"Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognises the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.
"Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognises her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.
"The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.
"The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI., come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date."
It will be noted that there is, as regards the general responsibility under the Treaty, some watering down. One Power is bound to come to the help of the other Power only by reason of "unprovoked attack or aggressive action" on the part of another Power. The fiction of preserving the independence of Corea is abandoned.
On April 3, 1911, a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was entered into between Great Britain and Japan. The Japanese Government had revised its tariff in such a way as to prejudice seriously foreign trade. It was announced in Japan that certain nations would have the benefit of "most-favoured nation" rates under the new tariff, but that Great Britain would not have that benefit, since, being a Free Trade country, she was able to give no con*cessions in return. Then the diplomatic Treaty of 1905 was used by the British Government as an argument for securing more favoured treatment for British merchants. If the Trade Treaty of 1911 is closely studied, it will be found that the trade advantages given to Japan by Great Britain, in return for some real concessions on the part of Japan to Great Britain, are wholly illusory. It is difficult to see how they could have been otherwise, since a Free Trade country can give nothing better than Free Trade to another country. But Great Britain, a good deal out of conceit at this time with the diplomatic value of the Treaty of 1905, did not hesitate to use it as a means of securing some trade benefits. The effect on Japanese public opinion was not favourable. But the diplomatic position had so changed that that was not considered a serious circumstance in Great Britain.
Two articles of the British-Japanese Trade Treaty of 1911 should be quoted to show the mutual acceptance by the two Powers of the independent right of the British overseas Dominions to restrict or prohibit Japanese immigration:
"The subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other, and, conforming themselves to the laws of the country,
"They shall in all that relates to travel and residence be placed in all respects on the same footing as native subjects.