The emperor spoke the truth, and his treatment of Russia was nothing new. It had long been a clumsy artifice of his insatiable greed for war and conquest to charge his enemies with taking the sword in hand on account of their fears or expectations, the fear and expectations being usually caused by his attitude and the projects with which he was credited. Military reasons assisted at this time in encouraging him to dissimulate and talk of peace. He had conceived the idea of occupying successively the vast territories by which he was separated from Russia, and gaining first the Oder and then the Vistula before the Russians were in motion to cross the Niemen. The first links of this combination were already begun to be forged; crowds of runaway conscripts were everywhere being dragged from the woods and rocks where they hid themselves; and, by sending columns of militia to scour the provinces, garrison the villages, and freely pillage the houses of the young deserters, there were 50,000 or 60,000 men thus compelled to give themselves up, whose hiding-places had not been discovered. The emperor sent them in troops to the islands of Elba, Corsica, Ré, Belle-Isle, and Walcheren, appointing the sea to keep his deserters. Scarcely had they acquired the most rudimentary notions of military discipline, when they were despatched in a body to Marshal Davout, who was still stationed on the Elbe, with instructions to drill and form them. They often arrived still clad in their peasant's dress, their bodies ill, and their minds revolting against the existence thus forced upon them far from their home and country. About one sixth of these wretches escaped during the march, braving all the dangers and suffering of flight across an unknown country rather than be soldiers. Recruits from all the conquered nations filled up the gaps in the regiments of the ever- increasing army. War supplies as well as soldiers were also constantly accumulating in Germany. Napoleon resolved to collect at Dantzig the resources necessary to support an army of 400,000 men for a year. The marvellous fertility of his mind was entirely occupied in facilitating and rendering certain the movements of that enormous mass of men and horses during a long campaign and across vast spaces. The transport arrangements were in charge of skilled lieutenants, who had been with him in all his battles; and General Eblé was at the head of the engineer division for bridge-construction. "With the means at our disposal, we shall eat up all obstacles," said Napoleon, confidently.
Alliances would have been difficult and few in Napoleon's case, if he had insisted on having genuine sympathy and hearty assistance; but he did not ask so much from Prussia, nor even from the Emperor Francis, whose daughter he had just married. Fear was enough for the accomplishment of his wishes, and in that he reckoned rightly. King Frederick William asked for Napoleon's alliance, because he dreaded seeing himself suddenly hemmed in by the attack against Russia. After leaving him for a long time unanswered, and at last bringing his preparations as far forward as he had beforehand determined, the emperor accepted the offers of the King of Prussia and his minister Hardenberg. In their anxiety to close the bargain, the Prussian diplomatist had gone so far as to say that their sovereign could place 100,000 men at the service of France. By skilful system of rotation in their military service, the King of Prussia had been able to exercise all his subjects who were of age to bear arms without appearing to exceed the narrow limits allowed to his army by Napoleon. Thus, under the weight of unjust restriction, were sown the seeds of that military organization which afterwards proved several times so fatal to us. In 1812, Napoleon let the King of Prussia know that he had observed the state of his military resources. By the treaty of alliance, concluded in February, 1812, the Prussian contingent in the war then preparing amounted only to 20,000 soldiers. Large supplies of provisions were to be received in part payment of the war contributions which Prussia still owed France; and on this condition the emperor guaranteed the security of the territory of his new ally—recently his mangled victim. Some hopes were also allowed him of several ulterior advantages; but Napoleon refused to restore Glogau, in spite of the entreaties of King Frederick William.
Austria would have wished to avoid the necessity of joining in the war and allying herself to Napoleon; but the situation of the daughter of the Emperor Francis upon the throne of France, and the eagerness which the Austrian court had shown for the union, prevented any refusal. In his negotiations Metternich insisted that the treaty should be kept secret: "There are only two of us in Austria who wish for a French alliance," said he; "the emperor is the first, and I am the second; but Russia must not know of our feeling towards you." Some regiments were being secretly prepared in Galicia.
In a famous conversation which Napoleon had, on 15th August, 1811, with Prince Kourakin, the Russian ambassador at Paris, he said, "Is it on Austria that you reckon? You made war upon her in 1809, and deprived her of a province during peace. Is it Sweden, from whom you took Finland? Is it Prussia, whose spoils you accepted at Tilsit after being her ally?" The same reproaches could with more justice have been applied to France—or rather, to her ruler. He was soon to understand that truth, and weigh the value of the alliances which he had imposed. On the eve of the Russian campaign he was, and seemed, more formidable than the Czar; and fear made the weak cling to his side, while they still concealed their secret hatred and long-cherished rancor.
Russia, nevertheless, was also negotiating, relying upon her rival's natural and declared enemies. The treaties were not new when they were published, on the 20th July, 1812, between the Czar and the Spanish insurgents, the 1st August with England, and on the 5th April with Sweden.
The powers hostile to France were astonished to hear of the advances made by the new Prince Royal of Sweden. From recollection of the republican enthusiasm of his youth, as well as personal antipathy, Bernadotte had never liked General Bonaparte when they were comrades and rivals for military fame. The fortune of Napoleon had dug a gulf between them. Raised to the throne by a curious freak of destiny, Bernadotte had brought to his new country no attachment for Napoleon, nor the enthusiastic recollections of France with which he was generally credited. He had asked the emperor to grant him Norway; but Napoleon did not wish to rob Denmark, and a contemptuous silence was the reply to the court of Sweden. Bernadotte pursued in another direction the same views of ambition and aggrandizement; and in allying himself to Russia he asked for Norway, urging the importance of the personal and national assistance which he could contribute to the coalition. England was not a stranger to this arrangement. Two months afterwards, disregarding his engagements with Russia, and alarmed at the huge display of Napoleon's power, the Prince Royal of Sweden proceeded to make fresh overtures to France. Norway was to remain as the price of his alliance, together with a subsidy of 20,000,000. Napoleon was extremely angry. Bernadotte had never possessed his good graces; and he, not unnaturally, felt indignant at the manoeuvres of a Frenchman who had so soon forgot his country. "The wretch!" exclaimed he; "he is true neither to his reputation, to Sweden, or his native land, but is preparing bitter remorse for himself. When Russia wants the Sound, her soldiers have only to cross the ice from Aland to Stockholm. The present opportunity of humbling Russia is unique, and he will never have such another. Never again will a man like me be seen marching against the North with 600,000 men! He is not worth thinking about; let nobody mention him again to me; I forbid sending any communication to him, formal or informal." Thus repulsed, Bernadotte remained faithful to his engagements with Russia, and was soon after to make others, which were still more disastrous to his native country.
Soon after the official publication of the treaty uniting Sweden to the enemies of France, the Emperor Alexander concluded a war which had long occupied the greater part of his forces. The hostilities so long waged between Russia and Turkey had not contributed to the glory of Alexander's generals. "Your soldiers are very brave," said Napoleon once to the Czar's ambassador, "but your generals are not worthy of them. It is impossible not to see that they have managed their movements very badly, and acted against all the rules." The fear inspired by the Emperor Napoleon had been of still greater use to the Turks than the bad generalship of the Russians, Alexander being eager to conclude the peace, in order to concentrate his forces against an enemy more formidable than the Sultan. Admiral Tchitchakoff, at the head of the army of the Danube, was empowered to finish the war or negotiate peace. The Czar renounced part of his former claims, contenting himself with Bessarabia, and proposing the Pruth as the boundary for both empires, on condition that Turkey became an active ally. The influence of the English diplomatists turned the balance, and Mahmoud, yielding to the desire for peace, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed on the 28th May, 1812.
Napoleon was afraid of this peace, and had tried to prevent it. Perpetually trying to gain time, he succeeded in throwing off the scent Nesselrode, who had been sent with instructions to put the question of peace or war simply. Lauriston was directed to dwell constantly upon the emperor's friendly feeling towards the Czar. Napoleon was at the trouble of conversing for a long time with a Russian of position who was visiting Paris. Czernicheff was sent to gather information as to the importance of our armament, and had learned much, when the emperor sent for him to come to the Elysée, to unfold his intentions with regard to Poland. He had formerly said to Prince Kourakin, "I shall give you nothing in Poland— nothing! nothing!" Now he declared his resolution never to restore to Poland its national independence. "I had no wish to engage in the convention which was proposed to me," said he, "because that engagement was not compatible with my dignity; but I am well resolved on that point. I have no other reason for arming except the notoriously unkind disposition of the Russian court towards me. She is deceived as to my intentions; she serves England, whose commerce extends to all parts of her territory. I only ask her to come closer; by ourselves we two shall crush all our enemies." Napoleon gave Czernicheff a letter for the Emperor Alexander, which made him a sort of accredited agent at the Russian court. "My brother, after the arrival of the courier sent by Count Lauriston on the 6th instant, I laid down my views of the troublesome events of the last fifteen months in a conversation with Colonel Czernicheff. It only depends on your Majesty to finish it all."
At the same time a despatch of the Duke of Bassano (Maret), who had succeeded the Duke of Cadore (Champagny) as minister of foreign affairs, informed Lauriston of the importance of the mission. "The emperor is anxious," said he, "that the troops should gradually advance upon the Vistula, rest there, settle there, strengthen their position, fortify their bridges; in short, make use of every advantage, and be certain of taking the initiative in military movements. The emperor has shown great kindness to Colonel Czernicheff, but I must tell you that officer has used his time in Paris intriguing and disseminating corruption. The emperor knew it without interfering. The preparations of his Majesty are really enormous, and the more they are known it will only be the better for him. The Emperor Alexander will, no doubt, show you the letter sent him by his Majesty; it is very simple…. The emperor has no wish for an interview, or even a negotiation which should take place out of Paris. He has no confidence in a negotiation of any sort, unless the 450,000 men whom his Majesty has put in movement, and their enormous mass of war apparatus, should have caused the cabinet of St. Petersburg to reflect seriously, and, by loyally restoring the system established at Tilsit, place Russia again in the state of inferiority in which she then was. Your single aim must be to gain time. The head of the army of Italy is already at Munich, and the general movement is being everywhere declared. Maintain on all occasions that, should war take place, it is Russia who wished for it."
It was no longer from Paris that the emperor dictated his diplomatic orders and directed the movements of his armies. Since March he had lived at St. Cloud, to avoid an opposition Which vexed him to the bottom of his heart, and which he had in vain attempted to disarm. The Parisians, long enthusiastic in favor of his glory, were showing discontent, aversion, and complaint. After the long drought of the summer of 1811, bread was dear; and the financial measures which had been tried to reduce the prices in the capital were extremely onerous for the Treasury without acting successfully upon trade. Corn was scarce, and the threat of an arbitrary tariff kept back the supply of provisions. The strain upon all the commercial relations caused by the continental blockade reacted unfavorably on the necessary resources during a dearth. The Food Council appointed by the emperor tried in vain to supply by artificial means the beneficent action of commercial freedom and confidence.