Further inaction followed the passage of the Bidassoa, until the fall of Pampeluna, already mentioned, set Lord Wellington free for a further advance. During this time, attempts were Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 17 Oct. 1813. made to supply mountain batteries for the coming service. Marshal Beresford brought a few 3-pounders from Lisbon; but it was found almost impossible to procure mules for them. Three guns of the same calibre, which had been taken from the French, had been temporarily equipped for single draught, and placed under the command of Lieutenant Robe, the son of the gallant officer who commanded at Roliça and Vimiera. This young officer subsequently fell at Waterloo, Ibid. 24 Oct. 1813. having seen more battles than years. A medley equipment was found for the guns brought from Lisbon,—the Artillerymen being Portuguese, but the drivers and mules being British. These guns were carried on the backs of the mules, and three of them were added to Lieutenant Robe’s command. A detachment for rocket-service was also sent from England, but received by Lord Wellington with very mixed feelings, as he had rather a horror of the rocket as Ibid. 31 Oct. 1813. a weapon of war. The Chestnut Troop and Douglas’s and Sympher’s field brigades were also got over the mountains to Vera, for outpost duty, and to be in readiness to support the attack on the enemy’s position, which Lord Wellington had decided to make as soon as Pampeluna should surrender. The difficulty in getting these guns over was very great, and was aggravated by the tempestuous weather which prevailed; Ibid. 7 Nov. 1813. but it was effected without accident. When the news arrived from Pampeluna, which should have set the army free for forward movement into France, the weather had become such that movement was impossible. At Roncesvalles, the fall of snow was so heavy and unexpected, that three of Captain Maxwell’s guns had to be abandoned in a redoubt,—the guns being buried under ground and the carriages concealed under the snow. Ross’s, Douglas’s, and Sympher’s guns had, however, been advanced still farther to support in the meditated attack on the position of Sarre; Robe’s mountain guns were attached to the 6th Division, and the Portuguese 3-pounders to the Light Division and Giron’s army; while no fewer than 54 guns had been attached to the left of the army under Sir John Hope,—Colonel Hartmann being in command. It will thus be seen that all necessary arrangements had been made, as far as the Artillery department was concerned.
Official Report to Master-General, dated St. Pé, 14 Nov. 1813, and Letter from Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. of same date.
The attack—which is known as the battle of La Nivelle—took place on the 10th November, and resulted in the enemy’s entrenched position being carried at every point, from St. Jean de Luz to the front of the Puerto de Maia; and in the capture of 51 French pieces of ordnance, and 1500 prisoners. The following was the distribution of the Artillery during the battle; and it will be seen that the greater part remained on the left of the army,—the nature of the country rendering it extremely difficult to move Artillery, except by the high road from Irun:—
With Sir Rowland Hill’s corps—
Lieut-Col. Tulloh’s Portuguese brigades One of 9-prs.
One of 6-prs.With the 6th Division: Lieutenant Robe’s mountain guns.
To support the attack of the 4th
and 7th Divisions on the redoubts and
position of Sarre.Lieut.-Col. Ross’s troop, R.H.A.
Major Sympher’s brigade of 9-prs.
Captain Douglas’s brigade of 9-prs.With General Giron’s Spanish reserve: a half brigade of Portuguese 3-prs.
With the Light Division: a half brigade of Portuguese 3-prs.
With Lieut.-General Sir John Hope’s corps—
Lieut.-Col. Webber Smith’s troop, R.H.A. Captain Ramsay’s troop, R.H.A. ” Carmichael’s brigade of 9-pounders. ” Mosse’s brigade of heavy 6-pounders. ” Greene’s brigade of 9-pounders. ” Cairnes’ brigade of 9-pounders. ” Michell’s brigade of 9-pounders. Major Arriaga’s Portuguese 9-pounders. ” Morrison’s 18-pounders.
| Lieut-Col. Tulloh’s Portuguese brigades | One of 9-prs. One of 6-prs. |
| To support the attack of the 4th and 7th Divisions on the redoubts and position of Sarre. | Lieut.-Col. Ross’s troop, R.H.A. Major Sympher’s brigade of 9-prs. Captain Douglas’s brigade of 9-prs. |
| Lieut.-Col. Webber Smith’s troop, R.H.A. | |
| Captain | Ramsay’s troop, R.H.A. |
| ” | Carmichael’s brigade of 9-pounders. |
| ” | Mosse’s brigade of heavy 6-pounders. |
| ” | Greene’s brigade of 9-pounders. |
| ” | Cairnes’ brigade of 9-pounders. |
| ” | Michell’s brigade of 9-pounders. |
| Major | Arriaga’s Portuguese 9-pounders. |
| ” | Morrison’s 18-pounders. |
There was also a brigade of Spanish Artillery with General Freire’s army.
The Artillery with Sir John Hope’s column was but little engaged, as its advance depended on the success of the right; but it kept up a heavy and successful cannonade, and met with a few casualties. The Artillery on the right, in support of the attack on the redoubts, was, however, of essential service; and was skilfully handled by the field officers in charge, Lieut.-Colonels Frazer and Buckner. They opened a vigorous fire on the first redoubt, while the 4th Division was moving forward to assault it, and the effect of the fire was such as to compel the enemy to abandon the redoubt without waiting for the assault. At this time the Chestnut Troop distinguished itself especially. “I must particularly notice,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “the gallant manner in which Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s troop was moved to an advanced position, when it reopened its fire at the distance of 350 yards from the work, and covered the approach of the others. In this operation Lieutenant Day was severely wounded.” As soon as the enemy quitted the first redoubt, the guns moved forward to support the 7th Division in the attack of the second, but after a few rounds it also was abandoned. In the subsequent operations on the right, the Artillery were unable to take much part, on Cust. account of the difficulty in moving the guns. The frightful state of the roads also aided the ultimate escape of the enemy without pursuit. To use Sir Augustus Frazer’s words, the Frazer’s ‘Letters,’ p. 342. ground over which the battle of La Nivelle was fought was “so rugged, that it would be difficult to attempt a sketch of it. You must fancy rocks, and hills, and woods, and mountains, interspersed with rough heaths and rivers, and everything but plain ground.” The casualties in the Artillery were as follows:—
Lieut.-Col. Rosa’s troop— Killed: 1 man, and 1 horse. Wounded: 1 officer, 10 non-commissioned officers and men, and 4 horses. Lieut.-Col. Smith’s troop— Killed: 1 man, and 2 horses. Wounded: 6 non-commissioned officers and men, and 7 horses. Major Bull’s (Ramsay’s) troop— Killed: 1 man, and 1 horse. Wounded: 2 non-commissioned officers and men. Captain Michell’s brigade—Wounded: 3 gunners. Captain Carmichael’s brigade—Wounded: No officers or men. 1 horse. Lieutenant Robe’s brigade—Killed: 1 mule. Total—Killed: 3 men, 4 horses, 1 mule. Wounded: 1 officer, 21 non-commissioned officers and men, 12 horses.