[384]. I. C. C. Rep. 1905, pp. 9, 10.
[385]. This clause together with the words italicized in the next paragraph make the ruling of the Commission final so far as the merits of the case are concerned. (See Appendix [B].)
[386]. As the galley proofs of this book go back to the printer, the Hepburn Bill has passed the House by a big majority. If passed by the Senate and put in force, it promises to operate as a serious check upon the abuses connected with private cars, terminal railroads and midnight tariffs, but it does not touch at all nine-tenths of the methods of discrimination. We have seen that between 60 and 70 different methods of unjust discrimination between persons and places are in use in our railway business to-day. The fixing of a maximum rate cannot prevent either secret rate cutting or favoritism in facilities and services, or even open discrimination in the arrangement of classifications and adjustment of rates between different localities.
No doubt this law in the hands of an able and honest commission would do much good, but it cannot reach the heart of the railroad problem, which is the unjust discrimination between persons and places. No amount of maximum rate-fixing or prescribing of regulations can destroy discrimination so long as we have the pressure of great private interests driving the railroads into the practice of favoritism.
The history of railroad legislation in this country shows that the railways do not respect or obey the law when it conflicts with the fundamental financial interests and orders of the railway owners and trust magnates, whose gigantic power represents the real sovereignty and control in America to-day.
On page 3 of the House Report, 59th Congress, 1st Session, No. 591, January 27, 1906, accompanying the Hepburn Bill the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce says: “It is proper to say to those who complain of this legislation that the necessity for it is the result of the misconduct of carriers.... If the carriers had in good faith accepted existing statutes and obeyed them there would have been no necessity for increasing the powers of the Commission or the enactment of new coercive measures.”
What reason is there to believe that the railroads will accept a new statute in good faith and obey it any more than any former law? On the contrary, the probability is that if the Hepburn Bill becomes a law the main effect will be to compel railway managers and counsel to sit up nights for a time planning methods to evade and overcome the new provisions. Even if Congress gave the full power at first demanded by the President, to fix the precise rate to be charged, the general effect would probably be that railways would exert themselves to control the Commission. They have always at hand the weapon of practically interminable litigation, and it is very doubtful whether the railroad representatives in the United States Senate will permit any law to pass until it is amended so that the review in the courts shall go to the merits of the Commission’s order in each case. Powerful interests are opposed to any provision that will permit the fixing of a rate, even a maximum, to go into effect before it is connected already with the Federal courts.
[387]. See statement earlier in this discussion.
[388]. Sen. Com. 1905, p. 3485.
[389]. Dept. of Commerce, Monthly Summary, April, 1900, p. 3991.