1. That it is not important to know what Germany can pay, but it is sufficient to know what she ought to pay.
2. That no one can foresee what immense resources Germany will develop within thirty or forty years, and what Germany will not be able to pay will be paid by the Allies.
3. That Germany, under the stimulus of a military occupation, will increase her production in an unheard-of manner.
4. The obligation arising from the treaty is an absolute one; the capacity to pay can only be taken into consideration to establish the number and amount of the annual payments; the total must in any case be paid within thirty years or more.
5. Elle ou nous. Germany must pay; if she doesn't the Allies must pay. It is not necessary that Germany free herself by a certain date; it is only necessary that she pay all.
6. Germany has not to discuss, only to pay. Let time illustrate what is at present unforeseeable, etc. etc.
If we exclude the third means of payment Germany has two ways open to her. First of all she can give goods. What goods? When we speak of goods we really mean coal. Now, as we have seen, according to the treaty Germany must furnish for ten years to Belgium, Italy, and France especially quantities of coal, which in the first five years run from 39-1/2 to 42 millions of tons, and in the following five years come to a maximum of about 32 millions. And all this when she has lost the Saar coalfields and is faced with the threatening situation in Upper Silesia.
Germany's exports reached their maximum in 1913, when the figures touched 10,097 millions of marks, excluding precious metals. Grouping exports and imports in categories, the millions of marks were distributed as follows:
Imports. Exports.
Foodstuffs 2,759 1,035
Live animals 289 7.4
Raw materials 5,003 1,518
Semi-manufactured goods 5,003 1,139
Manufactured goods 1,478 6,395