The Life of Jefferson Davis

by Frank H. Alfriend

The commissioners appointed by Mr. Davis, after this notification, were Vice-President Stephens, Senator Hunter, and Judge Campbell. The conference was held on a steamer lying in Hampton Roads, between the three Confederate commissioners and Messrs. Lincoln and Seward. By both sides the interview was treated as informal; there were neither notes nor secretaries, nor did the interview assume any other shape than an irregular conversation. During the four hours of desultory discussion, there was developed no basis of negotiation, no ground of possible agreement. Mr. Lincoln declared that he would consent to no truce or suspension of hostilities, except upon the single condition of the disbandment of the Confederate forces, and the submission of the revolted States to the authority of the Union. The result was simply the assertion, in a more arrogant form, of the Federal ultimatum—the unconditional submission of the South, its acquiescence in all the unconstitutional legislation of the Federal Congress respecting slavery, including emancipation, and the right to legislate upon the subject of the relations between the white and black populations of each State. Mr. Lincoln, moreover, refused to treat with the authorities of the Confederate States, or with the States separately; declared that the consequences of the establishment of the Federal authority would have to be accepted, and declined giving any guarantee whatever, except an indefinite assurance of a liberal use of the pardoning power, towards those who were assumed to have made themselves liable to the pains and penalties of the laws of the United States.

The statement of the Confederate commissioners, and all the known facts of the transaction, demonstrate, without argument, the injustice of holding Mr. Davis responsible, to any extent, for the results of the Hampton Roads conference. With one voice the South accepted the result as establishing the purpose of the Federal Government to exact “unconditional submission,” as the only condition of peace, and scorned the insolent demand of the enemy. If the South had shown itself willing to accept the terms of the Federal Government, or if Mr. Lincoln had suggested other propositions than that of unconditional submission, then only could Mr. Davis be charged with having presented obstacles to the termination of the war.

Nor is it to be assumed that the terms of his letter to Mr. Blair, referring to his desire for peace between the “two countries,” precluded negotiation upon the basis of reunion. His language was that of a proper diplomacy, which should not commit the error of yielding in advance to the demands of an enemy, then insolent in what he regarded as the assurance of certain victory. The period was opportune for magnanimity on the part of the North, but not propitious for the display of over-anxious concession by the South. Mr. Davis was at this time anxious for propositions from the Federal Government, for, while he had not despaired of the Confederacy, he was deeply impressed with the increasing obstacles to its success. His frequent declaration, at this time, was: “I am solicitous only for the good of the people, and am indifferent as to the forms by which the public interests are to be subserved.” Indeed, the Federal authorities had ample assurance that Mr. Davis would present any basis of settlement, which might be offered, to the several States of the Confederacy for their individual action. Nor did he doubt the acceptance of reconstruction, without slavery even, by several of the States—an event which would have left the Confederacy too weak for further resistance.

In view of the consistent record of Mr. Davis, during the entire period of the war, to promote the attainment of peace, it is remarkable that there should ever have been an allegation of a contrary disposition. In a letter, written in 1864, to Governor Vance, of North Carolina, he conclusively stated his course upon the subject of peace. Said Mr. Davis, in this letter:

“We have made three distinct efforts to communicate with the authorities at Washington, and have been invariably unsuccessful. Commissioners were sent before hostilities were begun, and the Washington Government refused to receive them or hear what they had to say. A second time, I sent a military officer with a communication addressed by myself to President Lincoln. The letter was received by General Scott, who did not permit the officer to see Mr. Lincoln, but promised that an answer would be sent. No answer has ever been received. The third time, a few months ago, a gentleman was sent, whose position, character, and reputation were such as to ensure his reception, if the enemy were not determined to receive no proposals whatever from the Government. Vice-President Stephens made a patriotic tender of his services in the hope of being able to promote the cause of humanity, and, although little belief was entertained of his success, I cheerfully yielded to his suggestions, that the experiment should be tried. The enemy refused to let him pass through their lines or hold any conference with them. He was stopped before he ever reached Fortress Monroe, on his way to Washington....

“If we will break up our Government, dissolve the Confederacy, disband our armies, emancipate our slaves, take an oath of allegiance, binding ourselves to obedience to him and of disloyalty to our own States, he proposes to pardon us, and not to plunder us of any thing more than the property already stolen from us, and such slaves as still remain. In order to render his proposals so insulting as to secure their rejection, he joins to them a promise to support with his army one-tenth of the people of any State who will attempt to set up a government over the other nine-tenths, thus seeking to sow discord and suspicion among the people of the several States, and to excite them to civil war in furtherance of his ends. I know well it would be impossible to get your people, if they possessed full knowledge of these facts, to consent that proposals should now be made by us to those who control the Government at Washington. Your own well-known devotion to the great cause of liberty and independence, to which we have all committed whatever we have of earthly possessions, would induce you to take the lead in repelling the bare thought of abject submission to the enemy. Yet peace on other terms is now impossible.”

The spirit in which the South received the results of the Hampton Roads conference is to be correctly estimated by the following extract from a Richmond newspaper, of date February 15, 1865:

“The world can again, for the hundredth time, see conclusive evidence in the history and sequel of the ‘Blair mission,’ the blood-guiltiness of the enemy, and their responsibility for the ruin, desolation, and suffering which have followed, and will yet follow, their heartless attempts to subjugate and destroy an innocent people. The South again wins honor from the good, the magnanimous, the truly brave every-where by her efforts to stop the effusion of blood, save the lives and the property of her own citizens, and to stop, too, the slaughter of the victims of the enemy’s cruelty, which has forced or deceived them into the ranks of his armies. We have lost nothing by our efforts in behalf of peace; for, waiving all consideration of the reanimation and reunion of our people, occasioned by Lincoln’s haughty rejection of our commissioners, we have added new claims upon the sympathy and respect of the world and posterity, which will not fail to be remembered to our honor, in the history of this struggle, even though we should finally perish in it. The position of the South at this moment is indeed one which should stamp her as the champion, not only of popular rights and self-government, which Americans have so much cherished, but as the champion of the spirit of humanity in both sections; for it can not be supposed that we have all the sorrows as well as sufferings of this war to endure, and that there are no desolate homes, no widows and orphans, no weeds nor cypress in the enemy’s country....

“One fact is certain, that whatever Seward’s design may have been, and whatever its success may be, the Confederacy has derived an immediate advantage from the visit of our commissioners to Fortress Monroe. Nothing could have so served to reanimate the courage and patriotism of our people, as his attempted imposition of humiliation upon us. Lincoln will hear no more talk of ‘peace’ and ‘negotiation’ from the Southern side, for now we are united as one man in the purpose of self-preservation and vengeance, and it may not be long before his people, now rioting in excessive exultation over successes really valueless, and easily counter-balanced by one week of prosperous fortune for the South, will tremble at the manifestation of the spirit which they have aroused.”

But the evidences of popular reanimation in the South were delusive. For a brief moment there was a spirit of fierce and almost desperate resolution. At a meeting held in the African church, in Richmond, President Davis delivered one of his most eloquent popular orations, and the enthusiasm was perhaps greater than upon any similar occasion during the war. But popular feeling soon lapsed into the sullen despondency, from which it had been temporarily aroused by the unparalleled insult of the enemy. Yet the ultimatum of Mr. Lincoln, and the declared will of the South, left President Davis no other policy than a continuation of the struggle, with a view to the best attainable results. Upon this course he was now fully resolved, looking to the future with serious apprehension, not altogether unrelieved by hope.