This was repeated in England, where the Prince of Wales had just assumed the regency, in consequence of a decided relapse into madness of King George III. The opposition thought itself returning to power; it had long sustained against the ministers of his father the policy of the heir to the throne; it now pleaded the cause of peace. The dangers to which the army of Portugal was exposed, the evils it might have to undergo, formed the subject of the debates in Parliament. The Prince Regent did not hasten to change his cabinet, but the violence of the recriminations in the ranks of the opposition affected the Marquis of Wellesley; he pressed his brother to make an effort to relieve England from the enormous weight that was crushing her. "I know it will cost me the little reputation I have been able to obtain, and the good will of the population that surrounds me," said Wellington; "but I shall not accomplish my duty towards England and this country, if I do not persevere in the prudence which can alone assure us success." Marshal Masséna had sent the eloquent and adroit General Foy to Paris, charged with representing to the Emperor the difficulties of the situation of the army, and the absolute need of a supreme effort in its favor.

The general arrived at Paris at the moment when new complications were preparing. The harshness of the proceedings of Napoleon, the violence which he had displayed towards the small independent princes whose territories he had confiscated, the yoke of iron under which he claimed to place all the commercial interests of Europe, had, little by little, effaced the remains of the youthful admiration and confidence with which his brilliant genius had inspired the Emperor Alexander. Personally wounded by the sudden abandonment of the matrimonial negotiations, the Czar experienced serious uneasiness at the insatiable ambition which threatened to invade the most distant regions. He had made some preparations for defence, of little importance in themselves, and simply manifesting his fears. Napoleon took umbrage at it; the mad passion for conquests was again roused in his mind; he already meditated a new enterprise, bolder and less justifiable than all those which he had hitherto accomplished, necessitating efforts which became every day more difficult. No resource would be neglected; no reinforcement could be detached for Portugal and Spain from the armies which were being prepared in France and Germany. The intelligent ardor of General Foy, his loyal pleadings on behalf of Marshal Masséna, did not completely succeed in enlightening Napoleon as to the situation of affairs in the peninsula; he understood enough of it, however, to order new dispositions of his troops. The corps of General Drouet, in Old Castile, and the fifth corps of the army of Andalusia, commanded by Marshal Mortier, were to proceed to the aid of Marshal Masséna. The emperor recommended the latter to occupy without delay the two shores of the Tagus—to throw a couple of bridges across, as formerly over the Danube at Essling, in order to assure his communications whilst waiting for the reinforcements, which would permit him to attack the English lines with 80,000 men, perhaps to seize them, and in any case to inflict such sufferings upon the Portuguese population and upon the English that the latter should be obliged to retire. "The policy of the English Government inclines to change," added Napoleon; "my grand and final efforts will at last bring us the general peace." He commenced at the same moment his preparations for the Russian campaign.

"Everything depends of the Tagus!" Such was the watchword sent back to Spain by General Foy, and the tenor of the correspondence between Major- General Berthier and the leaders of the armies in the Peninsula. General Drouet began the march with his army reduced to 15,000 men, which Napoleon reckoned as 30,000. In consequence of the delay of the operations, only one division of 7000 men was effectively at the disposal of the general when he took the road from Santarem. General Gardanne, sent forward in advance, had become alarmed through the report of a movement of the English, and had promptly fallen back upon Almeida, leaving to the soldiers of Massena, and to the general-in-chief himself, the wretchedness of a hope deceived. The instructions sent to General Drouet still gave evidence of the obstinate illusions of the Emperor Napoleon as regards the respective situation of the two armies in Portugal. "Repeat to General Drouet the order to go to Almeida," wrote Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, "and to collect considerable forces, in order to be of use to the Prince of Essling, and to aid in keeping open his communications. It will be necessary that he should give to General Gardanne, or any other general, a force of 6000 men, with six pieces of cannon, in order to reopen the communication, and that a corps of the same force should be placed at Almeida, to correspond with him. In short, it is important that the communications of the army of Portugal should be re-established, in order that during all the time that the English remain in the country the rear of the Prince of Essling may be securely guarded. Immediately the English have re-embarked he will make his headquarters at Ciudad Rodrigo, my intention being that only the ninth corps should be engaged in Portugal, unless the English still hold it; and even the ninth corps ought never to let itself be separated from Almeida; but it ought to manoeuvre between Almeida and Coimbra."

When General Drouet, collecting all his forces, arrived at length with 8000 or 9000 men at Thomar (January, 1811), Marshal Massena had been struggling for five months in complete isolation against a situation which became every day more critical. He had successively seized Punhete and Leyria, constantly occupied in preparing for that passage of the Tagus which Napoleon was recommending to him without fathoming the enormous difficulties of the task. The soldiers had been organized into companies of foragers, from day to day obliged to go out further from the encampments in order to be sure of some resources, exposing themselves in consequence to attacks from a population everywhere hostile. Marauders often detached themselves from their regiments, living for several weeks by veritable pillage before returning under their flags. The officers suffered still more than the soldiers, for they did not pillage. Money and rations failed them; their clothes were worn to rags; courage alone remained inexhaustible; discipline grew feeble in every rank of the military hierarchy. The lieutenants of Marshal Masséna did not experience the same confidence in him which sustained the soldiers. The bridges at length reached completion, thanks to prodigies of perseverance and cleverness; bitter discussions arose every day as to the most favorable point for the passage, when the approach of General Drouet infused joy and hope into the entire army. General Gardanne, who commanded the vanguard, announced the arrival of all the straggling divisions of the ninth corps, and the orders sent to Marshal Soult for the movement of Marshal Mortier. Money as well as reinforcements was about to rain upon the army. The instructions of the emperor were precise. The English were to be speedily dislodged from their famous lines; and, if it was necessary still to blockade them for some time, the Tagus once crossed, the troops would no longer want for resources. The plain of Alemtejo would be open to them; the fine season was approaching; all efforts would become easy. Confidence and cheerfulness spread through all the encampments.

Marshal Masséna alone remained sad and uneasy. He had read the despatches which General Drouet brought him; he had smiled bitterly at the hopes and counsels of the Emperor Napoleon; he comprehended that the reinforcements were insufficient, and that the attempt at resistance was in advance condemned to failure. General Drouet had the order to maintain communications between Santarem and Almeida; already the insurrection had closed up all the roads behind him, and new skirmishes were necessary to open a passage. Only the corps of General Gardanne was destined to remain in the encampments, and that corps did not amount to 1500 men. Masséna resolved upon keeping General Drouet near himself; not without pain did he arrive at this conclusion. Discouragement was already penetrating the army, with a true knowledge of the situation and of the notorious insufficiency of the succors. General Foy had just arrived, accompanied by a small corps of recruits or convalescents, which he had formed at Ciudad Rodrigo. Before quitting that post, he had written to Marshal Soult, continually occupied in Andalusia: "I beseech you, Monsieur le Maréchal, in the name of a sentiment sacred to all French hearts—of the sentiment which inflames us all for the interests and glory of our august master—to present at the soonest possible moment a corps of troops upon the left bank of the Tagus, opposite to the mouth of the Zezere. It is scarcely four days' journey from Badajoz to Breto, a village situated opposite Punhete. The English are not numerous on the left bank of the Tagus; they cannot dare anything in this part without compromising the safety of their formidable entrenchments before Lisbon, which are only eight leagues from the bridge of Rio Mazac. According to the decision that your Excellency may arrive at, the army of the Prince of Essling will pass the Tagus, hold in check the English on both banks of the river, will fatigue them, will prey upon them, will keep them in painful and ruinous inaction, will form between them and your sieges a barrier likely to accelerate the surrender of the towns; or, on the other hand, this army, failing to effect the passage that has become necessary, will be forced to withdraw from the Tagus and from the English in order to find sufficient to eat, and by the same movement will give the day to our eternal enemies, in a struggle in which till now the chances have been in our favor. The country between the Mondego and the Tagus being eaten up and entirely devastated, there can be no question as to the army of Portugal having to make a retrograde step of about five or six leagues. Hunger will follow it even into the provinces of the north. The consequences of such a retreat are incalculable. It appertains to you, Monsieur le Maréchal, to be at once the saviour of a great army and the powerful instrument in carrying out the ideas of our glorious sovereign. On the day when the troops under your orders shall have appeared on the banks of the Tagus, and facilitated the passage of this great river, you will be the true conqueror of Portugal."

When Marshal Soult received this eloquent and truthful summing up from General Foy, already forestalled by the formal orders of the emperor, he was personally in a grave embarrassment. Like Masséna in Portugal, he was disposing in Andalusia of forces less considerable than Napoleon estimated them in France. General Suchet, after having brilliantly accomplished his enterprise against Tortosa, which was reduced on the 2nd of January, had immediately commenced the difficult siege of Tarragona, which occupied almost all his forces. General Sebastiani with difficulty sufficed for guarding Granada; Marshal Victor was detained before Cadiz, where the Cortes had solemnly assembled on the 4th of September. The resistance was to be long, the place being manned by good troops, and constantly revictualled by the English vessels. Generals Blake and Castaños had collected their forces, and ceaselessly harassed the corps occupied by the sieges, as well as the armies which kept the country. Marshal Soult had just asked for important reinforcements from Paris, when he received the order to attempt the difficult enterprise of an expedition into Portugal. He thought he had the right to comment on the instructions sent to him, and whilst urging the obstacles which were opposed to his prompt obedience, he announced his intention of proceeding to the aid of Marshal Masséna, by reducing the hostile towns found upon the road to Portugal. The sieges accomplished, nothing more would hinder the march upon Santarem. He advanced then, with Marshal Mortier and the fifth corps, to the attack of Olivença, which did not oppose a long resistance. On the 27th of January he invested Badajoz.

The place was strong, protected by the Guadiana and by solid ramparts; it communicated by a stone bridge with Fort St. Cristoval, built upon the right bank, and defending the entrenched camp of Santa Engracia. At the moment when Marshal Soult approached Badajoz, the corps of the Marquis de la Romana, formerly occupied in Portugal in the service of the English, and recently recalled by the Spanish insurrection, took possession of these entrenchments; its indefatigable chief had just died at Lisbon. It was in presence of these hostile forces that the fifth corps commenced the work of a siege destined to detain them for several weeks. A successful attack on a little detached fort permitted the marshals to attempt the passage of the Guadiana, then much swollen by the rains, and to give battle to the Spanish army. On the 19th of February, in the morning, upon the banks of the Gevara, the corps of the insurgents were completely defeated, without having been able to succeed in establishing themselves in the entrenched camp of Santa Engracia. Marshal Soult was now in a situation to hasten the taking of Badajoz, and to push forward into Portugal before the Spanish army could be re-formed. He does not appear to have conceived this idea, and resumed with perseverance the work of the trenches. "I hope that Badajoz will have been taken in the course of January, and that the junction with the Prince of Essling will have taken place before the 20th of January," wrote the emperor, meanwhile. "If it is necessary, the Duke of Dalmatia can withdraw troops from the fourth corps. I repeat to you, everything depends upon the Tagus."

The cannon of Badajoz were heard at Santarem and at Torres Vedras, and the hearts of the two armies beat with uneasiness and hope. Upon the arrival of General Foy, in presence of the insufficiency of the disposable forces, the question lay between a retreat upon Mondego and an attempt at the passage of the Tagus. The wish of the emperor strongly expressed to Foy himself, the patriotic honor which animated all the generals, even the most dissatisfied, had made the balance incline in favor of a prolonged occupation. It was necessary, then, to attempt to cross the river; the distress which reigned in certain divisions, absolutely reduced by famine, did not permit of hesitation; the shores of the stream were reconnoitred with care. For a moment the idea was entertained of making use, as a guiding mark, of the isle of Alviela, situated in the midst of the river, as the isle of Lobau was found placed in the midst of the Danube. The materials of the bridge were collected at Punhete, but horses were wanting. General Eblé opposed an attempt, the advantages of which were to be too tardily recognized. The passage from Santarem to Abrantes offered the inconvenience of an immediate attack from the enemy in possession of that town, recently fortified by General Hill. It was resolved to wait for the arrival of Marshal Soult, or for the reinforcements which he had been ordered to send into Portugal. Masséna had never believed, and did not believe, in the promises which had been made him on this side; he consented, however, upon the advice of all, to retard for a few days a retrograde movement which became necessary, the impossibility of attempting alone the passage of the Tagus being recognized. The enemy had occupied the isle of Alviela; all the local resources were exhausted; the reserve of biscuit assured still fifteen days' provisions to the army. The weeks passed without news: the wind no longer brought the sound of the cannonade; the soldiers felt themselves abandoned at the end of the world; the anger of the generals no longer permitted them to reanimate the failing courage of an army famished and without hope. Masséna commenced the skilful preparations for his retreat upon Mondego. Under pretext of effecting a concentration of the corps necessary for the passage of the Tagus, he detached Marshal Ney towards Leyria, with a view of cutting off from the enemy the roads to the sea, in order to form afterwards a rear- guard. The wounded and the sick had been taken on before. On the 5th of March, at the end of the day, the whole French army was on the march, sad and gloomy in spite of their joy at quitting the places where they had suffered without compensation and without glory. The materials of the bridges, prepared with so much care by General Eblé, were burnt. General Junot pressed forward, in order to occupy Coimbra and the Mondego—a rallying-point indicated beforehand to all the corps.

Lord Wellington issued forth from his entrenchments on learning the movements which announced to him our retreat. His accustomed prudence kept him from precipitating the pursuit by an effort that might become dangerous; the well-known character of Marshal Ney protected the rear- guard no less than the valor of his troops. He ranged his forces in order of battle before Pombal, which obliged Wellington to recall the troops which he had detached for the succor of Badajoz. But the hurry of the retreat had resumed possession of the mind of General Drouet, ever haunted by compunctions for his disobedience to the formal orders of Napoleon. Ney was not in a position seriously to defend his positions against the English; after a brilliant skirmish, he fell back upon Redinha. His division of infantry had constantly fought under his orders in all the campaigns of the six previous years; it disputed the land, foot to foot, with the 25,000 English, who followed the French army, without letting itself, for a single moment, be troubled or pressed by the superiority of the enemy. The least offensive movement of the English columns was responded to by a charge from our troops, which soon re-established the distance between the two armies. Masséna, who was present at the manoeuvres of Marshal Ney, admired them without reserve, beseeching his clever and courageous lieutenant not to abandon the heights, in order to give the other corps the time and space necessary for the continuance of their march. A last engagement, which took place upon the banks of the Soure, in front of the position of Redinha, permitted Ney at last to cross the river, and gain the town of Condeixa.

The position was strong, and Masséna counted on the energetic resistance of his rear-guard, in order to hinder the English, and leave time for the different corps to reassemble at Coimbra. Marshal Ney on this occasion failed to realize the just hopes of his chief; after a slight skirmish, he abandoned Condeixa, and overtaking in his haste the corps that his movement had exposed, he fell back upon the main body of the army. A position at Coimbra became impossible, as Lord Wellington was following closely on our divided forces. Masséna gained the Alva by a series of clever manoeuvres, constantly thwarted by the want of discipline in his lieutenants. Marshal Ney had let himself be surprised at Foz d'Arunce by the English; General Régnier extended his camp to a distance, without care for the safety of other corps; the position of the Alva was no longer tenable. Masséna, exasperated and grieved, continued his march towards the frontier of Spain; re-entered it without glory, after having displayed, during six months, all the resources of his courage, and the energy of his will in a situation which had been imprudently imposed upon him by peremptory orders. He led back an army inured to fatigue and privations, but disorganized by an existence at once idle and irregular, directed by chiefs soured and discontented. The consequences of this state of things were not long in bursting forth; scarcely had the troops taken a few days' rest in Spain, when Marshal Masséna conceived the idea of assuming the offensive by descending upon the Tagus by Alcantara, in order to re-enter Portugal and recommence the campaign. Marshal Ney frankly refused to follow him without the communication of the formal orders of the emperor. In consideration of this act of revolt, twice repeated, Masséna took from Ney the command of the sixth corps, which was confided to General Loyson. Ney obeyed, not without some regret for his conduct; the ill-humor of all the chiefs of the corps rendered the resumption of the campaign in Portugal utterly impossible: the army was cantoned between Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca. The emperor had just confided the general command of all the provinces of the north to Marshal Bessières; the latter had promised much to Marshal Massena, who still nursed the hope of a great battle. Lord Wellington, following the French, had entered Spain.