Sir A. Dickson to General Napier, dated 16 Dec. 1830, and to Lord Beresford, dated 19 March, 1831, in correction of the former.
Captain Lefebure’s Troop of Royal Horse Artillery, consisting of 4 6-pounders.
Captain Hawker’s Brigade of Royal Artillery, now No. 4 Battery, 7 Brigade, R.A., consisting of 4 9-pounders.
Captain Cleeve’s Brigade, King’s German Artillery, consisting of 5 6-pounders and 1 5½-inch howitzer.
Captain Sympher’s Brigade, King’s German Artillery, consisting of 5 6-pounders and 1 5½-inch howitzer.
Captain Braun’s Brigade, Portuguese Artillery, consisting of 6 9-pounders.
Captain Arriaga’s Brigade, Portuguese Artillery, consisting of 6 6-pounders.
Spanish Artillery, consisting of 6 6-pounders.
No explanation is given in any of the Regimental records why Captain Lefebure had only four guns; it may, however, be assumed that his troop had not yet recovered the drain on its resources which was made on its arrival in the Peninsula, when it was called upon to fill up the vacancies in the Chestnut Troop.
A detailed statement of the services of the Artillery at Albuera was forwarded by Major Dickson to General Howorth, for transmission to England, but, unfortunately, was lost. The student has, therefore, merely a private letter from Major Dickson to General Macleod to rely upon, whose details are, of course, less ample than could be wished. In it he mentioned that the cannonade on both sides was tremendous during the whole battle, and that probably on few such occasions had there been more casualties from artillery fire. Major Hartmann was in command of the British and German Artillery; Major Dickson of the Portuguese. These latter behaved admirably. Captain Lefebure’s troop also distinguished itself, one gun having been, for a short time, taken, but afterwards recovered. Captain Hawker’s brigade, from Major Dickson’s personal observation, did great execution. General Cole spoke in the highest terms of Captain Sympher’s brigade; and Captain Cleeve’s guns went through a number of vicissitudes. Being placed on the hill, where the great attack was made, the whole of them fell into the enemy’s hands, but were afterwards recovered, with the exception of one howitzer. They were admirably served until the French were actually amongst them; and then retreat was impossible, the enemy’s cavalry having swept round the hill, and taken them in rear.
Modern battles may dwarf those of the Peninsula in point of the numbers engaged; but it is questionable if the British courage displayed at Albuera, and the proportionate losses to the number engaged, have ever been surpassed.
The severe fighting lasted about four hours; and in that time nearly 7000 of the Allies, and over 8000 French, were killed or wounded. On the side of the Allies, over 4000 of the casualties were among the British troops, only 1800 of the total number engaged being untouched. Major Dickson, in describing the scene, said that every one declared they had never seen such a field; that on the hill where the great struggle had been, in the space of from 1000 to 1200 yards, there were certainly not less than 6000 lying dead or wounded. Napier’s description of the field after the battle is characteristically graphic, and leaves an indelible impression on the reader’s mind. Such was the crippled and famished state of the Allies, that, had the French attacked again on the 17th, resistance would have been impossible. Fortunately, Soult resolved to retire; and Lord Wellington, reaching Albuera on the 19th, sent Beresford to watch his movements, while he himself proceeded to reinvest Badajoz. The order issued by Marshal Beresford, after the battle, included the following paragraph:—“To Major Hartmann and Major Dickson, and to the officers and soldiers of the British, German, and Portuguese Artillery, the greatest praise is due, and the Marshal returns them his best thanks.” In To D.-A.-G. dated Elvas, 29 May, 1811. forwarding to the Ordnance a copy of this order, Major Dickson, with soldierlike generosity, added: “The Marshal’s orders are not strong enough in favour of the Fusileer Brigade, who really saved the day.” In Lord Wellington’s letter to Admiral Berkeley, dated 20th May, 1811, he said that he considered the battle of Albuera one of the most glorious and honourable to the character of the troops of any that had been fought during the war. In Marshal Beresford’s report to Lord Wellington, dated 18th May, 1811, he said: “I have every reason to speak favourably of the manner in which our Artillery was served and fought. Captain Lefebure’s troop of Horse Artillery did great execution.”
On the 19th May, 1811, Lord Wellington, Colonel Fletcher, and Major Dickson arrived at Elvas, from Albuera, to make preparations for resuming the siege of Badajoz. Colonel Framingham had joined at head-quarters, and assumed command of the Royal and other Artillery; but Lord Wellington expressed a wish that Major Dickson should continue to direct all the arrangements for the siege, and communicate directly with himself. This distinction caused no jealousy in Colonel Framingham’s mind; on the other hand, that officer spoke of Major Dickson to Lord Wellington in the highest terms, and during the siege assisted him in every way. This was the beginning of a confidence between Lord Wellington and Major Dickson, which only increased as the war went on; and it is interesting to find, even thus early, the latter officer speak of his great chief as follows: To D.-A.-G. dated Elvas, 29 May, 1811. “I have transacted business with many Generals, but never such an one as Lord Wellington, both for general knowledge, and attention to reason and suggestion.”
The story of the second unsuccessful siege of Badajoz, as of the first, may be prefaced by showing in a tabular form some of the more important Artillery statistics connected with it. These have been extracted from the voluminous diary and almost daily correspondence of Major Dickson, on which the summary, given afterwards in the form of narrative, is also based.
TABLE B.
Second Siege of Badajoz.