'Though this association has for its object the complete destruction of the system of protection, it does not follow that it requires or expects such a reformation to be accomplished in a day, as by the stroke of a wand. To return even from evil to good, from an artificial state of things to one more natural, calls for the exercise of much prudence and precaution. To carry out the details belongs to the supreme power—the province of the association is to propagate the principle, and to make it popular.

'As to the means which the association may employ to accomplish its ends, it will never seek for any but what are legal and constitutional.

'Finally, the association has nothing to do with party politics. It does not advocate any particular interest, class or section of the country. It embraces the cause of eternal justice, of peace, of union, of free intercourse, of brotherhood among all men—the cause of public weal, which is identical in every respect with that of the public consumer.'

Is there a word in this programme which does not show an ardent wish to confirm and strengthen, or rather perhaps to re-establish, in the minds of men the idea of property, perverted, as it is, by the system of Protection? Is it not evident that the interest of commerce is made secondary to the interest of society generally? Remark that the tariff, in itself good or evil in the financial point of view, engages little of our attention. But, as soon as it acts intentionally with a view to Protection, that is to say, as soon as it develops the principle of spoliation, and ignores, in fact, the right of property, we combat it, not as a tariff, but as a system. It is there, we say, that we must eradicate the principle from the public mind, in order to blot it from our laws.*

* As Mr. Porter says, in one of his excellent notes on M.
Bastiat's work on Popular Fallacies, 'The true history of
all progress in regard to great questions, involving change
in social policy, is here indicated by M. Bastiat. It is in
vain that we look for such change through the enlightenment
of what should be the governing bodies. In this respect, all
legislative assemblies, whether called a Chamber of Deputies
or a House of Commons, are truly representatives of the
public mind, never placing themselves in advance, nor
lagging much behind the general conviction. This is not,
indeed, a new discovery, but we are much indebted to Mr.
Cobden and the leading members of the Anti-Corn-Law League
for having placed it in a point of view so prominent that it
can no longer be mistaken. Hereafter, the course of action
is perfectly clear upon all questions that require
legislative sanction. This can only be obtained through the
enlightenment of the constituency; but when such
enlightenment has been accomplished—when those mainly
interested in bringing about the change have once formed
their opinion in its favour, the task is achieved.'

It will be asked, no doubt, why, having in view a general principle of this importance, we have confined the struggle to the merits of a particular question.

The reason of this, is simple. It is necessary to oppose association to association, to engage the interests of men, and thus draw volunteers into our ranks. We know well that the contest between the Protectionists and Free-traders cannot be prolonged without raising and finally settling all questions, moral, political, philosophical, and economical, connected with property. And since the Mimerel Club, in directing its efforts to one end, had weakened the principle of property, so we aimed at inspiring it with renewed vigour, in pursuing a course diametrically opposite.

But what matters it what I may have said or thought at other times? What matters it that I have perceived, or thought that I have perceived, a certain connexion between Protection and Communism? The essential thing is to prove that this connexion exists, and I proceed to ascertain whether this be so.

You no doubt remember the time when, with your usual ability, you drew from the lips of Monsieur Proudhon this celebrated declaration, 'Give me the right of labour, and I will abandon the right of property.' M. Proudhon does not conceal that, in his eyes, these two rights are incompatible.

If property is incompatible with the right of labour, and if the right of labour is founded upon the same principle as Protection, what conclusion can we draw, but that Protection is itself incompatible with property? In geometry, we regard as an incontestable truth, that two things equal to a third are equal to each other.