To ensure the surrender of the castle, a bombardment from mortars was kept up, until two batteries were made ready in the left attack (Nos. 9 and 10), which were armed with 17 24-pounders,—and 2 24-pounders with 1 8-inch howitzer, respectively. No. 9 was to breach the Mirador and Battery de la Reyna, and No. 10 to operate against the lower defences of the castle, and to enfilade the Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 12 Sept. 1813. back of the hill. On the morning of the 8th September, the preparations being complete, the whole of the batteries opened on the castle. Colonel Dickson describes the bombardment as having been conducted in beautiful style, and carried on so vigorously, that in two hours the enemy hoisted a flag of truce. Sir J. Jones says that the fire was so extremely rapid and well directed, and of so overpowering a nature, that the castle scarcely returned a single shot. The terms of the capitulation having been agreed to, two batteries of the castle were delivered up the same evening, and on the next day the garrison marched out with the honours of war, and laid down their arms. Colonel Dickson was one of the three officers detailed to arrange the terms of the capitulation.
The sufferings of the garrison, and of the prisoners in the castle, during the bombardment, were excessive, as may Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 12 Sept. 1813. readily be imagined when one learns that “they had not a bomb-proof in it except for powder.”[43]
The siege of San Sebastian has an especial interest for the Royal Artillery,—more especially for that part of the Regiment, the duties of which are confined to the use of heavy ordnance. This episode was selected by an able and dispassionate historian, as one reflecting especial honour on Gleig’s ‘Military History.’ the Corps. “It offers,” he wrote, “an example of precision of aim, and absolute coolness on the part of the gunners, never surpassed.... Such services as these were rendered thirty years ago by no other artillery in the world; and as the same spirit still prevails, which prevailed then, in the magnificent corps of which we are speaking, it cannot be doubted but that when the opportunity offers again, they will prove themselves worthy of the renown that attaches to them.”
These words corroborate what has been so frequently urged in this work, that a regimental history differs essentially in its aim from all others. The glow, which it endeavours to throw over past events, is not meant to conceal defects, or to distort facts, but to awaken the spirit of emulation;—the boastful way in which special honours are recounted, and distinctive triumphs sung, is not egotistical pride, or aggressive conceit, but merely the fond treasuring of a glory which has been gained by others, and transmitted to their successors for safe keeping;—and the anxious gleaning among the fields of former action is but to find herbs, which in times of peace shall brace the gleaner for coming days of work or danger. The more truly a soldier knows and values the deeds and honours of those who have gone before him in his corps,—the more certain will he be to emulate them. There is no jealousy of the dead. Admiration of their qualities passes unconsciously into a love for their memories; and this love inspires a longing not to be unworthy. It may seem to some but a poor ambition, to use the weapons well which have been given to us,—to sacrifice one’s will unmeaningly,—and never to be downcast by discomfort or failure; but it is the highest ambition to which a soldier can aspire. Nor is it easy for him to conceive a higher. Cheerful obedience and conscientious zeal imply most of the higher qualities of humanity; and a perfect soldier must possess both. The great poet of England in these days has been the noblest preacher, to whom her army has ever listened. As he places before his readers the ideal of a true knight, the soldier sees a standard which he should never cease to gaze upon. He sees, it may be for the first time, that opposite virtues should not rebel, but mingle; and that such should be found in himself as “Utter hardihood, utter gentleness,
And loving, utter faithfulness in love,
And uttermost obedience to the king.”
And, once realising this,—with the knowledge, possibly, in his heart that there have been in his corps before him men who approached even the standard of Arthur’s knights,—he must, as he reads of their deeds, long “To sweep
In ever-highering eagle-circles up
To the great sun of glory, and thence swoop
Down upon all things base, and dash them dead.”
CHAPTER XXI.
Conclusion of the Peninsular War.
The absence of Colonel Dickson from the head-quarters of the army during the sieges of San Sebastian has had the effect of leaving the Artillery share in the operations Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 18 Sept. 1813. known as the battle of the Pyrenees, unwritten. He did not rejoin head-quarters until the 17th September, 1813: the period, therefore, between the battle of Vittoria and that date is, as far as the operations of Lord Wellington’s army are concerned, almost ignored in his correspondence. In the chapter on the Old Tenth Battalion, in this volume, some allusion to the services of the Artillery at this time will be found; and one or two facts are mentioned in Sir Hew Ross’s memoir; but, really, the chief work fell upon the Infantry during these operations. Soult had been sent to take command of the army of Spain, with orders to assume the offensive at once; which he did, with the ostensible Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 1 Nov. 1813. view of relieving the blockade of Pampeluna. This he failed to do, and that city ultimately surrendered on the 31st October, 1813, relieving Lord Wellington of a great drag on his movements. The mountainous country, in which the combats which constituted the battle of the Pyrenees were fought, was unsuited to the movements of Artillery; ‘Memoirs of Sir H. Ross,’ p. 45. and the Chestnut Troop, which may be taken as a sample of those engaged, had its carriages completely shaken to pieces. Soult, having failed to relieve Pampeluna, made an attempt to raise the siege of San Sebastian; and, on the very day when the city was stormed, the 31st August, he attacked the Spanish forces on San Marcial for this purpose, but was defeated with loss. The conduct of the Spanish on this occasion was much commended by Lord Wellington; and it was a singular and happy coincidence that this engagement, To Lord Bathurst, dated 2 Sept. 1813. so creditable to the Spanish troops, was the last fought on Spanish soil. Soult withdrew his forces across the frontier, and assumed the defensive. For six weeks Lord Wellington remained inactive, pending intelligence from the Allies in the north, who were then concentrating their forces against Napoleon, and would shortly demand from Lord Wellington a diversion in the south.
During these six weeks, much was done to render the equipment of the Artillery suitable for a rough and winter campaign; measures were taken to expedite the arrival, from Lisbon, of some additional horses which had been sent from England; and, in the meantime, the troops and To D.-A.-G. dated 3 Oct. 1813. brigades were, as Colonel Dickson wrote, “kept above water” by the purchase of mules and French horses.
On the 7th October, Lord Wellington made a forward movement into France by crossing the Bidassoa. This has always been considered one of the ablest movements made Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 10 Oct. 1813. by the great English General. The passage was effected as follows. The 5th Division and two 9-pounder brigades forded at Fuentarabia. The 1st Division, and General Wilson’s brigade, with one 9-pounder brigade, and Webber Smith’s Troop of Horse Artillery, crossed at Irun; the Artillery of this column being commanded by Major Dyer. The passage of the 1st Division column was covered by the 18-pounder brigade and a troop of Horse Artillery. General Freire’s Galician army passed at two fords higher up, covered by a 9-pounder brigade, Bull’s troop of Horse Artillery, and a brigade of Spanish Artillery. The passage of the river was effected, and the French position carried with great ease. The most difficult duty fell upon the Spaniards, who behaved well. The French, on the other hand, behaved ill. The 18-pounder brigade was especially useful in covering the passage of the troops.
The attack upon the Puerto de Vera was made by the Light Division and General Giron’s Spanish reserve army, supported by the 4th Division, who were successful in getting possession of the pass and adjoining heights; but not until the 9th October did the French quit the Montagne de la Rhune.
The night prior to the crossing of the Bidassoa had been very stormy, and aided in concealing the movements of the Allies. But Soult never imagined such a thing possible as Cust. “the astonishing hardihood of passing columns by fords where the tide rose 16 feet, and where the sands were half a mile broad, to force such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth.” In his description of the crossing of the Bidassoa, Sir Augustus Frazer mentions that, when he reached Irun with Ramsay’s troop and Michell’s (late Parker’s) brigade, he found 400 Infantry waiting to pull the guns over the mountain to the places from which they ‘Frazer’s Letters,’ p. 290. were to cover the crossing of the army. “But,” he adds with pride, “Bull’s (Ramsay’s) horses never want assistance; they were soon posted on a height with some Spanish Dated Vera, 10 Oct. 1813. “Horse Artillery.” From a subsequent official return to the Master-General, it appears that the 9-pounder brigade which accompanied the 1st Division was Captain Dansey’s; and that the 9-pounder brigade which accompanied the 5th Division was Lawson’s, commanded by the 2nd Captain,—Mosse. Captain Morrison still commanded the 18-pounder brigade; and Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s troop of Horse Artillery was held in reserve, moving from one point to another as most required. Including Major Arriaga’s Portuguese brigade, and the other troops and brigade already mentioned, there were 48 British and Portuguese guns engaged at the passage of the Bidassoa; and the Master-General was informed that the fire of the Artillery on the occasion was well directed, and that the exertions made by the officers in bringing forward their respective brigades to the point of attack were most satisfactory. Lieut.-Colonel May was Assistant Adjutant-General to the Artillery, Lieutenant Ord was Brigade-Major, and Lieutenant Pascoe Adjutant. Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann was in charge of the artillery in position, and Lieut.-Colonel Frazer and Major Dyer superintended the bringing forward of the guns.