[375]. Knapp, p. 3299; without such a provision the old roads can cripple a new road unless it goes clear across the continent.
[376]. Morawetz, pp. 818, 824; Bacon, pp. 16, 23; Davies, p. 3470; and Report of Industrial Commission. Publicity is an excellent aid, but is insufficient alone. It must keep steady company with adequate legislation and efficient enforcement of it. What has been the effect of publicity on the Standard Oil Trust up to date?
[377]. Commissioner Prouty, p. 2912. “That would stop discriminations,” said the Commissioner. “Unless they got possession of the man,” said Senator Dolliver.
[378]. Judge Gaynor proposes that the traffic managers shall be appointed by the Government. The present writer has suggested that the public might be represented on the board of direction in consideration of the franchises, etc.
[379]. Arena, vol. 24, p. 569, Parsons.
[380]. Many of the States have strong laws, but the inharmonious, uncoordinated efforts of individual States have proved of little avail against the giant railway systems. Of the 31 States which have established railway commissions, 22 have given the commissions more or less of the rate-making power. For example, the Alabama Code, 1886, gives the Commission authority “to revise the tariffs and increase or reduce any of the rates.” The California Constitution, 1880, confers power “to establish rates;” Florida Laws, 1887, “to make and fix reasonable and just rates;” Georgia Code, 1882, “to make reasonable and just rates;” Illinois Laws, 1878, “to make for each railway a schedule of reasonable maximum rates;” Iowa, 1888, and South Carolina, 1888, the same as Illinois; Minnesota, 1887, power “to compel railways to adopt such rates and classification as the Commission declares to he equal and reasonable;” South Dakota, 1890, the same; Mississippi, 1884, “to revise tariffs;” New Hampshire, 1883, “to fix tables of maximum charges.” (See 63 N. H. 259.) Kansas: on complaint and proof of unreasonable charge Commission may fix reasonable rates, and if companies don’t comply they may be sued for damages. The Massachusetts Commission has “authority to revise the tariffs and fix the rates for the transportation of milk” (158 Mass. 1). In New York the board may notify the railways of changes in the rates, etc., it deems requisite, and the Supreme Court may in its discretion issue mandamus, etc., subject to appeal. In Nebraska the State Supreme Court has held that general language prohibiting unreasonable rates, and giving the Commission power to enforce the law, is sufficient to confer authority to fix reasonable rates in place of those found unreasonable, such authority being essential to the efficient execution of the law against excessive rates (22 Neb. 313).
In none of the States does the power to regulate rates appear to have produced results of much value. In some States, Georgia, Texas, Nebraska, Iowa, etc., the power has been at times vigorously used, but the effect has been to antagonize the railroads, which have so much power that is beyond the reach of any State Commission that they can arrange their tariffs and service so as to work against the aggressive States and disgust the people with the consequences of trying to control the rates. Senator Newlands, who is sincerely on the people’s side in the struggle for justice in transportation, voiced the common opinion when he said in the United States Senate, January 11, 1905, “As to the rate-regulating power, my judgment is, and it is the belief of almost all experienced men in this country, that the rate-regulating power exercised by the States has not, as a rule, been beneficially exercised.”
[381]. The Bill provides that “Whenever ... the Interstate Commerce Commission shall ... make any finding or ruling declaring any rate, regulation or practice whatsoever affecting the transportation of persons or property to be unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory the Commission shall have power and it shall be its duty to declare and order what shall be a just and reasonable rate, practice or regulation to be ... imposed or followed in the future in place of that found to be unreasonable” etc. It also provides that the order of the Commission shall take effect 30 days after notice, but may on appeal within 60 days be reviewed by a special transportation court having exclusive jurisdiction of all such cases. By Section 12, the case is to be reviewed on the original record, except when there is newly discovered evidence which was not known at the hearing before the Commission, or could not have been known with due diligence, and the findings of fact by the Commission are prima facie evidence of each and every fact found. The only appeal from the court of transportation is to the United States Supreme Court.
[382]. I. C. C. Rep. 1905, p. 9.
[383]. The granting of such power of inspection and publicity has been urged by the Commission upon Congress in previous reports. On page 11 of the Report for December, 1905, the Commission says: “We have also called attention to the fact that certain carriers now refuse to make the statistical returns required by the Commission. For example, railways are required, among other things, to indicate what permanent improvements have been charged to operating expenses. Without an answer to this question it is impossible to determine to what extent gross earnings have been used in improving the property and the actual cost of operation proper.... Certain important railways decline to furnish this information at all, and others furnish it in a very imperfect and unsatisfactory manner.”