson, of the 42d, in temporary command of the Shah's 1st cavalry regiment, was to march twenty-five miles and over a pass (the Kotilla Meercha), to be out of the way of the others, on account of the scarcity of water. The troops had not had any thing to do, nor was there even a chance of their having a foe to contend with, for the people of that part of the country got such a lesson in the fight of Secunderabad, that the chiefs could not have collected 200 men; the forts were mere shells, their walls of no thickness.
The fort against which the eighteen-pounder guns were sent out, has been an utter ruin for years, not only indefensible but uninhabitable. The troops have been terribly distressed bringing the guns over and through the passes, which are more difficult than can be imagined by those that have not seen them; the last, the Dana Thunghee, is described as resembling what the Khyber would be about Ali Musjid, if it had a deep and very rapid river flowing through it, the said river having to be crossed thirteen times.
The Kotilla Taj-i (crown of the mountains), is very steep, and as nearly impracticable as it can be, without being actually so. To avoid these passes, the troops are to go through the Kotilla Murdee (dead men's pass), which Capt. Leeson reports, from what he has seen of it, as practicable but difficult. He writes to me that it will take a great deal of labour to get the guns over it. From thence they steer for Kurtoot (the donkey's mulberry), but it was not known whether the route by that place was practicable; if not, they must face the Kotilla Taj-i, bad as it is. Major Rawlinson, the political agent, had obtained the blessings of the force for leading them such a wild-goose chase; he seems to have received information that Akram Khan had a fort there, but not to have known what that fort was like. It is a pity the army were harassed unnecessarily; but in Major R.'s defence it is but justice to say, that information is difficult to procure, and that it all comes from our enemies.
25th.—I received a letter from Sale, in which he informs me, that the conduct of the troops employed in the affair at Tézeen was good beyond all praise; but, concluding that I had heard all the particulars, he did not enter into detail. He wrote me that he was to halt that day (the 24th), as Macgregor was in treaty with the chiefs, who he says are willing to refrain from all further opposition, and say they are convinced they have no chance against us. Sturt has seen a letter from Lieut. Cunningham, of the Shah's sappers and miners, by which it appears that no enemy showing themselves, Capt. Paton, Qr.-Mr.-Genl., was on the point of pitching the camp, when some of the advance guard were fired on, upon which two companies were sent from each corps, with the sappers, who all behaved gallantly; they went up the hills, and down again, chased the enemy into their fort, and the sappers, commanded by Capt. Broadfoot, drove them through it, and followed them through the wicket they escaped by. The 13th having expended their ammunition were obliged to retreat, and it was then that Lieut. E. King fell.
Lady Macnaghten called on me, and told me that Capt. Macgregor, Political Agent, wrote that the chiefs received him with great politeness, and were pleased at the confidence reposed in them by his going to meet them attended only by one suwar. They appeared to be unanimous, and many in number, mustering 700 followers, who were daily increasing. They agreed to all the conditions but one; whatever that is, it appears to be the main point to be conceded, and we suppose that it relates to the 40,000 rupees. One day has been allowed to the chiefs to deliberate. The Envoy was some time since warned by three Affghans not to ride so early in the morning or so late in the evening as was his wont; but, whether from policy or natural fearlessness, he has not attended to their advice. The Akhoonzadah has also told him that three men have sworn on the Koran to take his life. The people of Tagow and Lughman are leagued with those of Tézeen. Capt. Macgregor writes that a great quantity of ammunition was left on the road for want of camels to carry it on, which must have proved a great prize to the enemy, who were much in want of it.
26th.—There being a report that all was peaceably settled at Tézeen, I became very anxious for intelligence. Two letters were brought to me, but alas! neither of them were to my address, one being from Capt. Havelock to Gen. Elphinstone, the other from Capt. Paton to Major Thain. After giving them a reasonable time to ruminate over their news, I wrote to Major Thain, requesting him to give me any information in his power; and informing him that I had no letter, I got the provoking reply that the Sahib was gone out. Sometime afterwards Major Thain called: he owned he was puzzled as to what was going on, but hoped that affairs would remain quiet until we got out of the country. He said it was the present intention, that the sick should move out on Saturday next, and the Envoy and the General should leave Cabul on Monday the 1st. Shortly after he left me, he sent me the two letters to read; he had expressed his surprise that they had not arrived sooner, both being dated the 24th; and my letter of the same date from Sale had arrived the day before! Capt. Havelock mentions that all is settled and hostages given, but remarks that, since the pacification, the camels have been fired on, as also our outposts, but says, the one may be attributable to the arrival of a chief who was in ignorance of the treaty, and the other, to their people not being well in hand, a pretty sounding phrase; but are we to understand that our men are so well in hand as not to resent it? Capt. Paton writes mysteriously, that he has much to communicate, "better spoken than written," and says the enemy have consented regarding the obnoxious chief, (some person who they did not wish should participate in the benefits of the treaty). He adds that a force to be of any use in that country must not be hampered with camels, tents or baggage, and that the ammunition should be carried only on mules or yaboos. If all remained quiet, Paton and Havelock were to return, and the force to go on to Kutta Lung. Paton hints that something had gone wrong which would not have done so, had Gen. Sale not been confined to his dhooley. Thain tells me that there is no mention in Sale's despatch of the gallant conduct of the sappers and miners as related by Cunningham; he being wounded probably did not observe all that passed, and did not have the circumstances brought to his notice in time to write them; but had he done so, it would have been very immaterial, for, excepting from private letters, no intelligence transpires.
Last year, when Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded, and during the disturbances in the Kohistan, every despatch from Sale, who commanded the troops there, was promulgated in orders, and the present system of keeping information close is disgusting; there can be no secrets regarding what passes in action in the field. The general impression is that the Envoy is trying to deceive himself into an assurance that the country is in a quiescent state. He has a difficult part to play, without sufficient moral courage to stem the current singly. About two months since Sir William wrote to Lord Auckland, explaining to him the present state of Affghanistan, and requesting that five additional regiments should be sent to this country, two of them to be European. To these statements a written war succeeded between the Envoy and the Supreme Government of Bengal. Letter after letter came calling for retrenchment. Sir William had been appointed from home Governor of Bombay, and was particularly chosen for the office from his being a moderator and a man unlikely to push any violent measures; he hoped affairs might take a turn for the better, and was evidently anxious to leave Cabul and assume his new appointment. In an evil hour he acceded to the entreaties of Sir Alexander Burnes (who appears to have been blinded on the subject) and wrote to Lord Auckland to nullify his former request for additional troops, and to say that part of those now in the country might be withdrawn. The 1st brigade under Sale was accordingly ordered to be in readiness to move down; and it was generally understood, that all would be withdrawn as soon as the Shah had raised five more regiments of his own. The letter of recall, as we may term Sir William's, was sent off only two days before the breaking out of the Zoormut affair.
Great stress has been laid upon the chiefs having given us hostages, but this is no certain proof of their sincerity; we have been long enough amongst them for them to know the British character; they also know that the Dost's family were safely and honourably treated under our protection, whilst he and his son were in arms against us, and they naturally consider their safety as a proof of that of any hostages they leave with us.
The dāks, which have not arrived since the 2d (nor have been despatched since the 4th), are confidently asserted to be now on their way, and are expected in to-morrow at the farthest. No one appears to have been made acquainted with the terms of the treaty, which have been kept close by the Envoy, who, however, observed that Macgregor had given them better terms than he himself would have done. They are to get the 40,000 rupees the quarrel began about, and they promise to return us any property they can find of ours: so that we leave off where we set out, barring our killed and wounded, expence, loss of ammunition and baggage, and annoyance of the detention, if not loss, of our dâks, bhanghys, &c .