THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1911)
The British 'Expeditionary Force' [252]
Numbers as a test of adequacy [253]
Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war [254]
Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers [256]
Germany must hold Russia in check with superior numbers [256]
Germany would then endeavour to crush France [257]
Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose [257]
Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest [258]
Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany [259]
Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales [260]
Our armaments did not correspond with our policy [261]
Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system' [261]
Three periods of war—the onset, the grip, and the drag [263]
In 1870 the onset decided the issue [264]
By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased [265]
Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914) [266]
Immense value of British sea-power [266]
No naval success, however, can win a European war [267]
Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security [268]
THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914)
Changes between August 1911 and August 1914 [269]
Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within a year [270]
Inability of France to counter this effort unaided [270]
French increase could not take effect till 1916 [271]
Russian and Austrian increases [272]
No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength [273]
Balkan wars (1912-1913) [273]
Their effect on Balance of Power [274]
Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration [275]
Germany's two dates: June 1914-June 1916 [275]
A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS
Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions? [277]
The German Fleet was a challenge to British security [278]
Candour of German publicists [278]
British Government finds comfort in official assurances of Berlin [279]
Disregarded warnings [279]
First Warning [279]
(1905-1906) Morocco incident [279]
After which British naval programme was reduced [280]
Second Warning [281]
(1908-1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German naval programme [281]
Imperial Defence Conference [281]
Third Warning [282]
(1910) German sincerity under suspicion [282]
The Constitutional Conference [283]
Secret de Polichinelle [283]
Failure of British Government to trust the people [284]
Fourth Warning [285]
(1911) The Agadir incident [285]
Mr. Lloyd George's speech [285]
Consequences of various kinds [286]
Fifth Warning [287]
(1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff [287]
Menacing nature of German proposals [288]
Dangers of amateur diplomacy [289]
German love of irregular missions [290]
Sixth Warning [294]
(1913) German Army Bill and War Loan [294]
British Government ignore the danger [295]
Neglect military preparations [297]
Shrink from speaking plainly to the people [298]
Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey [298]
Enemies in his own household [299]
Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First Lord of Admiralty fomented by Germany [299]
Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet [300]
Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy [301]
Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion [302]
Danger of breaking the Liberal party [303]
Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice [303]
War not inevitable had England been prepared [304]
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE