"Still more theology," replied the emperor; "hold your tongue; you are an ignoramus. In six months I should get to know more than you. Ah! the commission votes thus! I shall not get the worst of it. I shall dissolve the Council and all will be finished. It is of small consequence what the Council wishes or doesn't wish, I shall declare myself competent, following the advice of the philosophers and lawyers. The prefects will appoint the curés, the chapters, and the bishops. If the metropolitan does not choose to institute them, I will shut up the seminaries, and religion will have no more ministers." The violence of the insult and the grandeur of the situation elevated the soul of Cardinal Fesch. "If you wish to make martyrs, commence in your own family, sire," said he. "I am ready to give my life to seal my faith. Be perfectly assured that unless the Pope shall have approved this measure, I, the metropolitan, will never institute any of my suffragans. I go even further: if one of them should bethink himself, in my default, of instituting a bishop in my province, I would excommunicate him immediately."
It was then that Napoleon recognized the advantages of the abortive attempt at Savona. "You are all noodles," said he to his ecclesiastical counsellors, "you do not understand your position. It will then be for me to extricate you from the affair; I am about to arrange everything." He dictated upon the spot the draft of a decree based upon the concessions at first accepted by the Pope. "The deputation of bishops to the holy Father has removed all difficulties," said he; "the Pope has condescended to enter into the difficulties of the Church; the sole difference is to be found in the length of the delay; the emperor wished for three months, the Pope asked for six. This difference not being of a nature to break up the arrangement already concluded, it became henceforth the duty of the Council to enact it. The deputation to the holy Father should convey to him the thanks of the prelates and the faithful."
At first the commission of the Council almost entirely fell into the trap. Could it be doubted that the authorization given by the Pope appeared to cut the question whilst reserving the rights of the holy see. The Archbishop of Bordeaux alone protested in the first place; he soon rallied to his side Broglie, Boulogne, and the Bishop of Tournay. In spite of the most ardent efforts of the bishops favorable to the court the majority of the commission ended by rejecting the decree. "You will answer for all the future evils of the Church," said the Archbishop of Tours to the Bishop of Ghent, "and I cite you before the tribunal of God." "I await you there yourself," replied Broglie.
The emperor appeared to acquiesce without anger in the decision of the commission. "What is it in the decree that most displeases the bishops?" he asked of Cardinal Fesch. "It is the demand for it to be converted into a law of the state," replied the Archbishop of Lyons. "If that hinders them, they have only to take it out," replied Napoleon; "I can just as well make it a law of the state when I please." Cardinal Fesch gave a report of his mission; he promptly broke up the sitting (July 10th). On the following morning the Council was dissolved. In the night the bishop of Ghent, Troyes, and Tournay were arrested in their beds, taken to Vincennes, and kept in secrecy. The Duc de Rovigo was opposed to the arrest of the Archbishop of Bordeaux. "We must not touch M. d'Aviau," said he; "he is a saint, and we shall have everybody against us."
The Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr had but recently given a peremptory reason against select companies. "There are not many brave men in the world," said he; "when you collect them all in the same corps, there is not enough leaven elsewhere to make the dough rise." Deprived of the most resolute of its members, the Council found itself in the hands of Napoleon like dough, soft and unresisting. The grand reasons, the elevated and powerful arguments which the captive prelates had made so important, lost all influence over the mass of their colleagues. "One is afraid of Vincennes and one has no desire to loose one's revenues," replied Cardinal Fesch to the entreaties of the persons who solicited the fathers of the Council to use their efforts in favor of the prisoners. By fear or persuasion the bishops, when personally urged and worked upon, bent one after another under the imperial will. The news from Savona were that the Pope's health was improved and that he was inclined to go back to the original concessions. The Council, dissolved on the 11th of July, quietly assembled again on the 5th August. The signature of about eighty bishops was considered certain. The public discussion was not renewed; the Archbishop of Bordeaux alone protested against sanctioning all the imperial claims by a decree, thirteen or fourteen prelates joining their mute protest to Aviau's declaration; and the votes were decided by sitting and rising. Subject to a power which they durst not discuss, the Fathers of the Council disliked to proclaim openly their personal subservience. The decree drawn up by the Emperor Napoleon came back to his hands confirmed by the approbation of the Council "Our wine was not considered good in the wood," said Cardinal Maury cynically, "you will find it better in bottles." A deputation of bishops set out for Savona.
A few months afterwards, under the pressure of the same arbitrary and sovereign will, Pius VII., now alone at Fontainebleau as he had been in his prison at Savona, had in his turn to yield in a certain measure to Napoleon's demands. As it had recently been at Savona, he was destined to see his concessions deformed and exaggerated in order to serve as a basis for a convention which he never ratified. On the day after the Council he showed no displeasure to the bishops who had come as delegates, but promised the investiture of the twenty-seven prelates who were nominated, and even gave to the deliberations of the Council a sort of sanction in a brief which he reserved to himself the right of drawing up. The form of it did not please the emperor, who sent it back to the Council of State for examination. The bishops who still remained in Paris waiting for the decisions of the holy Father were sent to their dioceses. "I don't wish to have a meeting of saints always here," said the emperor to Rovigo. In summoning the Council he had made the blunder of reckoning upon the easy docility of an assembly. "To ask men questions is to acknowledge their right to be deceived," said the Parisians on the day after the refractory bishops were arrested; "why does he summon a Council to imprison afterwards those who are not of his opinion?" The triumph obtained by Napoleon over the terrified prelates did not add to his glory, though it assisted in lessening for the moment his ecclesiastical difficulties. All the dioceses were now provided with bishops, and order was restored to the chapters. That was all the emperor then wished, his outrages upon the independence of consciences and on personal liberty weighing nothing in his balance. He was accustomed to set little value on rights which prevented the accomplishment of his designs. He had brought the bishops to submission, imposed upon the captive Pope a partial acceptance of his will, loftily vindicated the heritage of Charlemagne, and proclaimed his moral and religious supremacy: and now, leaving Pius VII. still at Savona and the refractory prelates at Vincennes, there was nothing more to keep him in Paris. The Russian campaign was already preparing.
CHAPTER XIII.
GLORY AND MADNESS—THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (1811-1812).
It is painful to love one's country and see it advancing to defeat; it is sad to see a great mind, whose good sense recently equalled his power, dragged to ruin by his own faults and dragging after him a wearied nation. In 1812, France began to judge the Emperor Napoleon: and long previously Europe had denounced him as an insatiable conqueror who laid her waste incessantly. She was about to learn once more that neither distance, nor the rigors of climate, nor threatening armies, afforded sufficient protection against the emperor's schemes. Whilst his armies were struggling hard in Spain and Portugal against the insurgent population assisted by England, and whilst still holding in Germany the pledges of his conquests, Napoleon made preparations to attack the Emperor Alexander, who was still officially honored with the name of "ally," and to whom he thus wrote on the 6th April, 1811, when his armaments were already everywhere being prepared: "Has your Majesty ever had reason to repent of the confidence which you have shown me?"
Several reasons urged Napoleon to begin hostilities against the Emperor Alexander—reasons which, though bad and insufficient, weighed in his eyes, and, under the influence of his personal passions, with a decisive weight in the balance. He wished to pursue, everywhere and by every means, his struggle against England and her influence in Europe. Alexander had refused to increase the rigors of the continental blockade. To this infraction of the spirit of the treaties uniting the emperors, Alexander had added, during the Austrian war, an attitude of indifference and reserve which inspired confidence in the Emperor Francis and his advisers. He had shown no eagerness for the family alliance which Napoleon twice offered, while, at the same time, the latter was not deceived as to the annoyance caused at St. Petersburg by the negotiations for the hand of the grand-duchess being suddenly broken off. In short, Napoleon was convinced that the Emperor Alexander was preparing for war, eager to recover his liberty, and be freed from the conditions of the treaty of Tilsit. He, at the same time, believed that the renewal of hostilities would be signalized by important advantages for whichever of the two belligerents could first enter on the campaign. His main efforts, therefore, in 1811, were to hasten his warlike preparations, while using diplomatic artifices to make his adversary sleep, and, at the same time, proving to Europe that the rupture of the treaties was on the part of Alexander, and that the Russians were the first to arm. On sending him Count Lauriston, who was appointed to replace Caulaincourt, Napoleon wrote the Czar: "The man I send you has no consummate skill in business, but he is true and upright, as are the sentiments I bear towards you. Nevertheless I daily receive from Russia news which are not pacific. Yesterday I learned from Stockholm that the Russian divisions in Finland had left to go towards the frontiers of the Grand Duchy. A few days ago I had instructions from Bucharest that five divisions had left the Moldavian and Wallachian provinces for Poland, and that only four divisions of your Majesty's troops remain on the Danube. What is now taking place is a new proof that repetition is a powerful figure of rhetoric. Your Majesty has so often been told that I have a grudge against you, that your confidence has been shaken. The Russians quit a frontier where they are necessary, to go to a point where your Majesty has only friends. Nevertheless I had to think also of my affairs, and consider my own position. The recoil of my preparations will lead your Majesty to increase yours; and what you do, re-echoing here, will make me raise new levies, and all that for mere phantoms! It is a repetition of what I did in 1807 in Prussia, and in 1809 in Austria. As for me, I shall remain your Majesty's friend even when that fatality which rules Europe will one day compel our two nations to take sword in hand. I shall regulate my conduct by your Majesty's; I shall never make the attack: my troops will advance only when your Majesty has torn up the treaty of Tilsit. I shall be the first to disarm, and restore everything to the condition in which things were a year ago, if your Majesty will go back to the same confidence."