Diary in America, Series Two

by Frederick Marryat

That a representative body similar to that which attempted to overturn the constitution in Lower Canada can work well, and even usefully reform when in the hands of loyal English subjects, is acknowledged by his lordship, who says, “the course of the Parliamentary contest in Upper Canada has not been marked by that singular neglect of the great duties of a legislative body, which I have remarked in the proceedings of the Parliament of Lower Canada. The statute book of the Upper Province abounds with useful and well-constructed measures of reform, and presents an honourable contrast to that of the Lower Province.”

Indeed, unless I have misunderstood his lordship he appears to be inconsistent, for in one portion he claims the extension of the power of the representative, and in another he complains of the want of vigorous administration of the royal prerogative, for he says:—

“The defective system of administration in Lower Canada, commences at the very source of power; and the efficiency of the public service is impaired throughout by the entire want in the colony of any vigorous administration of the prerogative of the crown.”

To increase the power of the representative is to increase the power of the people, in fact to make them the source of power; and yet his lordship in this sentence acknowledges that the crown is the source of power, and that a more vigorous administration of its prerogative is required.

There are other points commented upon in his lordship’s Report, which claim earnest consideration: one is, that of the propriety of municipal institutions. Local improvements, when left in the hands of representative assemblies, are seldom judicious or impartial, and should therefore be made over either to the inhabitants or executive. The system of townships has certainly been one great cause of the prosperity of the United States, each township taxing itself for its own improvement. Although the great roads extending through the whole of the Union are in the hands of the Federal Government, and the States Government take up the improvement on an extensive scale in the States themselves, the townships, knowing exactly what they require, tax themselves for their minor advantages. The system in England is much the same, although perhaps not so well regulated as in America. Are not, however, municipal institutions valuable in another point of view? Do they not prepare the people for legislating? are they not the rudiments of legislation by which a free people learn to tax themselves? And indeed, it may also be asked, would not the petty influence and authority confided to those who are ambitious by their townsmen satisfy their ambition, and prevent them from becoming demagogues and disturbing the country?

Whatever may be the future arrangements for ruling these provinces, it appears to me that there are two great evils in the present system; one is, that the governors of the provinces have not sufficient discretionary power, and the other, that they are so often removed. The evils arising from the first cause have been pointed out in Lord Durham’s Report:—

“The complete and unavoidable ignorance in which the British public, and even the great body of its legislators, are with respect to the real interests of distant communities, so entirely different from their own, produces a general indifference, which nothing but so me great colonial crisis ever dispels; and responsibility to Parliament, or to the public opinion of Great Britain, would, except on these great and rare occasions, be positively mischievous, if it were not impossible. The repeated changes caused by political events at home having no connexion with colonial affairs, have left, to most of the various representatives of the Colonial Department in Parliament, too little time to acquire even an elementary knowledge of the condition of those numerous and heterogeneous communities for which they have had both to administer and legislate. The persons with whom the real management of these affairs has or ought to have rested, have been the permanent but utterly irresponsible members of the office. Thus the real government of the colony has been entirely dissevered from the slight nominal responsibility which exists. Apart even from this great and primary evil of the system, the presence of multifarious business thus thrown on the Colonial Office, and the repeated changes of its ostensible directors, have produced disorders in the management of public business which have occasioned serious mischief, and very great irritation. This is not my own opinion merely; for I do but repeat that of a select committee of the House of Assembly in Upper Canada, who, in a Report dated February 8, 1838, say, ‘It appears to your committee, that one of the chief causes of dissatisfaction with the administration of colonial affairs arises from the frequent changes in the office of secretary of state, to whom the Colonial department is intrusted. Since the time the late Lord Bathurst retired from that charge, in 1827, your committee believe there has not been less than eight colonial ministers, and that the policy of each successive statesman has been more or less marked by a difference from that of his predecessor. This frequency of change in itself almost necessarily entails two evils; first, an imperfect knowledge of the affairs of the colonies on the part of the chief secretary, and the consequent necessity of submitting important details to the subordinate officers of the department; and, second, the want of stability and firmness in the general policy of the Government, and which, of course, creates much uneasiness on the part of the Governors, and other officers of the colonies, as to what measures may be approved.

“‘But undoubtedly (continues the Report) by far the greatest objection to the system is the impossibility it occasions of any colonial minister, unaided by persons possessing local knowledge, becoming acquainted with the wants, wishes, feelings, and prejudices of the inhabitants of the colonies, during his temporary continuance in office, and of deciding satisfactorily upon the conflicting statements and claims that are brought before him. A firm, unflinching resolution to adhere to the principles of the constitution, and to maintain the just and necessary powers of the crown, would do much towards supplying the want of local information. But it would be performing more than can be reasonably expected from human sagacity, if any man, or set of men, should always decide in an unexceptionable manner on subjects that have their origin thousands of miles from the seat of the Imperial Government, where they reside, and of which they have no personal knowledge whatever; and therefore wrong may be often done to individuals, or a false view taken of some important political question, that in the end may throw a whole community into difficulty and dissension, not from the absence of the most anxious desire to do right, but from an imperfect knowledge of facts upon which to form an opinion.’”

This is all very true. There is nothing so difficult as to legislate for a colony from home. The very best theory is useless; it requires that you should be on the spot, and adapt your measures to the circumstances and the growing wants of the country. I may add that it is wrong for the Home Government to consider the government given to the colony as permanent. All that the mother-country can do is to give it one which, in theory, appears best adapted to secure the true freedom and happiness of the people; but leaving that form of government to be occasionally modified, so as to meet the changes which the colony may require, and to conform with its wants and its rising interests: all of which being unforeseen could not be provided for by the prescience of man. The governor, therefore, of a colony should be invested with more discretionary power.

The constant removal of the governor from the colony is also much to be deprecated. On his first arrival, he can only have formed theoretical views, which, in all probability, he will have to discard in a few months. He finds himself surrounded by people in office, interested in their own peculiar policy, and viewing things through their own medium. In all colonies you will usually find an oligarchy, cemented by mutual interest and family connection, and so bound up together as to become formidable if opposed to the Government. Into the hands of these people a governor must, to a certain degree, fall; and must remain in them until he has had time to see clearly and to judge for himself. But by the time that he has just disenthralled himself, he is removed, and another appointed in his place, and the work has to commence de novo.