[[4]] For purposes of immediate mobilisation, however, Continental reservists are superior to our own, because in the British Army they lose touch with their regiments, and in case of war will in many cases be serving with officers and comrades whom they know nothing about; whereas in Germany (for example) they come up for periods of training with the regiments to which they belong. Also, at the outset, the proportion of reservists to serving soldiers will be much greater in our case.
[[5]] This was in 1912. Their numbers appear to have increased somewhat. In July 1914 they were something over 146,000.
[[6]] Viz. four months for infantry and six for cavalry.
[[7]] Twenty-seven battalions of the Special Reserve were scheduled to go out as complete units for duty on lines of communication, etc. The report on recruiting for 1912 says that the great majority of recruits for the Special Reserve join between the ages of seventeen and nineteen. It is hardly necessary to point out the folly of putting boys of this age in a situation where they will be peculiarly liable to disease. Continental nations employ their oldest classes of reserves for these duties.
[[8]] In July 1914 about 61,000.
[[9]] I.e. in the autumn of 1912. They were, therefore, 56,000 short of Lord Haldane's estimate.
[[10]] Latterly there was a slight improvement in recruiting. In July 1914 the numbers (including permanent staff) were a little over 268,000—48,000 short of Lord Haldane's estimate.
[[11]] The fact that in certain cases we did so withdraw our garrisons in 1914-1915 without disaster does not invalidate this calculation.
[[12]] The experience of the past few months makes this criticism appear absurd—in its understatement. But of course what was contemplated in 1912-13 was not anything upon the gigantic scale of our present 'New Army'; but only (a) the Special Reserve, (b) the Territorial Army, possibly doubled in numbers during the first six months, and (c) fresh recruits for the Regular Army upon a very considerably enhanced scale. But even for these purposes which were foreseen, the provision of officers was quite inadequate; so inadequate indeed as to appear from the soldier's point of view in the light of a parliamentary farce.
[[13]] I.e. of holding the Germans at the French frontier and keeping them out of Belgium should they attempt to invade that country.