February 3, 1907.
OUGHT we to interfere? In this whole discussion I have looked at the question solely from the humanitarian standpoint. I assume that Secretary Root’s first presentation of the matter was carefully prepared. He insisted that we had no grounds for interference, insofar as the Berlin conference was concerned. It is only, then, from the point of view of interest in the natives, the desire to save them from suffering and from atrocity, that we can join with England in calling a new conference of the world’s powers to consider Congo matters. Ought we to pursue such a course? We ought not, and that for several reasons.
First—We should not interfere in Congo matters from philanthropic reasons, unless we are ready to undertake the policing of the whole of Africa. If the atrocities in the Congo are sufficient to involve us in difficulty with Belgium or with Belgium’s king, the atrocities and cruelty practiced in the French Congo, throughout German Africa, in the Portuguese possessions, and even in the English colonies, must also attract our notice. If we really intervene to save the African black man from white oppression, we must do this job thoroughly and on a large scale.
Second—We should not interfere with the conditions in Congo unless we desire strained relations with France and Germany. No possible agitation will bring about a second meeting of all the powers that participated in the Berlin conference. Turkey alone, so far, has signified her willingness to act with England. The only other nation in which there seems to be the slightest trend toward participation is Italy. No Scandinavian country—Sweden, Norway, Denmark—will join in the movement. The many Scandinavians who, in one capacity or another, have labored in the Congo Free State are, on the whole, well satisfied with the conditions. Though there is a vigorous and aggressive Swedish mission in the country, it is significant that its members have never joined in the agitation. Nor is Holland, which has sent a large number of individuals into the Congo State as employés of government and concession companies, likely to favor an agitation. Austria, for various reasons, stands aloof. France has a definite understanding whereby in case of the dissolution of the Congo Free State she becomes heir to all the district. Germany, responsible for the foundation of the Congo Free State, has, on the whole, always favored its existence, and would certainly oppose interference in its affairs. In case of the partition of the Congo, Germany would be willing enough to take her share, but it is really more to her interest both at home and abroad to maintain its independence. All these European countries speak quite freely in regard to England’s design. France and Germany would seriously oppose any demonstration by England and the United States.
Third—We ought not to interfere unless we are really willing to play the undignified part of pulling England’s chestnuts from the fire. What would we, nationally, gain by the partition of the Congo? Our repeated declarations about not wishing new territory in distant regions are, of course, looked upon as twaddle by other nations. If we really mean them, we must avoid the very appearance of evil. What will the natives gain by partition? They will still have their oppressors, only they will be divided around among three instead of being exploited by one. Suppose the redistribution did take place. Suppose France, Germany, and England divided the Congo between them; suppose—as would be certain—that oppression and atrocity continued in the divided territory. Would we still continue our noble effort in behalf of the suffering black millions?
Fourth—We should not interfere, unless we wish to present a glaring example of national inconsistency. Distance lends enchantment to the view. We are solicitous about the Bantu in their home under the rule of Leopold II.; we have 12,000,000 or more of them within our own United States. The Bantu in the Congo we love. We suffer when he is whipped, shudder when he is put upon a chain-gang, shriek when he is murdered. Yet, here he may be whipped, put on the chain-gang, murdered, and if any raise an outcry he is a sentimentalist. Our negro problem is a serious and difficult one. We do not know how to treat it. But it is at our door, and we can study it and strike out some mode of treatment. But the years pass, and we do nothing. So complicated is it and so united together and interdependent its issues and its elements, that any course of action is dangerous, because we frequently cannot foresee the outcome of well-meant effort. With this example constantly before us, one would suppose that we would hesitate in meddling with the equally complicated problem, regarding conditions of which we know little or nothing, on the other side of the globe.
Fifth—We ought not to interfere, unless we come with clean hands. We have an even closer parallel to Congo conditions than our negro problem in the South. In the Philippines we found a people to be elevated; an inscrutable Providence—so we say—thrust the Philippine Islands, with their millions, upon us. A few years ago we heard much of benevolent assimilation. Benevolent assimilation is the most dreadful of all forms of cannibalism. Our Congo reformers emphasize the fact that the Congo State was founded with many philanthropic assertions and with high-sounding promises of improving and elevating the native population. The parallel is close. We took the Philippines and Filipinos for their good. So we said. Of course, we took them just as the European nations have taken Africa—for exploitation. Had there been no hope of mines, of timber, of cheap land for speculation, of railroads to be built, and other enterprises to be undertaken and financed, we should never have had such a tender interest in the advancement of the Filipinos. And how has our benevolent assimilation proceeded? Just exactly as it always proceeds everywhere in tropic lands with “lower peoples.” Torture, punitive expeditions, betrayal of confidence and friendship, depopulation—these have been the agencies through which we have attempted to elevate a race.
You will tell me that what I am about to quote is ancient history and has lost its force. It is no more ancient than the bulk of the atrocities and cruelties within the Congo. We quote a newspaper of April 12, 1902:
“From the Philippines authentic news is now at hand tending to confirm the charges of barbarity on the part of American army officers, which have hitherto been strenuously and sweepingly denied. This news comes in Associated Press dispatches reporting the court-martial trial of Major Waller, now in progress at Manila. This officer led an expedition last winter into the interior of the island of Samar. After being given up for dead, he and his party returned to camp January 28th, delirious from privation. Major Waller was next heard of in this connection in a dispatch of March 6th from Manila. He had been subjected to court-martial proceedings, on charges of having, while on this ill-fated expedition, executed natives of the island of Samar without trial. One of the specifications alleged that in one instance the accused had caused a native to be tied to a tree, and on one day to be shot in the thigh, on the next in the arm, on the third in the body, and on the fourth to be killed. Friends of Major Waller attributed his horrible action to delirium caused by privation; but Major Waller himself refused to make this defense, insisting that he had acted under superior authority.”
This sounds like an indictment of the Belgians in the Congo put forth by the Congo Reform Association. It is revolting; it is horrible; it probably is true. Personally, I believe that Major Waller must have suffered from the physical, the mental, the moral disintegration which the tropics so constantly produce in white men. It is unlikely that he was by nature a man of exceptional cruelty. He became what he was—either permanently or for a time—through the environment in which he lived. He had excuse; so have the Belgians. There is another respect in which this quotation sounds Congo-like. Major Waller insisted that he had “acted under superior authority.”