THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE
Public opinion puzzled by military problems [309]
The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909-1914) [310]
Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game [312]
'The blood taxes' [313]
The nation realised it had not been treated with candour [313]
Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace [314]
Alone among European nations Britain had not an army commensurate to her population, policy, and resources [316]
THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY
The Regular Army [317]
Three classes of reserves [318]
The Army Reserve [318]
The Special Reserve [319]
The Territorial Army [320]
The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war [321]
These were inadequate to redress the balance against the Triple Entente [322]
In the onset period untrained and half-trained troops were of no use [322]
Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops [323]
Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles [324]
Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis [326]
Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 [326]
Size of British striking force necessary as complete were of against a coolly calculated war [327]
Reserves required behind this striking force [328]
South African War no precedent for a European war [330]
LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS
The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) [332]
Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness [332]
Attack concentrated on three passages [333]
Two of these have been proved true by events [334]
The other was misinterpreted by its critics [335]
Liberal criticism [336]
Unionist criticism [341]
Ministerial rebukes [343]
No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of these attacks [347]