On the night of the 11th, the battery intended to enfilade the bridge was armed, and the disabled ordnance in the breaching battery exchanged. Captain Hawker, commanding a 9-pounder field brigade of the Royal Artillery, lately arrived from Lisbon, was directed to place himself under the orders of Major Dickson, although regimentally senior to that officer, and was placed in charge of the Artillery operations against San Cristoval.
The commencement of the siege was very disheartening. On the day before the solitary battery opened fire, the Allies had met with a severe loss during a sally made by the garrison; and now, in a few hours their one battery was silenced. Beresford was also disquieted by rumours which reached him that Soult was on his way to raise the siege, and that he would certainly arrive before the city could be taken. He therefore sent for Major Dickson late on the night of the 11th, and desired him not to bring forward any more ammunition or stores from Elvas, and to be in readiness to remove at the shortest notice what had already arrived. Colonel Fletcher also was ordered not to break ground that night against the Castle. In event, however, of the operations proceeding, it was arranged that four 24-pounders should be moved from the south attacks to that of San Cristoval, and that they should be replaced by six additional guns of the same calibre from Elvas.
On the morning of the 12th intelligence reached Beresford which led him to doubt the accuracy of the reports which had reached him on the previous day, and he ordered active operations to recommence at once. Additional guns were therefore sent forward from the park at Elvas, and at night ground was broken for the batteries against the Castle. The new activity, however, was but short-lived; for positive information was received at midnight as to the enemy’s movements. On the morning of the 13th the siege was ordered to be raised, and Major Dickson directed to send the heavy ordnance, ammunition and stores back to Elvas. This duty was admirably performed. As many pieces of ordnance were at once despatched, as the means of conveyance would permit; and in the first instance it was thought sufficient to take the pieces across the flying bridge, and to park them in a situation not visible from Badajoz. On the Cristoval side the guns were removed from the battery on the night of the 13th; and at the same time the battery in the false attack against Picurina was dismantled. The 14th May was spent in carrying away the ordnance and stores in such a way as to conceal from the enemy the fact that the siege was being raised; and by noon on the 15th the whole of the besieging artillery and ammunition from the great park had been sent across the river, and the flying bridge removed, while the park of the Cristoval attack had been taken back to the vicinity of Elvas.
The investing troops on the south bank were then withdrawn; but a corps remained on the north bank to cover the removal of the heavy artillery to Elvas. Of the duty performed by Major Dickson on this occasion, under Marshal Beresford’s orders, Napier writes that “the arrangements for carrying off the stores were admirably executed; ... and that the transactions were so well masked by the 4th Division, which, in concert with the Spaniards, continued to maintain the investment, that it was only by a sally on the rear-guard, in which the Portuguese piquets of the 4th Division were very roughly treated, that the French knew the siege was raised.”
The same author visits the failure of this siege, and the heavy losses attending all the subsequent sieges carried on by the British in Spain, on the absence of any properly-equipped corps of Sappers and Miners to assist the officers of Engineers. The want of such a corps, with the necessary implements, rendered, according to Napier, the British sieges a mere succession of butcheries. But Sir Alexander Dickson was ready to accept part of the responsibility of this failure for his own department. In his diary of the first siege of Sir A. Dickson’s MSS. Badajoz he wrote: “Every praise was due to the Portuguese Artillery for the activity, zeal, and willingness they displayed in this service. Indeed, nothing could exceed their personal exertions; but, from their professional inexperience, Major Dickson has great doubts whether a satisfactory result would have been obtained without the assistance of a proportion Dated Elvas, 22 May, 1811. of better-trained Artillerymen.” At the same time, however, he distinctly stated, in a letter to General Macleod, that his wish was not to begin the fire from any one battery until the whole attack should be more advanced, and that the Cristoval attack should be supported from other points. He added that the battery against the Picurina, although well placed as an auxiliary for general attack, afforded no support to that against San Cristoval. In these points, he wrote, “my opinions coincide entirely with those of Colonel Fletcher (R.E.), with whom it is a pleasure to serve.”
Marshal Beresford was brave, but was better as an administrator in peace than as a General in war. No praise can exceed his deserts in reference to the organization and training of the Portuguese army, or his fidelity to Wellington; but his abilities as a commander in the field were feeble, and the success of his troops in the battle which followed the raising of the siege of Badajoz was won in spite of, rather than by him. Albuera was one of the fiercest battles of the Peninsula; with it the name of Beresford will always be associated; but its chronicler will always have to register with the stories of its gallantry that of his incapacity. The policy of fighting the battle at all—a question which lies with a General alone—was more than doubtful; but, even admitting that it was wise, his tactics were extremely faulty, and the errors were expiated only by the courage and losses of his men. With a General like Soult against him, the arrangement of his army on the morning of the 16th May revealed a childlike innocence, which, in a General charged with the lives of men, was criminal. Part of his army was still at Badajoz, and could not possibly reach his position in time for the battle;—part had barely succeeded in doing so on the eventful morning;—he had, on the previous day, allowed the French to occupy a wood on the other side of the Albuera River, where they could conceal their intentions;—and, with marvellous blindness, he had allowed them to secure a hill in the immediate front of his own right, behind which they organized the famous attack, which so nearly proved fatal.
On the afternoon of the 15th, Major Dickson, having completed his duties at Badajoz, proceeded to Albuera, where the army had taken up its position, and resumed the command of his two brigades of Portuguese Field Artillery. About the same hour on the morning of the 16th as that on which General Cole’s division happily succeeded in joining Beresford’s army, the enemy showed himself in force. The first appearance was the advance of seven or eight squadrons of cavalry, some light infantry, and a troop of horse artillery, from the wood towards the bridge of Albuera by the Seville road. This was a feint, but not immediately recognized as such by Marshal Beresford. They drove in the English piquets, and formed in the plain, where they opened an artillery fire towards the village of Albuera, a small place, which, with the exception of its church, was almost in ruins, and which was without inhabitants. This fire was answered by some of Major Dickson’s and of the German Artillery, which directed their practice against the cavalry. At first Major Dickson thought it was merely a reconnoissance; but it was soon seen that the real attack was intended against the right, which was composed of Blake’s Spanish troops. Beresford sent orders to Blake to throw back the right at right angles to the line; but the command was not obeyed until he went in person to enforce it, by which time the French were upon them, harassing them, as they wheeled, with a murderous fire. From the position occupied by Major Dickson near the bridge, which was opposite the centre of the line, he first saw a column of infantry advancing to the bridge by the same road as had been taken by the cavalry, on which a brigade of General Stewart’s division was at once sent to the village to support Baron Alten, who commanded there. Very soon afterwards, however, he saw another column moving through the wood in the direction of the Allied right, and as, at the same time, the column approaching the bridge first halted, and then commenced to retire, it was evident that the real French effort would be made against the right. Stewart’s British brigade, therefore, at once marched from the village to the right, followed by the rest of the division, and Cole’s division formed up in support.
By this time a heavy shower of rain had commenced, which greatly favoured the approach of the French columns against the Spaniards on the right, and during which they passed the river, and advanced upon and came round the height which the latter occupied, and on which they were then, in great confusion, wheeling into a new position. In describing the conduct of the Spanish troops at Albuera, Major Dickson, referring to this particular episode in the To D.-A.-G. dated 22 May, 1811. battle, wrote to General Macleod as follows: “The fact is, the Spaniards, once in line, could not be moved—I mean, could not manœuvre—and the Marshal was obliged to use the British, that knew how to move, or else our flank must have been completely turned.”
This quite corroborates Napier’s account of the battle. It was on the hill occupied by the Spanish that the contest was decided; it was there that the gallantry of the French Cavalry and the heroism of the English Infantry were manifested; there a murderous artillery fire of grape at close range was maintained incessantly on both sides; and it was there that the grand final episode took place which was Napier. described with poetic fervour by the great historian. “The Fusileer battalions of Cole’s division advanced in gallant line, but, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships. But, suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies; and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights.... Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as, slowly and with a horrid carnage, it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the height.... At last the mighty mass gave way, and, like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the steep. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood; and eighteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill!” Before this final charge took place, Beresford thought the battle was lost, and commenced arrangements for a retreat. He ordered the withdrawal of Alten’s Germans and Major Dickson’s guns from Albuera bridge. This was strongly asserted by Napier, although denied by one of his critics; and it is confirmed To D.-A.-G. 22 May, 1811. by a passage in one of Major Dickson’s letters. “The Marshal himself, for a moment, thought he was defeated, as I received an order to retreat, with my Artillery, towards Valverde, and Baron Alten absolutely, by order, quitted the village for a moment. All this was, however, soon countermanded and rectified.” To Colonel Hardinge was due the credit of ordering the final and successful advance.
The Artillery force at Albuera, on the side of the Allies, comprised:—