[14] (p. 10). In his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant enunciates his Categorical Imperative in the following forms: “Act only in accordance with that maxim which you can at the same time will should become a universal law,” and “Act as if the maxim of your action were by your will to be raised to a universal law.”
In the Critique of Practical Reason it runs “Act so that the maxim of your will could on each occasion be valid as a universal legislative principle,” i.e. as Kant himself explains, in such a way that the maxim, when raised to a universal law, does not lead to contradictions and consequent self-abrogation. The consciousness of this fundamental law was, for Kant, a fact of pure reason, thereby proclaiming itself to be legislative (sic volo sic jubeo). Beneke has already observed (Grundlinien der Sittenlehre, vol. ii. p. xviii., 1841; cf. his Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, a counterpart to Kant’s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1822) that it is nothing more than a “psychologische Dichtung,” and to-day no one able to judge is any longer in doubt concerning it. It deserves to be noted that even philosophers like Mansel, who have the highest reverence for Kant, admit that the Categorical Imperative is a fiction and absolutely untenable.
The Categorical Imperative has at the same time another and not less serious defect, i.e. that even when admitted, it leads to no ethical conclusions. Kant fails, as Mill (Utilitarianism, chap. i.) rightly says “in an almost grotesque fashion” to deduce what he seeks. His favourite example of a deduction, by which he illustrates his manner of procedure not only in his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten but also in the Critique of Practical Reason is as follows: May a person, he asks, retain for himself a possession which has been entrusted to him without a receipt or other acknowledgment? He answers, No. For he thinks, were the opposite maxim to be raised to a law, nobody, under such circumstances, would entrust anything to anybody. The law would then be without possibility of application, therefore impracticable and so self-abrogated.
It may easily be seen that Kant’s argumentation is false, indeed absurd. If, in consequence of the law, certain actions ceased to be practised, the law exercises an influence; it therefore still exists and has in no way annulled itself. How ridiculous would it appear if the following question were treated after an analogous fashion: “May I yield to a person who desires to bribe me?” Yes, since, were I to think of the opposite maxim as raised to a universal law, then nobody would seek any longer to bribe another; therefore the law would be without application, therefore, impracticable, and so self-abrogated.
[15] (p. 11). Cf. J. S. Mill, System of Deductive and Inductive Logic, vol. iv. chap. iv. section vi. (towards the end); vol. vi. chap. ii. section iv. and elsewhere, e.g. in his Utilitarianism, Essays on Religion, and in his article on Comte and Positivism, part ii.
[16] (p. 11). Cf. with what has been said in the lecture the first chapter of the Nicomachian Ethics, and it will be seen that Ihering’s “fundamental thought” in his work Der Zweck im Recht, vol. i. p. vi., viz.: “that no legal formula exists which does not owe its origin to an end,” is as old as ethics itself.
[17] (p. 12). Cases may arise where the consequence of certain efforts remains in doubt, and two courses are open: one presenting the prospect of a greater good but with less probability, the other a lesser good but with a greater probability. In choosing here, account must be taken of the degree of probability. If A is three times better than B, but B has ten times as many chances of being attained as A, then practical wisdom will prefer course B. Supposing that, under like circumstances, such a procedure always takes place, then (in accordance with the law of great numbers) the better would, generally speaking, be realized, a sufficient number of cases being assumed, and so such a manner of choosing would still obviously correspond to the principle laid down in the text, i.e. “Choose the best that is attainable.” The full significance of this remark will be made still more evident in the course of the inquiry.
[18] (p. 12). This truth was familiar to Aristotle (cf. e.g. De Anima, iii. 8). The Middle Ages maintained it, but expressed it unfortunately in the proposition: nihil est in intelluctu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu. The notions “willing,” “concluding” are not gained from sensuous perception; the term “sensuous” would in that case have to be taken so generally that all distinction between “sensuous” and “super-sensuous” disappears. These notions have their origin in certain concrete impressions with psychical content (Anschauungen psychischen Inhalts). From the same source arise the notions “end,” “cause” (we observe, for example, a causal relation existing between our belief in the premises and in the conclusion), “impossibility” and “necessity” (we gain these from judgments which accept or reject not merely assertorically, but, as it is usually expressed, apodictically,) and many other notions which some modern philosophers, failing in detecting the true origin of them, have sought to regard as categories given à priori. I may mention, by the way, that I am well aware Sigwart and others influenced by him have recently questioned the peculiar nature of apodictic as opposed to assertorical judgments. But this is a psychological error which it is not the place to discuss here. Cf. note 27, p. 83 sub.
[19] (p. 12). This doctrine in germ is also found in Aristotle; cf. espec. Metaph.: Δ 15, p. 1021 a. 29. This term “intentional,” like many other terms for important notions, comes from the scholastics.