[5] (p. 4). Cf. e.g. Allgem. Juristenzeitung, 7 Jahrg. p. 146.
[6] (p. 5). Rep. 2. 31.
[7] (p. 5). Dig. 1. 8, 9.
[8] (p. 6). Amongst the numerous adherents of this view and one of its best advocates is J. S. Mill in his Utilitarianism, chap. iii.
[9] (p. 6). Here also, along with many others, J. S. Mill may be cited. The motives of hope and fear are, according to him, the external; the motives first described, the feelings developed by habit, the internal sanction. Utilitarianism, chap. iii.
[10] (p. 7). Cf. espec. here a discussion in James Mill’s Fragment on Mackintosh, printed by J. S. Mill in the second edition of his Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind, vol. ii. p. 309 seq.; and Grote’s powerful essay published by A. Bain under the title, “Fragments on Ethical Subjects, by the late George Grote, F.R.S.,” being a selection from his posthumous papers, London, 1876; Espec. Essay 1, On the Origin and Nature of Ethical Sentiment.
[11] (p. 9). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, London, 1751.
[12] (p. 9). Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, 81 seq. Collected Works, vol. i. p. 124 seq.
[13] (p. 9). This comparison with logic should be my best defence against the charge of placing Herbart’s doctrine in a false light. Were the logical criterion to consist in judgments of taste experienced on the appearance of thought-processes in accordance with or opposition to rule, it would then, in comparison with what it actually is (the internal self-evidence of a process in accordance with rule) have to be called external. Similarly Herbart’s criterion of ethics is rightly characterized as external, however loudly Herbartians may insist that in the judgment of taste which arises spontaneously on the contemplation of certain relations of will, an inner superiority regarding these relations is recognizable.